


ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY

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/ C.C.

INDIANA PUBLIC OPINION
AND THE WORLD WAR
1914 - 1917

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INDIANA
PUBLIC OPINION
and the World War

—————{ 1914-1917 }—————

By CEDRIC C. CUMMINS

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To J.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I WISH to acknowledge my debt to the people of the county-seat Indiana town in which I grew to be a Hoosier. Inevitably, they are on virtually every page of this book. To Professor R. Carlyle Buley of Indiana University I am immeasurably obligated for careful and considerate aid throughout all stages of this work.

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The final tribute belongs to the editorial staff of the Indiana Historical Bureau for meticulous and scholarly editing of this manuscript.

CEDRIC C. CUMMINS

INDIANA UNIVERSITY EXTENSION
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
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PREFACE

TODAY Indiana is that non-existent thing known as an average. Statisticians tell us that the truth is variant and that the average is rarely seen. But Indiana approximates an average of America and closely resembles the composite that the various corners of our country might present could they be brought together and intermingled. It is an average that makes a state with fewer of the very rich, with fewer of the very poor, with fewer of the foreign born, with a larger proportion of the home born than most of our other states; that makes a community born within itself, enlarging its own traditions and carrying on its own ideals; and because of the trend of its history it is singularly American in its point of view. . . .

“ . . . Indeed, so excellent an example is Indiana of the rest of us, that we all look to Indiana in order to get a glimpse of what we think, for what Indiana thinks is likely to be a fair sample of what America thinks.”¹

This is the conclusion of a trained observer made only a few months before the United States entered the first World War. Because of their location, population, and resources, the Middle Western states have generally held the balance of power among the different sections of the nation. This was true in the days of Jacksonian Democracy, the Civil War, the free-silver controversies, the tariff struggles, and to a large degree in the days of the War of 1914-18. When President Wilson began his preparedness drive in the winter

¹ Frederic L. Paxson, “A Hoosier Domesday,” in *Indiana Historical Society Publications*, 6: no. 1 (1917): 253-56.

of 1915-16, he journeyed into the Middle West to recruit strength for his measure by joining the support of those states with that of the East. A last-minute fight to keep the United States out of war was led by citizens of that section—David Starr Jordan, Robert M. La Follette, George W. Norris, William J. Stone, Henry Ford, Jane Addams, and Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr.—and was lost when it was evident that they no longer represented the dominant sentiment of their section.

In the years that immediately followed the World War, the American public was confident that its martial efforts had been noble and necessary. But in the twenties doubts began to be heard, and in the succeeding years the people appeared to get a perverse enjoyment from the self-torture of cynicism. Shocked at what they read in the "Now It Can Be Told" exposures, many persons concluded that the country had been caught in a diabolically clever web woven by British propagandists. By quoting trade statistics and a letter of Ambassador Walter H. Page, others sought to show that the United States became a belligerent in order to insure the continuance of a foreign loan-fed war prosperity. Some felt that America had gone to war to protect the loans of international bankers or to fill the coffers of munition makers. Another group believed that the explanation was to be found through a psychological study which would trace the progressive stages of President Wilson's ideas from 1914 to 1917, with perhaps some similar attention to Robert Lansing and Colonel Edward M. House. No matter which of these interpretations or combinations of interpretations the average individual accepted, he was placed in the uncomplimentary role of dupe. The only compensating thought for him was that if he had

been tricked into war then the responsibility was not his.

A second World War brought a new *Zeitgeist*, however, and a consequent re-evaluation of the cause of American action in 1917. One result of the new spirit was to place a share of the responsibility for participation in World War I on the general public. If that participation was wise the mass of citizens deserve much of the credit; if it was a mistake they must shoulder a corresponding portion of the blame. It is the function of this study to trace the changing attitudes of the "average" group, the Indiana citizens, as they traveled the road to war.

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I. WAR IN EUROPE

LOWERING depression was settling slowly over Indiana as the summer of 1914 opened, pushing even politics into a position of second importance. In the realm of foreign affairs, all eyes were turned toward Mexico, where American troops occupied Vera Cruz and Huerta's little-loved regime was tottering to its close. The Progressive Era had come to full flower and Wilson was in his second presidential year. Money was beginning to flow through the Federal Reserve banks and water into the Panama Canal.

The Indiana political circus still performed in three rings: Democratic, Republican, and Progressive (Bull Moose). The Democrats were in office and were very proud of Wilson; they hoped that the split in the Republican party would continue, asserted that if the "calamity howlers" would be quiet the depression would disappear, and were embarrassingly discomfited by the malodorous records of local municipal Tammanies at Terre Haute and Indianapolis. The Republicans leveled their guns at Theodore Roosevelt for his party treason and at the Administration for its free trade tariff, its attacks on business by means of punitive legislation, and its feeble foreign policy. Daily they stated that business conditions were bad and would continue to deteriorate until rescued by the Republican party and a high tariff. The Progressives had been the runner-up party in the last election, and their cause was still championed by such papers as the Indianapolis *Star*, Muncie *Star*, and Terre Haute *Star*, the Richmond *Palladium*, the Lafayette *Courier*, Goshen *News-Times*, La Grange *Standard*, Liberty *Herald*, Attica *Ledger*, Chicago *Tribune*, and

Louisville *Herald*. They referred to themselves as "the party of the future." Following Theodore Roosevelt's lead, they assailed the Administration for backing down before Japan, for proposing to "haul down the flag" in the Philippines, for failing to pass the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption Bill, for delaying in the Caribbean (Haiti and Santo Domingo), for proposing apology and payment to Colombia, and above all for failing to intervene in Mexico. If its press and spokesmen were representative of its membership, the party was as nationalistic as it was progressive. The point on which the two divisions of the Republicans were in closest agreement was their criticism of the Administration's weak foreign program. A cartoon popular with both factions depicted Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan teaching the American Eagle to say, "I apologize."¹

Yet all topics were not as heavy as these. The tango was the latest dance craze, and Tris Speaker and Ty Cobb vied for the title of "greatest outfielder of all time." Colored pugilist Jack Johnson had recently defeated the current white hope; Billy Sunday was engaged in a grudge fight with the devil with no holds barred; women cited the general state of affairs as a good argument for woman suffrage; and the Anti-Saloon League felt it was at last pulling with the tide. The people of that generation believed in progress and moral law—and both immutable. They were opti-

¹ Indianapolis *Star*, June 29, 1914, p. 1. The Marion *Chronicle*, July 1, 1914, p. 4, in an editorial typical of the sentiments of those who favored American intervention in Mexico, said in part: "This whole Mexican proposition has been handled in a manner to bring a blush of shame to the cheek of every patriotic American. It has caused us the sacrifice of our international prestige and brought us into the contempt of the nations of the world."

mistic and perhaps a little adolescent. To them came the news, on June 29, 1914, of the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo.

For a few days the assassinations attracted general attention throughout Indiana, but it was an interest devoted preponderantly to personalities. Detailed accounts of the private and public lives of Ferdinand, Francis Joseph, and the assassin made up most of the news. The Archduke's nature was never clearly drawn: he remained the person of vague character who is murdered in the opening scene of a mystery play. The aspect of his life which caught the attention of the public more than any other was the morganatic nature of his marriage (this difference in position of husband and wife was stressed pointedly in all funeral arrangements). The result was local commendation for the Archduke for his independence of spirit and sharp criticism for a society that held to such "medievalism."²

Princip, the assassin, was variously described as a hated anarchist ("Anarchist" Altgeld and Czolgosz, the murderer of McKinley, were still remembered), as a Serbian, or a Serbian anarchist.³ Contemporary readers must have been uncertain as to his exact status. Emperor Francis Joseph was pictured as a lonely old man weighed down by a life of sorrow somewhat but not entirely deserved. Paper after paper recounted the curse placed upon him by the Hungarian Countess Karolyi for the execution of her son and listed the tragedies that had subsequently

² Indianapolis *Star*, June 30, 1914, p. 6; Indianapolis *News*, June 29, 1914, p. 6; June 30, p. 6.

³ Lafayette *Courier*, July 2, 1914, p. 1; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, July 1, 1914, p. 4; South Bend *News-Times*, June 30, 1914, p. 6.

marked the Emperor's life—Mexico, Mayerling, Sarajevo.⁴

Thus, the early crisis came to Indiana as a succession of human interest stories. An aspect that catches the attention of the later reader is the absence of the word "war" from news columns and editorials. That generation had seen so many crises resolved short of war that it was not in the habit of finding in every unusual event the possibility or probability of a world conflict. The public had not been deeply moved one way or another and generally dismissed the affair as just another assassination of a foreign aristocrat (the papers were full of long lists of prominent Europeans murdered in the past century). The weekly newspapers had generally ignored the whole story for matters of more concern to their readers. That "Mr. and Mrs. _____ spent Sunday with Mr. and Mrs. _____ at their home near _____" was a part of the immediate pattern of living. The event at Sarajevo apparently was not. By July 4 the news had disappeared from even the larger papers. Therefore, the stringent Austrian ultimatum of July 23 came as a surprise to most Indianans, and found them mentally unprepared for the developments that soon crowded the headlines.

War followed with a rush, and as it leaped from country to country, the people watched its progress in hypnotized horror. Beyond a doubt, the first major reaction toward the European strife was one of deep shock that such things could be. Some called it Armageddon, while others used the pithy definition attributed to General Sherman. Practically all agreed

⁴ Evansville *Journal-News*, July 1, 1914, p. 8; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, July 1, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, June 29, 1914, p. 7.

that the war was "the most gigantic, most bloody, and most disastrous" development of modern times.⁵ It was judged the more terrifying because war on such a scale and among the western Christian nations was supposed to have been locked in the history books. "But now an unchristian, barbarous, brutal relic of the dark ages," made more terrible by the use of modern weapons, had been called upon to "settle questions of state on the basis of which side can pile up the dead and wounded the highest."⁶ "Death and disaster, unparalleled, unprecedented, and immeasurable" were certain to result.⁷ "The cry that rang through Egypt would soon be heard in Europe, 'There was not a house where there was not one dead.' So it was of old, so it shall be again. . . . Only a month ago, no one could in the wildest delirium have dreamed that such a crime against God and man was possible. Now men are asking themselves whether there is such a thing as civilization."⁸ It was all too terrifying to be real. "It's in the picture books. . . . It's a bad dream in the night. It couldn't happen. It is a great illusion. It is impossible."⁹

The war was real enough, however, and some explanation had to be found for the anachronistic happenings. From all parts of the state and from all classes came the simultaneous response—the institu-

⁵ New Albany *Ledger*, August 2, 1914, p. 2.

⁶ North Judson *News*, August 27, 1914, p. 4.

⁷ Evansville *Journal-News*, August 3, 1914, p. 8.

⁸ Indianapolis *News*, August 4, 1914, p. 6.

⁹ Chicago *Tribune*, August 6, 1914, p. 6. Because of their large circulation in the state, the newspapers of Chicago and Louisville were studied along with those of Indiana. However, they have been quoted only when their sentiments were typical of a significant portion of the Indiana public.

tion of monarchy with its attendant militarism and secret diplomacy was the culprit. With virtual unanimity it was asserted that the war had not been willed by the people but by their rulers in pursuance of personal policies of revenge or ambition, and that the common folk went unwillingly to battle or with an enthusiasm which they had been tricked and trained into adopting by present slogans and past schooling.¹⁰ It was felt that, whereas the souls of emperors and commoners were cast in the same mold, the reasons that made for wrangles between neighbors caused war between princes. But in the latter case, though it was a king's war, it was a peasant's fight. Therein lay the rub. It was a shame—practically every vocal Hoosier vowed—that the rulers could not be made to fight their own battles and break their own heads. "Chic" Jackson left a guide for the future researcher when he recorded the following conversation between two of his comic-strip characters.

IRA: "And who bears th' brunt of it? Tell me that! Does the King, the Czar, the Kaiser? No!"

ROGER BEAN: "Wope! Just uh minute, Ira. I know what yer gonta say and please don't say it, cause I've heard it eight times since breakfast."¹¹

¹⁰ Madison *Courier*, August 4, 1914, p. 2; Connersville *Evening News*, August 4, 1914, p. 4; Liberty *Herald*, August 6, 1914, p. 4; New Castle *Daily Times*, August 4, 1914, p. 4; Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, August 13, 1914, p. 2; South Bend *Tribune*, August 6, 1914, p. 6; Hartford City *Telegram*, August 12, 1914, p. 4; Salem *Democrat*, August 12, 1914, p. 2; Louisville *Herald*, August 3, 1914, p. 4. This was the general explanation. There were, of course, many minority-held variations.

¹¹ Indianapolis *Star*, August 16, 1914, Hoosier and City Life Section, p. 1. Historians search for the motives of Berchtold, Sazonov, Bethmann-Hollweg, and other ministers, but few contemporaries saw past the titular rulers.



Indianapolis News, August 6, 1914

This oversimplified view as to the cause of the war was in the prevailing spirit of automatic progress, for it presumed the essential goodness and perfectibility of the mass of mankind. Furthermore, to put so much guilt on monarchy was to praise democracy, and a wave of democratic testifying swept the land.¹² A rediscovery of the merits of popular government was made, and much that had come to be taken for granted was clothed with new meaning. Platitudes came to life and copybook phrases became fighting phrases.

Struck by the spirited criticism directed at the reigning monarchs, one observer wrote, "Over night our people have revived all the revolt against the throne which inspired so avidly our war of independence. Even the old phrases of revolutionary days are heard on tongues that have known them only in school books. The man in the street is voicing [pledges to democracy]. They come in to the newspapers in every mail. They compose the one clear and strong reaction from the war."¹³

The citizens of 1914 were not ones to hesitate at drawing conclusions. If autocracy meant war, and democracy peace, the way to world concord was clearly indicated. Dogmatically and repetitiously it was asserted that the subject peoples should and would realize that war was too high a price to pay for the luxury of monarchy and that they would take their respective governments into their own hands. That

¹² Connorsville *Evening News*, August 4, 1914, p. 4; New Castle *Daily Times*, August 8, 1914, p. 4; Liberty *Herald*, August 13, 1914, p. 4; Crawfordsville *Journal*, August 10, 1914, p. 4; Muncie *Evening Press*, August 4, 1914, p. 4.

¹³ Chicago *Evening Post*, August 7, 1914, p. 6.

being done, all nations might live in harmony with their neighbors, and in that new day the neurotic Kaiser, the henpecked Czar, and the presumptuous Emperor would become mere object lessons to future generations studying the irrationality and war-making tendencies of autocratic government.¹⁴ It was a doubly entrancing picture because it necessitated no contributing action on the part of the United States nor any change in its trade policies.

Allied to this resurgence of democracy was a temporary sharp reaction against militarism and jingoism at home and abroad. The European strife was widely accepted as proof that large military establishments were detrimental to peace, and former advocates of their establishment in America found themselves severely criticized.¹⁵ "Watchful waiting" and "grape-juice diplomacy" were probably more popular during this August than at any previous or later time, and the Democrats hastened to compare Wilson's patience toward Mexico with the precipitate action of various European chancellories.¹⁶

¹⁴ Madison *Courier*, August 10, 1914, p. 2; Crawfordsville *Journal*, August 10, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *Star*, August 3, 1914, p. 6; New Castle *Daily Times*, August 8, 1914, p. 4; Crown Point *Lake County Star*, September 11, 1914, p. 6; South Bend *News-Times*, August 19, 1914, p. 4; Louisville *Courier-Journal*, August 16, 1914, p. 4.

¹⁵ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 20, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *News*, August 7, 1914, p. 6; Muncie *Evening Press*, August 4, 1914, p. 4; Marion *Chronicle*, August 1, 1914, p. 4; Connersville *Evening News*, August 31, 1914, p. 4. See Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, September 3, 1914, p. 1, for a speech of Elwood Haynes. At this point, August, 1914, antipreparedness sentiment was stronger than it was ever to be again in the prewar days.

¹⁶ Vincennes *Western Sun*, August 7, 1914, p. 4; North Judson *News*, August 27, 1914, p. 4; New Albany *Ledger*, September 2, 1914, p. 4; Rochester *Sentinel*, August 5, 1914, p. 2; North Vernon *Sun*, September 10, 1914, p. 4.

To these reactions can be added still another. From the time the Austrian ultimatum was first announced the majority of the people of Indiana gave their sympathy to the Allied Powers. There were two clearly distinguishable reasons for this attitude: the nature of the governments of Austria and Germany and the belief that hasty action by those countries had caused the war. The newly accentuated affinity for democracy and antipathy against autocrats created a deep antagonism toward the Central Powers and good will for the Entente nations, Russia excepted. It would have been unnatural and a reflection on the virility of the American democratic spirit if it had been otherwise. As a Richmond editor put it, "Americans cannot help but feel that one of the great issues in the struggle is popular government. If Germany is victorious, an attempt will be made to Prussianize Europe which will deter the progress of democracy many years."¹⁷

The New Castle *Daily Times* had this interpretation of the strong American sentiment against Germany: the feeling "was not against the German people or their cause, but because the Kaiser and his royal authority were so foreign to American institutions. The fact that France is a republic and that England's ruler is wholly dependent on the House of Commons for his authority, make these governments nearer our own form. That this creates a bond of sympathy is evidenced by the fact that there is no sentiment in this country in favor of Russia and its autocratic government."¹⁸ "Dynasties dared Democracies," averred the South Bend *Tribune*. "There are some strange

¹⁷ Richmond *Palladium*, August 15, 1914, p. 4.

¹⁸ New Castle *Daily Times*, August 21, 1914, p. 4.

alliances among the forces of Democracy, but the issue is clear."¹⁹

Friends of Germany sometimes contended that the Bismarck-inspired economic and social legislation made the German workman a freer man, *de facto*, than was his American brother, who had a wider franchise but no old-age insurance. To the Middle Westerner of 1914, however, freedom meant political freedom, and monarchical socialism was but little understood or liked.

Autocracy was not the only attribute that Indiana contemporaries decried in the governments of Austria and Germany. They rejected the aggressive militarism that manifested itself in periodic saber rattling, believing it capable of war for war's sake. Prussian militarism and its leader and prototype, Kaiser Wilhelm, came in for special criticism. With his spiked helmet, army cloak, upturned mustache, sword, boots, spurs, and grim visage, the Kaiser personified the American conception of a Prussian war lord.²⁰ And worse yet, as one Methodist minister told his flock, many persons were convinced that he had "a pronounced degree of insanity."²¹ His bombastic war-like utterances and ostentatious manner of addressing God were subject to particular censure in evangelistic Indiana; there is no more striking example of the compass of German diplomatic ineptitude than the

¹⁹ South Bend *Tribune*, August 6, 1914, p. 6.

²⁰ Crawfordsville *Journal*, August 14, 1914, p. 4; Madison *Courier*, August 6, 1914, p. 6; Marion *Chronicle*, August 11, 1914, p. 4; Connersville *Evening News*, August 8, 1914, p. 4; Plymouth *Democrat*, August 6, 1914, p. 4; Louisville *Times*, August 6, 1914, p. 6.

²¹ Rev. Fred M. Stone of Central Avenue M. E. Church, Indianapolis, quoted in Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 10, 1914, p. 5.

ability of the Protestant Kaiser to alienate Protestant America by his method of calling on God. The toast "Hoch! Der Kaiser!" carried approximately the same connotation to that more sensitive generation that "Heil Hitler!" did to a later one. A derogatory poem with this toast as its title was much quoted at the time; the opening stanza will serve to indicate its nature:

"Der Kaiser of dis Faderland
Und Gott on high all dings command,
Ve two—Ach! Don't you understand?
Myself—und Gott!"²²

Aside from all matters of political ideology, an examination of the crisis events on their own merits seemed to brand Austria and Germany as initiators of the war. Surface appearances, at least, were against them, for they had issued most of the ultimatums and war declarations. The reactions on this score can best be made clear by a chronological summary of events.

Austria-Hungary, on July 28, had ended one aspect of the diplomatic crisis by a declaration of war on Serbia. The response in the Indiana papers was instantaneous and definite.

"Austria has deliberately and wilfully forced conflict upon Servia, and by doing so has brought Europe face to face with calamity."²³

²² Indianapolis *News*, August 4, 1914, p. 4; South Bend *News-Times*, August 6, 1914, p. 4. A few months later another poem appeared, written in similar pidgin German and called "The Latest Ultimatum," wherein the Kaiser gave God twenty-four hours in which to range his forces alongside those of Germany or suffer the consequences. See, for example, Rochester *Sentinel*, February 9, 1915, p. 2.

²³ Lafayette *Courier*, July 31, 1914, p. 4.

"If there is a general European war the responsibility for it must rest on Austria."²⁴

"The present dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is the result of the efforts of Austria-Hungary to increase her dominion at the expense of Serbia."²⁵

"At this distance it looks like Austria, or rather its ruler, is determined to have war at any cost."²⁶ As far as the Dual Monarchy was concerned, opinion had crystallized, and that opinion, once formed, was never changed in the years prior to the United States' involvement in the war.

In the hectic days that followed the Austrian war proclamation it was clearly recognized that the key to the spread of war lay in St. Petersburg and Berlin. Both governments were unpopular in Indiana, but the picture of Russia coming to the aid of ill-used "little brother" Serbia caught hold sufficiently to keep opinion leaning slightly toward the two latter countries.²⁷ When Germany declared war on France, on August 3, this partisanship was considerably strengthened; locally prepared headings told of "War-Mad Germany" in conflict with a France in which "Patriotic Spirit Runs High."²⁸

²⁴ Evansville *Courier*, July 28, 1914, p. 6.

²⁵ Connersville *Evening News*, July 28, 1914, p. 4.

²⁶ Rochester *Sentinel*, August 3, 1914, p. 2.

²⁷ Lafayette *Courier*, July 31, 1914, p. 4; Louisville *Evening Post*, July 31, 1914, p. 6; Indianapolis *News*, July 31, 1914, p. 6; Chicago *Daily News*, August 1, 1914, p. 8. The South Bend *News-Times*, August 3, 1914, p. 4, said "even Russia wanted peace." Labor leaders, however, preferred Germany with its strong trades unions and social legislation to antilabor Czarist Russia. See Indianapolis *Union*, August 1, 1914, pp. 2, 5.

²⁸ South Bend *Tribune*, August 3, 1914, p. 6; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 5, 1914, p. 4.

France, after all, was America's favorite among the great powers by reason of her republican traditions and her aid in the War of Independence. "All along the earlier years of my life," wrote Thomas R. Marshall in his *Recollections*, "I saw Lafayette marching side by side with George Washington. I grew to have an intense affection for the French people, and even now I shall thank nobody for trying to prove to me that they are cool, calm, calculating and deliberate in their relations with America, as in their relations with the world."²⁹

The German occupation of Luxembourg and the invasion of Belgium seemed to be but new editions of the spectacle of big Austria against little Serbia plus an open treaty violation, and the public reacted accordingly.³⁰ Because Great Britain's peace efforts had been widely publicized and applauded, and because the United States was drawn to her by ties of language, race, and culture patterns, her participation at the close of August 4 brought an added stimulus to the pro-Allied pulse (Irish and Anglophobes excepted).³¹

Although the British involvement strengthened the pro-Allied attitude, the mistake should not be made of exaggerating the change. The cumulative effect of prior events, particularly Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude toward Serbia and the German

²⁹ *Recollections of Thomas R. Marshall. A Hoosier Salad* (Indianapolis, 1925), 258.

³⁰ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 5, 1914, p. 4; South Bend *News-Times*, August 3, 1914, p. 4; Chicago *Journal*, August 5, 1914, p. 14.

³¹ Evansville *Courier*, August 8, 1914, p. 6; Goshen *News-Times*, August 11, 1914, p. 2; South Bend *News-Times*, August 5, 1914, p. 8; Chicago *Daily News*, August 5, 1914, p. 8.

crossing of the Belgian border, had already fixed the direction of American thought and was of greater immediate influence. It should be noted, also, that the effect of British censorship, propaganda efforts, and cutting of the German cable (August 5) had not as yet been materially felt. In the main, these first reactions were spontaneous individual expressions of belief made by Americans emotionally moved.

As a matter of fact, public opinion about August 4 and for the following week or ten days was more pronounced and more united against the Central Powers than it was to be again until the sinking of the "Lusitania." Individuals who were later to become much more circumspect in statement now blurted out their feelings, and even politicians were found willing to make categorical declarations. "No amount of special pleading," a typical summary ran, "can alter the judgment of mankind. Germany and Austria could have prevented this war by refusing to take the first foolish step."³² A usually restrained weekly noted approvingly that the "expression is generally heard that Germany ought to be wiped off the map."³³

Perhaps the best indication of pro-Allied sympathy is found in the manner in which Belgian victories were applauded and exaggerated. Even after the fall of Liège the papers continued to tell of daily Belgian triumphs, though the scene of each was in some mysterious way south of the last. Unwarranted importance was placed on certain events (such as the French ten-kilometer withdrawal) and the full import of others (Russian mobilization, etc.) was not grasped, but the discovery of these errors did not come in time to help

³² Indianapolis *News*, August 5, 1914, p. 6.

³³ Waterloo *Press*, August 13, 1914, p. 4.

the cause of the Central Powers. Meanwhile, the brusqueness of German diplomacy, so fatally demonstrated by the "scrap of paper" statement, was putting her case in the worst possible light.

High as this first crest of anti-German feeling rose, it did not carry with it any discernible demand for action. Despite unstinted sympathy for Belgium, there was no suggestion that America join in her protection. Nor did the general public recognize a possibility of being compelled to fight by reason of a direct challenge from one of the combatants or of being drawn in by forces beyond their control, for that age was not aware of any such forces. The vast majority never doubted but that they could will war or peace. Though they had not been neutral in thought themselves, they expected their Government to proceed "strictly and impartially"³⁴ by the rules which international law provided. "Our interests," it was said, "are only economic. There is no likelihood of our national integrity or our national honor becoming involved."³⁵

Perhaps these attitudes were in part due to two common predictions of the neighborhood strategists: (1) Germany would be defeated;³⁶ and (2) the conflict would be short. Modern warfare was expected to be so voracious that it must come to an early end for sheer lack of further credits and material on which

³⁴ Indianapolis *News*, August 5, 1914, p. 6.

³⁵ Marion *Chronicle*, August 10, 1914, p. 4. The only exceptions found to this sentiment were a few scattered speculations as to what America's duty would be should the Triple Alliance seize Canada (Indianapolis *Star*, August 2, 1914, p. 14) or Haiti (Madison *Courier*, August 3, 1914, p. 2).

³⁶ Crawfordsville *Journal*, August 10, 1914, p. 8; Paoli *Republican*, August 5, 1914, p. 8; Hammond *Lake County News*, August 20, 1914, p. 2; Louisville *Times*, August 11, 1914, p. 6.

to feed. The Salem *Democrat* said "three to four weeks,"³⁷ while the Indianapolis *Star* judged that war would probably be over by spring though it might last as long as a year.³⁸

³⁷ Salem *Democrat*, August 19, 1914, p. 2.

³⁸ Indianapolis *Star*, August 6, 1914, p. 8. Another editorial, however, predicted a long war.

II. STABILIZATION OF OPINION

AS THE war rolled deeper into Belgium and the armies half vanished into the mists of censorship, the strong anti-German feeling of the first two weeks suffered several checks. From July 24 to August 5 each event had appeared to result solely from the preceding one. But as the early crisis receded, and the occurrences of those days dropped into the background, there was a tendency to dismiss the details and say that the war was a test of strength between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente—that and nothing more.¹ Furthermore, German-Americans, Hungarians, and Irish had hastened to present pro-German and anti-English views in the foreign-language and religious press, in individual letters to editors of other papers, and in corporate resolutions.² Delegates and letters came to the editorial sanctums asking that papers shed their pro-Allied bias.³ Ministers discovered that some members of their congregations did not like those barbs that had been so earnestly cast from the pulpit at the “war-mad” Kaiser.⁴ When the politician lowered his eyes from

¹ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 15, 1914, p. 4; Richmond *Palladium*, August 14, 1914, p. 4; Goshen *Democrat*, August 28, 1914, p. 2; Chicago *Tribune*, August 17, 1914, p. 6; La Porte *Argus*, August 12, 1914, p. 8.

² Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*; Indianapolis *Spottvogel* (*Sonntagsblatt des Telegraph und Tribune*), especially August 23, 1914, p. 4, for appeal of Joseph Keller, president of Indiana German-American Alliance; Evansville *Demokrat*; Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung*; Indiana *Catholic*, August 21, 1914, p. 4; *Catholic Columbian Record*, August 14, 1914, p. 4; *Der Lutheraner*; *Lutheran Witness*, 33:133 ff. (August 11, 1914); letter of L. A. Meyer, in Vincennes *Western Sun*, August 21, 1914, p. 3; letter of Joseph P. O'Mahony in Indianapolis *Star*, August 21, 1914, p. 4.

³ Louisville *Herald*, August 14, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *News*, August 18, 1914, p. 11.

⁴ Elkhart *Truth*, August 24, 1914, p. 3.

heaven and his ear to the ground, he became disquietingly conscious of the "German vote," the "Irish vote," and the "Hungarian vote."⁵ What, after all, was a war in Europe when the election of county sheriff was but three months away?

Russia's increasing role was another factor in moderating American opinion. Napoleon's prophecy that Europe was destined to be Cossack or republican was recalled, and there was much talk of the "Slavic barbaric hordes" as being "half savage, with no appreciation of the finer things of civilization, of the results of centuries of endeavor in education, in science, and in art. . . ."⁶

The Russians were not to be the only "threat to western civilization" fighting on the side of the liberal powers, for on August 15 Japan ordered Germany out of the Far East, and a week later moved against her. The specter of the yellow peril appeared immediately at every Hoosier crossroads. "Japan's entry into the field of international complications and war through her ultimatum to Germany," said the *Richmond Palladium*, "has arrested the on-sweeping flood of public opinion in this country favorable to the Allies in their struggle with Germany. . . . What power Japan gains at the expense of Germany now will later be used against this country in the great struggle that is inevitably coming between that nation and this."⁷ Since 1905, American suspicion of Japan had been mounting until war with her

⁵ Trace, for example, the unmistakable courting of the German-American vote in the *Fort Wayne News*, *Evansville Courier*, and *Indianapolis Star* throughout this fall.

⁶ *Indianapolis Star*, August 28, 1914, p. 8.

⁷ *Richmond Palladium*, August 21, 1914, p. 4. The *Connersville Evening News*, August 19, 1914, p. 4, said: "While there are many

would have been more popular than with any other major country in the world.

Friends of the Central Powers took pains to link Japan with England and bring to a focus the ever present, latent anti-English feeling. Though enmity toward England had declined somewhat during and following the Spanish-American War, twisting the Lion's tail was still popular in other than Irish circles—and a luxury the country could yet afford. Indiana, like the rest of the section to which it belonged, was strongly nationalistic, and that nationalism had been nurtured to a large degree on anti-English sentiments. To that extent, the public's American nationalism and its antagonism toward England were but opposite sides of the same coin—two names for one emotion. The generation of 1914 had been brought up on Montgomery's and Ridpath's textbook accounts of the Revolutionary War, accounts that turned each schoolboy into a vicarious minuteman at Lexington bridge. The local lawyer, politician, or school teacher who harangued the sweating Fourth of July crowds still spoke out so roundly against British tyranny that his audience was almost ready to declare war anew against either George III or George V. The Jay treaty, War of 1812, Fifty-four-Forty controversy, Civil War unneutrality, Alabama claims, Venezuela boundary dispute, and general British condescension were either called to mind or related in patriotic histories. In short, Great Britain came the nearest

not in sympathy with Germany there would be few tears shed if the Kaiser's forces were able to give the Japs a lesson that they would not soon forget." See also Valparaiso *Daily Vidette*, August 18, 1914, p. 1; New Albany *Ledger*, August 21, 1914, p. 4; Princeton *Clarion-News*, August 24, 1914, p. 2; Winamac *Democrat-Journal*, August 21, 1914, p. 4.

to being a "natural" enemy that the United States had ever had. As a result, one looks in vain through the Indiana prewar press for editorials which lauded Great Britain *per se*. Conversely, probably every paper in the state indulged in satirical anti-British quips and broadsides of a nature never used in speaking of France or Belgium.⁸

By the end of August, 1914, choosing sides in the war had become more difficult than at the beginning of the month. The sheep and the goats had become inextricably mixed; the line-up which the average Hoosier would have most enjoyed rooting for did not exist. Some papers passed out of the pro-Allied orbit, not to return until 1917. Among them were the Richmond *Palladium*, New Albany *Ledger*, the Hearst press of Chicago (the union of England and Japan on the same side was too much for Hearst's neutrality),⁹ and to some extent the Chicago *Tribune*.¹⁰ Other papers generally softened their criticism of Germany, and many leaned over backward to be fair to her.

These two weeks of middle and late August, when opinion toward the war was so confused and hesitant, proved that the bulk of the people were not fully in

⁸ For expressions of anti-English feeling, see New Albany *Ledger*, August 21, 1914, p. 4; Princeton *Clarion-News*, August 21, 1914, p. 2; Goshen *Democrat*, August 14, 1914, p. 4; Madison *Courier*, August 15, 1914, p. 2; Evansville *Journal-News*, August 8, 1914, p. 8; Oxford *Gazette*, January 29, 1915, p. 8; Waterloo *Press*, January 21, 1915, p. 4.

⁹ Chicago *Examiner*, September 5, 1914, p. 18, and Chicago *American*, September 7, 1914, p. 10, for a personal letter from William Randolph Hearst.

¹⁰ See Chicago *Tribune*, August 18, 1914, p. 6, for a strong indictment of England and Japan. Four Chicago papers, the *Daily News*, *Journal*, *Herald*, and *Evening Post*, were pro-Allied, the first three strongly so.

harmony with either side, and that their sympathy would depend largely on the course of events. Had that state of mind continued, Indiana would have hoped for an Allied victory but would have accepted a German one. Perhaps the best proof of this statement was the general approval given to Bryan's telegram of August 15 to J. P. Morgan, condemning loans by American bankers to the belligerents as "inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality." Affinity for the Allies was not so strong but that the people could refuse to give them this aid.¹¹ After noting the new sentiment, a normally pro-Allied paper prophesied, on August 21, "that before many weeks most citizens of the United States will regard the European conflicts as a war between two of our friends and we shall be neutral as individuals as well as a nation."¹²

Even as this editor spoke, the pro-German swing of public opinion was approaching its apex. The closing days of August saw a mounting reassertion of sympathy for the Allies that leveled off a month

¹¹ Evansville *Journal-News*, August 20, 1914, p. 8; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 15, 1914, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 18, 1914, p. 11; Chicago *Daily News*, August 17, 1914, p. 8; Louisville *Times*, August 14, 1914, p. 6. The Indianapolis *News*, August 18, 1914, p. 6, and Indianapolis *Star*, August 22, 1914, p. 8, however, thought the prohibition unwarranted, and many papers failed to take notice of the issue.

It has been customary for postwar writers to interpret the policy of the Government toward loans for combatants, and public approval thereof, solely in terms of economic pressure. However, since the first prohibition came at a time when sympathy for the Allies was at its lowest ebb, and the sanctioning of such loans followed the sinking of the "Lusitania," it is possible that the change in policy was as much due to increased pro-Allied sentiment on the part of Government and public as to economic determinism.

¹² New Castle *Daily Times*, August 21, 1914, p. 4.

later somewhere between the high partisanship of the first week of the war and the low of the third week of August. The extremely fluid state of public opinion was then past, and the people settled back at their new level of feeling to watch developments throughout the fall and winter of 1914-15.

At least four factors had played a part in turning Indiana sympathies back toward the Allied cause: (1) unpopular Russia and Japan dropped into the background of the news so that attention was focused on Belgium, France, and England; (2) German apologists were ineffectual; (3) censorship and colored news accounts favored the Allies; and (4) developments in Belgium strengthened American sympathy and admiration for that country. The last three deserve elaboration.

Since the cutting of the German cables on August 5, the bulk of news had come to the United States over the English cables and was subject to censorship. Consequently, an open-minded person reading his daily paper would have tended to become pro-Allied.¹³ British efforts were the more effective be-

¹³ The author attempted to divide the war news appearing in the three Indianapolis papers during the last week of August, 1914, into five categories and measure each. Items of local origin were omitted. The results, for which no scientific accuracy is claimed, were: (1) direct appeals by German Government or by recognized German leaders, 245 inches of space; (2) direct appeals by Allied governments or by recognized leaders, 164 inches; (3) news that carried a German bias, 784 inches; (4) news that carry an Allied bias, 5,103 inches; (5) neutral news, 2,875 inches. Thus, the direct pleas by the Germans exceeded those of the Allies, and this was generally true throughout the war. The news dispatches, however, carried a preponderance of over six to one in favor of the Entente nations. For a general discussion of this topic, consult H. Schuyler Foster, Jr., "How America Became Belligerent: A Quantitative Study of War News, 1914-17," in *American Journal of Sociology*, 40: 464-75 (January, 1935).

cause they were unobtrusive. Straight-out pleas for American sympathy were singularly few, and lists of direct arguments as to why the Allied cause was the right one scarcely existed. Consequently, in many dispatches that could be analyzed as pro-English, it would be difficult to put a finger on the specific words that created the impression. This deft approach contrasted favorably with the frontal assault of the German propaganda efforts that reached America. The English supplied neutrals with biased information and left them to form their own conclusions. The Germans told them what they should believe and in loud and argumentative tones why they should believe it. The newly rich and newly powerful German Empire had some of the unpleasant characteristics generally associated with those attributes, not least of which was a blustering exterior designed to convince themselves and the rest of the world of their excellence. They tried too hard and spoke too loud and succeeded only in arousing suspicion. They had not learned the salesman's trick of selling his product by first selling himself.¹⁴

The most influential factor, however, in the revival of pro-Entente sentiment was the news that came from Belgium. Those mid-August days when sympathy had gravitated toward the Central Powers had come before accounts of German destructiveness and "atrocities" appeared. When accounts of Belgian suffering began pouring into Indiana in the last week of August the public was moved to unstinted compassion for Belgium and a corresponding criticism of Germany.

¹⁴ See Horace C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War. The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914-1917* (Norman, Okla., 1939), 32 ff., for elaboration of this theme.

In this case, as was true of all major developments during the war, it was the impact of the actual course of events presented with a skillful partisanship to a public already distrustful of Germany that was the determining factor. Atrocity stories manufactured from whole cloth had comparatively little effect on the public at this stage and were, as a matter of fact, far less numerous at this early period than is generally remembered. These fabrications were never headline material, were generally inconspicuously placed, and if one Indiana editor expressed written belief in them or presented a single "artist's conception" of any one of these stories in a newspaper in Indiana during 1914, the writer failed to find it.

The news pictures of children with amputated hands, the Belgian boy with a bayonet through his body, and similar subjects that one who had lived through that period was to recall later, are to be found in papers issued after the United States entered the war or, in a few cases, in the prewar Eastern press and in periodicals such as *Collier's* and *Life*. It is true that reports of "boys with both their hands cut off, so that it was impossible for them to carry a gun," of "firing on Red Cross nurses," of "women raped," of "civilians whose brains were batted out with rifle butts," of "dum dum bullets,"¹⁵ were scattered through the papers of the fall and winter of 1914, but apparently their

¹⁵ Anderson *Bulletin*, September 12, 1914, p. 1; Bluffton *Banner*, August 25, 1914, p. 1; Hartford City *Telegram*, October 21, 1914, p. 1; Crown Point *Lake County Star*, September 25, 1914, p. 7; Evansville *Courier*, October 3, 1914, p. 8. There is evidence that these imputed atrocities were subjects for oral discussion to a greater extent than is indicated by the written records of the time.

chief effect was to heighten the blood pressure of those who were already irretrievably pro-Allied. Certain it is that they were discounted editorially by much of the press.¹⁶ Moreover, a "good press" was accorded the statements of American correspondents behind the German lines who denied that Germany had been guilty of illegal or immoral acts. One such refutation, signed by five of America's most responsible journalists, including Irvin S. Cobb and John T. McCutcheon, was quoted throughout the whole of the state.¹⁷

There can be no doubt of the far-reaching effect of actual occurrences in Belgium and northern France. By reason of the instruments, techniques, and numbers involved, destruction was faster than

¹⁶ Princeton *Clarion-News*, August 21, 1914, p. 2. See also Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, September 12, 1914, p. 6; Muncie *Star*, September 20, 1914, p. 4; New Albany *Ledger*, December 18, 1914, p. 4; Lafayette *Courier*, August 27, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *News*, September 1, 1914, p. 6; Chicago *Journal*, August 28, 1914, p. 12. A recent researcher has noted that even citizens of belligerent states were not nearly as credulous at this time as they were to be later. "Concerning the first atrocity stories an erroneous impression persists that the public in all countries immediately believed every one. Actually, at the beginning of the war much skepticism prevailed toward reports of cruelties." James M. Read, *Atrocity Propaganda. 1914-1919* (New Haven, Conn., 1941), 28.

¹⁷ Muncie *Star*, September 7, 1914, p. 1; Evansville *Courier*, September 7, 1914, p. 2; North Judson *News*, September 24, 1914, p. 7; Lafayette *Courier*, September 7, 1914, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, September 7, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, September 7, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, September 7, 1914, p. 1. The five men were Roger Lewis (Associated Press), Irvin S. Cobb (*Saturday Evening Post* and Philadelphia *Public Ledger*), Harry Hansen (Chicago *Daily News*), James O'Donnell Bennett and John T. McCutcheon (Chicago *Tribune*). A short time later Bennett elaborated on this report, prefacing his remarks with the statement, "I never sat down to write with a more sincere belief that I could say something that ought to be known." Indianapolis *News*, September 17, 1914, p. 1.

in previous wars. It was doubtful if the world had seen so much destruction in so short a time as when German forces flooded Belgium "as the swollen waters of the Connemaugh valley swept through Johnstown."¹⁸ A land was laid waste and a people scattered in less than a month. Refugees poured along the roads in advance of the German flood, and shattered villages emerged in its wake.

In the Indiana papers appeared pictures of shell-torn buildings and of Belgian refugee families wearily plodding along crowded roads. These were the "atrocities" pictures that moved the people in 1914. If both combatants had been judged to be equally guilty, if both had suffered damage, if they had been of approximately equal size and strength, American sympathy would not have been stirred. But no part of this was true. "The Kaiser is seeing to it that war's destruction falls on enemy territory and not on Germany,"¹⁹ fumed the public in helpless anger at what they regarded as an unfair incidence of war's horrors. Germany's plea of justification on the ground of national necessity was given a hearing, but its effectiveness was somewhat undermined by the belief that the Central Powers had been chiefly responsible for the war's origin.

The stubborn fighting of her soldiers and the effective leadership of her king won additional favor for Belgium. "*Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae*" editorialized the *Kokomo Tribune*,²⁰ and the *Muncie Star* observed that "King Albert acts like a man

¹⁸ Description given by Richard Harding Davis in a news dispatch published in a number of Indiana papers, e.g., *Indianapolis News*, August 24, 1914, p. 1.

¹⁹ *Rochester Sentinel*, September 28, 1914, p. 2.

²⁰ *Kokomo Daily Tribune*, September 2, 1914, p. 4.

who could be elected President in Belgium.”²¹ When German propagandists sought to counteract growing partisanship for the Allied cause by vilifying Belgium,²² one rankled editor spoke for the majority when he countered, “Let there be no doubt about this. If there is one nation in the European conflict which has the unmeasured sympathy and admiration of the American people it is Belgium.”²³

Thus far, attempts to weigh the influence of the Belgian campaign on Indiana opinion have been confined to fictional atrocity stories and to inevitable wartime destruction. Other German actions were of more difficult classification, for they fell in the twilight zone between the legal and illegal. Among the most important was the German practice of levying tribute on captured towns and provinces to help defray the cost of occupation. Prosperous Brussels, an open city which had not offered military resistance, was taxed forty million dollars, and smaller cities accordingly. Although James G. McDonald of the Department of History of Indiana University justified the levy as a moral and humane method of as-

²¹ Muncie *Star*, September 6, 1914, p. 4.

²² Two statements released by Count Bernstorff were typical and read in part: “The name of Belgium is the worst insult that could be inflicted upon civilized man” (Indianapolis *Star*, September 3, 1914, p. 15). “This will forever remain a shameful spot in the history of Belgium” because her citizens have been guilty of “the gouging out of eyes of the wounded soldiers; the cutting out of tongues; cutting off of limbs; murdering of the wounded; treacherous assaults by peasants; attacks by priests.” Indianapolis *News*, September 14, 1914, p. 9. See copies of Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune* and *Spottvogel*; Evansville *Demokrat*; Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung* for September and October, 1914.

²³ Chicago *Tribune*, August 26, 1914, p. 6. Such a statement by this paper was of special significance because it was generally sensitive to German appeals.

sessment on a conquered enemy,²⁴ the general public felt that Belgium did not deserve to be treated as a conquered enemy. Regarding her as an innocent bystander, who would not have been in the war if her lands had not constituted the easiest road to Paris, they believed that if military necessity compelled Germany to take this road, it behooved her to see that the bystander suffered as little as possible. Heavy assessments constituted "a rather high price to pay for the blessings conferred upon Belgium by the Kaiser's troops."²⁵ Also, it should be remembered that the Germans were seeking to collect these levies at the very time when the neutral world was being called upon to sustain life in Belgium by a gratuitous relief program.

Other actions which the Hoosier looked upon as unwarranted were the bombing and shelling of cities in Belgium, France, and England. The use of the Zeppelin for this purpose was especially obnoxious, and the vision of one of those long, lean monsters of the air appearing suddenly over a sleeping city like "a hyena in the night"²⁶ became the epitome of sinister frightfulness. In all probability, the Ger-

²⁴ Indianapolis *News*, August 29, 1914, p. 11; James G. McDonald, *German "Atrocities" and International Law* (Chicago, 1914). This was a pamphlet published "Under the Auspices of the Germanistic Society of Chicago" and constituted a defense of German activities in Belgium. Other titles in the series included Ferdinand Schevill, *Germany and the Peace of Europe* (1914) and John W. Burgess, *The Causes of the European Conflict* (1914).

²⁵ Muncie *Evening Press*, August 25, 1914, p. 4. See also Plymouth *Democrat*, January 21, 1915, p. 4; Evansville *Journal-News*, August 25, 1914, p. 8; La Porte *Argus*, January 2, 1915, p. 1; New Castle *Daily Times*, August 22, 1914, p. 4. Atrocity or not, these levies provided a moral and legal precedent for the assessment of reparations upon Germany at the end of the war.

²⁶ South Bend *News-Times*, August 27, 1914, p. 10.

mans sought to confine their attacks to legitimate military objectives, but because of the nature of this weapon, noncombatants often suffered more than the target. "It is bad enough that men must face bullets and cold steel and that fortified cities must be shelled to reduce the fortifications, but it is unspeakably shocking that women and children, wounded and non-combatants in the heart of a city should be subjected to indiscriminate bombardment from the sky," ran a typical editorial of late August.²⁷ The subsequent dropping of scattered bombs on Paris (August 31 and following),²⁸ the attacks on English seacoast towns by German naval and air units throughout the fall and winter,²⁹ and the shelling of Rheims Cathedral on September 18³⁰ were viewed with similar emotion.

Still another German practice that was generally regarded as reprehensible was the severe handling of the Belgian civilian population because some of its members took part in the fighting. The Germans, in a desperate hurry to conquer and pacify Belgium and angered at what they considered to be nefarious attacks, struck out savagely against all civilian war

²⁷ Chicago *Daily News*, August 27, 1914, p. 8. See also Indianapolis *Daily Times*, September 2, 1914, p. 1; Lafayette *Courier*, August 27, 1914, p. 4; North Judson *News*, October 29, 1914, p. 7; Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, September 2, 1914, p. 4.

²⁸ Indianapolis *News*, September 1, 1914, p. 6; Plymouth *Republican*, October 1, 1914, p. 6.

²⁹ Anderson *Bulletin*, December 17, 1914, p. 1; Gary *Post-Tribune*, January 20, 1915, p. 1; Frankfort *Crescent-News*, January 16, 1915, p. 4.

³⁰ Rochester *Sentinel*, September 21, 1914, p. 1, noted, "It is the second time in all history that Rheims has been destroyed. The first time the destroyer was Attila." The Muncie *Star*, November 19, 1914, p. 4, asserted that "Rheims Cathedral belonged to no one nation but to the world."

activity. Visé, Termonde, Malines, Sempst, Aerschot, Louvain, and other municipalities were in part destroyed, and some of their leading officials and citizens were executed as hostages because civilians fired on German troops. The university city of Louvain was treated with an especial roughness—as an example to the rest of Belgium—that left parts of the city in charred ruins and many of its inhabitants dead or homeless.

The Indiana public violently disapproved of these “sample” burnings and killings. One contemporary mirrored the common attitude when he stated, “Even if the non-combatants, driven to desperation, had fired on the enemy, the most drastic punishment permissible under the rules of civilized warfare would be the execution of the individual offenders, and the Germans destroy the whole city. . . . The Kaiser has explained with pious eloquence, that Germany went to war to protect the world from the Slavs and preserve German culture and ideals. If Germany’s recent behavior represents German civilization—which God forbid!—the world will have no more fear of the Slavs.”³¹

Aside from the question as to whether German retaliatory action had been too severe, there was a difference in national psychology between Germany and the United States in regard to the civilian-soldier. In the eyes of the military-bred German, he was a despicable military outlaw who was acting con-

³¹ Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, September 2, 1914, p. 4. Probably of more significance than the editorials were the headings over news columns proclaiming “Burned Villages and Dead Bodies Tell of Slaughter,” “Burn Louvain and Massacre Inhabitants,” etc., that daily met the reader’s eye. As a matter of fact, the headlines were generally more pro-Allied throughout the war than were the editorials.

trary to the rules of the game, whereas in the non-military United States, the citizen-soldier was looked upon with honor and respect. Part of the success of the American War of Independence had been due to just such nonprofessional soldiers as those whom the Germans were executing. For these reasons, American civilians regarded the fighting Belgian civilians as heroes who had taken up arms in defense of their country.

An anti-German influence of a somewhat different nature that grew out of the Belgian campaign was the two-month relief program that was launched about the middle of October. The managers of the drive understood that the depth to which a donor would reach into his pocket depended to a large degree on the depth of his emotions. Consequently, the appeal for funds was pitched to highlight Belgium's plight and to personalize the sufferers. Some of the local philanthropists were of the opinion that they were "doing work which the conquerors of the country should do."³² For these reasons, each dollar or sack of flour donated and each comforter or pair of socks knit was likely to bind the giver to Belgium and her allies. The partisan effect of donating toys to help fill a Christmas ship for Belgian children must have been tremendous.

In each locality the relief campaign took on the nature of a community enterprise. The newspapers publicized the drive, editorialized on the need to "go the last mile," and published daily lists of contrib-

³² Indianapolis *Star*, November 8, 1914, p. 6. Will Irwin in an appeal for Belgian aid in the La Porte *Argus*, January 2, 1915, p. 1, wrote: "Industry stopped when the Germans came; the money gave out through the payment of fines and indemnities; the crops were mainly ruined."

utors. Committees of key citizens were appointed. Relief boxes were placed in all stores. Sunday-school classes bought barrels of flour and theaters donated a part of one night's receipts. Business and professional men were repetitiously solicited, school children gave pennies, and women's clubs met to sew and knit and make extended remarks concerning the German-American and Irish women who were not supporting the drive. Contributions consisted of such nonperishables as toys, clothing of all kinds, flour, peas, and beans. Cash contributions were transformed into these goods by way of the local merchants. The commodity that was most stressed was flour, and the work of the "Star League" (Indianapolis *Star*, Terre Haute *Star*, and Muncie *Star*) owned by John C. Shaffer, was especially noteworthy on that score, accumulating approximately 2,250 barrels in Indianapolis, 1,000 in Terre Haute, and 500 in Muncie.³³ Local pride was fanned. Large banners on one railroad car rolling toward the coast proclaimed that the inclosed relief goods were from Kokomo, Indiana,³⁴ and the woolen comforters within bore individual ribbons with the legend "From Kokomo, Indiana, U.S.A."³⁵ Society was given a boost and a purpose,³⁶ and because the Hoosier was an insuppressible "joiner," giving for Belgium became a fad as well as an act of charity.

Contributions for Belgium continued throughout the years of American neutrality, but the initial dynamic and emotional phase was definitely ended by the

³³ Indianapolis *Star*, December 3, 1914, p. 6; Terre Haute *Star*, December 1, 1914, p. 1; Muncie *Star*, December 2, 1914, p. 1.

³⁴ Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, December 1, 1914, p. 5.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, November 20, 1914, p. 1.

³⁶ Indianapolis *Star*, December 5, 1914, p. 13.

middle of December, 1914.³⁷ By that time, early donations had been dispatched, and the local press was reminding its readers that "charity begins at home." But Belgium was not forgotten, and in subsequent months the Indiana public tended to cite her experiences as proof of probable genuineness of the latest reported German illegality. It was indubitably true that the dispatches had been biased, the damage to Belgium exaggerated, and photographs carefully selected. But there was a core of truth in the story of Belgian suffering and ill-usage, and without that kernel the whole picture would have collapsed. Hoosier citizens of 1914 were a sensitive people, for they had not seen these things before. The strategy that the German General Staff had felt offered the best chance of winning the war put German diplomacy at an initial disadvantage from which it would never entirely recover.

It has been pointed out that one source of the critical attitude toward Germany in the first week of the war was the public belief in her military-mindedness. During the succeeding fall and winter that opinion grew stronger instead of weaker. German activity in Belgium was partly responsible, but, in addi-

³⁷ The Indiana Committee of the Commission for Relief in Belgium was not officially organized until April, 1915. In February, 1916, its Indiana office was closed and its responsibilities transferred to district headquarters at Detroit. Officers had consisted of Charles W. Fairbanks, honorary chairman; Henry Lane Wilson, chairman; Paul Grosjean and Booth Tarkington, vice-chairmen; W. E. Burton, secretary; and S. A. Fletcher, treasurer. The final account of contributions in cash and in kind from Indiana to the national commission amounted to \$84,202.51. See George I. Gay, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Documents* (2 vols. Stanford University, 1929), 2:301; *The Commission for Relief in Belgium, Executive Personnel, Balance Sheet and Accounts, Statistical Data* (New York, 1921), 4; *Indianapolis News*, February 15, 1916, p. 22.

tion, Americans became acquainted with a group of German military writers of a chauvinistic nature whom they accepted as representative of German psychology.

Heinrich von Treitschke's doctrine of German racial superiority, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's belief in the superman, and Friedrich von Bernhardi's glorification of the military life became especially well known. Nietzsche was regarded as the prophet of the mailed fist,³⁸ and his name "became almost as familiar as that of the contemporary holder of the highest batting average in professional baseball."³⁹ Bernhardi's *Germany and the Next War* appeared in numerous editions and became for a time the most-read nonfiction book in the United States. Four printings were sold in the single month of October. A paper-bound edition was offered for sale at railway newsstands and hotel lobbies, and library waiting lists grew discouragingly long.⁴⁰ It was run in serial form in newspapers under such headings as "German View of War and Peace Is Authoritatively Set Forth by a Distinguished Member of the German General Staff,"⁴¹ and quotations, such as the following, appeared on the editorial pages:

³⁸ Henry L. Mencken, "The Mailed Fist and Its Prophet," in *Atlantic Monthly*, 114: 598-607 (November, 1914). The *Reader's Guide* listed nine articles on Nietzsche for the months of October and November, 1914.

³⁹ Mark Sullivan, *Our Times. The United States, 1900-1925* (6 vols. New York, 1926-35), 5:138. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche's philosophy was somewhat misunderstood, and it was erroneously believed that Bernhardi was as widely read in Germany as in the United States.

⁴⁰ South Bend *Tribune*, October 31, 1914, p. 24; *New Republic*, November 14, 1914, p. 1.

⁴¹ Evansville *Courier*, December 15, 1914, p. 24.

"Efforts directed toward the abolition of war are not only foolish but absolutely immoral and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race." "The state is justified in making conquests whenever its own advantage seems to require additional territories." "The war spirit is the highest moral and spiritual object." "It is a biological necessity of the first importance." "The brutal incidents inseparable from every war vanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the sham reputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters are unmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth and honor come to the front and are put into play." "[Only in war] are nations enabled to do justice to the highest test of civilization by the fullest development of their moral forces."⁴² These quotations were often accompanied by similar ones from the Kaiser, Bismarck, or other Germans.

There were other straws in the wind which convinced the public that the Germans worshiped the god of war. "Revelations of the Kaiser's Personal Spy," a series of articles in which A. K. Graves pictured the German Government as maintaining an international spy system of frightening efficiency and Machiavellian intent, were spread through the state press.⁴³ Twenty-nine leading Protestant churchmen of Germany, including Adolf von Harnack, sent an appeal to the "Evangelical Churches Abroad," breathing fire and holy words and boasting of the

⁴² *Lafayette Courier*, November 18, 1914, p. 4; *Indianapolis News*, October 6, 1914, p. 6; *South Bend News-Times*, January 1, 1915, p. 6; *Louisville Courier-Journal*, September 11, 1914, p. 4.

⁴³ *Bluffton Banner*, December 1, 1914, p. 2; *Evansville Courier*, Sunday supplement through September, 1914.

German military sword which was "bright and keen."⁴⁴ From the German military, the Foreign Office, and the German-American press flowed a continuous stream of utterances glorifying the invincibility of Germany's might. The very war songs seemed to point up the picture. "*Die Wacht am Rhein*" and "*Deutschland ueber Alles*" were as martial as a bugle call and were no match in propaganda value to the nostalgic "Tipperary" of the English troops. There were countless photographs of grim-visaged officers in spiked helmets—a picture of the Kaiser with a smiling countenance might have been worth more than tons of ordinary propaganda pamphlets.

The Central Powers having come to be rather generally regarded as illiberal and militaristic it was unfortunate for their standing with neutral nations that their first ally should have been the "terrible Turk." Americans had been accustomed to look upon Turkey not only as the sick man of Europe but also as its boggy man, and her reported treatment of Christian Armenians had long furnished grist for the mill of religious and sensational journalism. Consequently, when it became evident in the first week of September that Turkey was moving toward an affiliation with Germany, the reaction was both anti-Turkish and anti-German. "To Hell with the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs" who talk ostentatiously of God and at the same time invite the Moslems to war against Christians, proclaimed the irrepressible "Marse" Henry Watterson of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*.⁴⁵ The *Evansville Courier* noted that the sympathy

⁴⁴ *Evansville Courier*, September 28, 1914, p. 3.

⁴⁵ *Louisville Courier-Journal*, September 3, 1914, p. 4.

which Germany had gained when Japan joined the Allies would "be lost and more should Turkey join forces and become the ally of Germany and Austria." "Massacre, pillage, and outrage have gone hand in hand with the Turkish troops and there is no reason to believe that the nature of the animal has changed. . . . As Moslems the Turks are religious fanatics and believe that to kill a Christian in battle is a sure way to gain entrance to Heaven."⁴⁶

A. Rustem Bey, Turkish ambassador to the United States, explained that victims of past massacres in Turkey "suffered not as Christians but as political agitators." He spoke of similar acts of other countries and permitted himself the unpolitic luxury of saying that the United States had little right to complain when "the thought of lynchings which occur in the United States and the memory of the 'water cures' in the Philippines should make them chary in attacking Turkey in connection with acts of savagery committed by her under provocation compared with which the economic competition of an Italian or the sniping of a Philippino or the outrage of a negro are as nothing."⁴⁷ A few days later he sought to repair the diplomatic damage by a second statement but succeeded only "in putting the other foot in it."⁴⁸ As a result he left for Turkey in early October never to return, the first of several agents of the Central Powers to take that road before the United States entered the war.

⁴⁶ Evansville *Courier*, September 4, 1914, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Indianapolis *News*, September 8, 1914, p. 8. For reactions to this statement, see Muncie *Star*, September 9, 1914, p. 4; Rochester *Sentinel*, September 26, 1914, p. 2; Evansville *Courier*, September 10, 1914, p. 6; Indianapolis *Star*, September 9, 1914, p. 8, etc.

⁴⁸ Indianapolis *Star*, September 14, 1914, p. 6.

On October 30 Turkey became an open war ally of the Central Powers, and a new round of attacks was launched against her. Some hastened to point out that Turkey's entry was "big with promise for Christendom" because her defeat might drive her from the continent of Europe and also bring Jerusalem under Christian control.⁴⁹ When Turkish Moslem leaders later proclaimed a Holy War against the Christians in an effort to rally the Arab world, these sentiments were repeated with added vigor.

The adherence of the Sultan's government to the Central Powers seemed to confirm the impression that one side in the war was the side of autocracy. Furthermore, the religious element had been added, and restoration of Christian rule in the Holy Land appeared to depend on the defeat of the Central Powers. It was no accident that the comic-strip characters Mutt and Jeff killed only Turks when they went to war.

Nineteen hundred fourteen was an election year, and for a time the war dropped into the background as all Indiana played the election game. The European strife was generally ignored because it contained too much unpredictable dynamite and because there was little discernible difference in the position of Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives on this matter. No party considered that there was any danger of the United States becoming a combatant.

⁴⁹ *Bloomington Daily Telephone*, January 27, 1915, p. 2; *South Bend News-Times*, November 11, 1914, p. 6; *Indianapolis Star*, November 1, 1914, p. 16; *Valparaiso Daily Vidette*, January 30, 1915, p. 3. The Turkish chapter for 1914 was not yet ended for on November 18 a nationalistic tremor ran through the country when it was learned that a launch of the cruiser "Tennessee" had been fired upon by Turkish forts at Smyrna. *Lafayette Courier*, November 18, 1914, p. 1; *Gary Post-Tribune*, November 18, 1914, p. 1.

Enough, however, was said to cast a slender shadow of what was to come in 1916.

The shock of the European war had temporarily strengthened the peace sentiment in the United States. The Democratic party sought to convert this reaction into votes by pointing out that if the Administration had been as warlike toward Mexico as its critics had wished, the United States would be at war with her and the Western Hemisphere would be like the Eastern. William Jennings Bryan stressed this point in a two-day speaking tour of the state,⁵⁰ and Democratic orators, with Mexico and Europe in mind, exclaimed "War in the East, Peace in the West—Thank God for Wilson."⁵¹

The Republicans campaigned principally, in the words of Will H. Hays, for "a protective tariff and lower taxes." The European war played no significant part in their efforts, but two minor developments were of some importance as presaging Republican strategy in 1916. Former Vice-President Charles W. Fairbanks in a speech at Knightstown asserted: "I venture the opinion that he [an Englishman] thinks that the Democratic party is really a great institution. The fact is it has always been tremendously popular in England; its popularity will never diminish there."⁵² Second, an anonymous pamphlet written in German and accusing the Administration of being partial to the Allies was circulated among the German voters.⁵³ The chief significance of this elec-

⁵⁰ Princeton *Clarion-News*, October 10, 1914, p. 1; Anderson *Bulletin*, October 10, 1914, p. 1; Kentland *Newton County Enterprise*, October 22, 1914, p. 4; Evansville *Courier*, October 10, 1914, p. 1; Bloomington *World*, October 10, 1914, p. 1.

⁵¹ Evansville *Courier*, October 30, 1914, p. 1.

⁵² Indianapolis *News*, October 23, 1914, p. 14.

⁵³ Indianapolis *Star*, October 8, 1914, p. 8.

tion, however, was political and was tersely expressed by one editor the day following the voting: "The Progressive party died yesterday."⁵⁴

It would seem fair, on the basis of material examined, to say that as this singular year came to an end, Indiana opinion toward the war was divided somewhat as follows: not less than two-thirds and not more than three-fourths of the people favored the Allied nations. Many New Year's celebrations resounded to the tune of "Tipperary" set to dance time,⁵⁵ and a joke going the rounds proclaimed, "I'm neutral—I don't care who whips Germany."⁵⁶ A few of the more determinedly pro-Allied sympathizers were echoing Theodore Roosevelt in asserting that the United States Government should have entered a strong diplomatic protest against the invasion of Belgium.⁵⁷ Since neither they nor Roosevelt had so spoken in August, a Lilliputian step toward war had been taken. However, most Hoosiers were far from any thought of war because they felt little enthusiasm for England and positive distrust of Japan and Russia. Moreover, antagonism toward Germany was still almost entirely on a humanitarian basis. The nationalistic chord had not been struck, for there had been no clash between the United States and Germany, and as long as the patriotic element was lacking there would be no serious war sentiment

⁵⁴ Indianapolis *News*, November 4, 1914, p. 6. The Democrats carried the state, re-electing United States Senator Benjamin F. Shively. The Republicans, however, were greatly encouraged by their gains. The Progressive vote dropped to approximately 100,000.

⁵⁵ Sullivan, *Our Times*, 5:74.

⁵⁶ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, December 17, 1914, p. 6.

⁵⁷ Indianapolis *Star*, December 6, 1914, p. 6; Evansville *Courier*, January 8, 1915, p. 6.

in the Midwest. Most Hoosiers were in sympathy with Wilson's opposition to increased armaments as expressed in his message to Congress on December 8, 1914.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, December 9, 1914, p. 4; La Porte *Argus*, December 9, 1914, p. 4; Hartford City *Telegram*, December 9, 1914, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, December 8, 1914, p. 8; Indianapolis *News*, December 8, 1914, p. 6.

III. GROUP REACTIONS

THE response of the individual to major developments is conditioned by the racial, political, social, economic, occupational, cultural, or religious clusters to which he belongs. Indiana had its group divisions along such lines, but in order that proper perspective not be lost, it should be emphasized that these groups were not as pronounced or significant as in many of the states. Class consciousness scarcely existed; foreign groups were small; cities were of moderate size; rural and urban population was almost equally balanced; Middle Western culture patterns prevailed. The result was a fairly uniform outlook, which was both the strength and weakness of the Hoosier state. Each man was much like his neighbor—and yet what an astounding amount of stubborn individualism close acquaintance with him uncovered!

The most numerous and influential group in Indiana consisted of those persons who were rather vaguely designated as the "old stock" and apparently included all whose ancestors had been in the United States more than two generations. They tended to be Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, nativistic, and positive; they voted a straight ticket and took calomel in man-sized quantities. They were not neutral, but because their American nationalism had been completed they came nearer to that position than did more recent immigrants.

They believed Germany was more responsible than any other power for starting the war; they disliked Prussian militarism; and they hoped for an Allied victory. But they intended to stay at peace. They were a sentimental people, for it was they who raised the Belgian relief funds. Yet their sentimentality was not

without a governor, and more than sympathy for the "starving Belgians" and the "butchered Armenians" would be required to involve them in armed conflict. There was a latent anti-English feeling among them, and they were far from naive in their response to British propaganda. Staunch believers in democracy, a trait that was largely responsible for their distrust of Germany, they were not actively interested in an International for the spread of democracy abroad. Theirs was an American democracy, a fundamental part of their nationalism. In short, the later popular picture of Hoosiers carried away by sentimentality, by English propaganda, by an ideological crusade, by munition makers, and by international bankers to the point of rushing to war against the greatest military power in the world was drawn by men who had never leaned their elbows on the gate and talked to these folks or who had forgotten what they were like. Sentiment and propaganda helped to make them pro-Allied, but a direct challenge to their nationalism would be necessary to make them prowar.

Moreover, more than disputes over theoretical principles of international law would be required to bring their nationalism to the boiling point. They had their feet on the ground, so firmly in fact that visitors from the Eastern states were sometimes shocked at their failure to "comprehend the deeper issues involved."

There were more than 60,000 Negroes in Indiana in 1910, and the increasing volume of immigration from the South was yearly making them a more important part of the population. Two-thirds of them were in Marion, Vanderburgh, Vigo, Clark, and Floyd counties. It is virtually impossible to deter-

mine the attitude of their rank and file toward the war in its early stages, but the opinions of their professional spokesmen were clear enough. They praised France because the French considered a colored citizen a man "for a' that an' a' that," and particularly because officers' posts were open to colored personnel of the French army and navy.¹ They were antagonistic toward Belgium as a result of the exposures of the use of slavery by King Leopold II in the Belgian African colonies,² thereby becoming the only group in Indiana to be pro-French and anti-Belgian. As between England and Germany their spokesmen leaned slightly toward the latter, for, as one editor explained, the Germans had never been a party to enslavement of the American Negro, whereas England had supported the South in the Civil War in order to get "free cotton" at the expense of "free Negroes."³

The Negroes seized every opportunity to reaffirm their allegiance to the United States, and the Indianapolis *World* reprinted with pride an editorial from the New York *Tribune* praising their loyalty.⁴ "No, it was left to certain European immigrants, whose coming America had greeted with outstretched hand, to fail in this respect. Europeans came here voluntarily, but the African was dragged here in chains. Others came to find liberty; the Negro came to endure generations of slavery. . . . [Yet he has become

¹ Indianapolis *Recorder*, July 24, 1915, p. 4; Indianapolis *World*, August 15, 1914, p. 4; December 26, p. 4. Both of these were Negro papers; the *Recorder* had a circulation of 2,500 in 1914; that of the *World* was 1,000.

² Indianapolis *Recorder*, May 8, 1915, p. 4.

³ Indianapolis *World*, June 12, 1915, p. 2. See also Indianapolis *Recorder*, May 6, 1916, p. 6, for an anti-British cartoon.

⁴ Indianapolis *World*, June 17, 1916, p. 1.

an American and] if the black man can find that way, others must."

Immigration into the Midwest during the past two generations had been characterized by the large percentage which the Germans bore to the whole. Although Indiana had received less than her proportionate share of this flood, the Germans constituted her largest and most influential minority racial group.⁵ Fort Wayne and Evansville were "German cities," and Goshen, Michigan City, Hammond, La Porte, Valparaiso, Lafayette, Logansport, Richmond, Indianapolis, Terre Haute, Jasper, and Huntingburg were among the many communities seasoned with a German flavor. The Lutheran, Catholic, German Evangelical, Evangelical Church of America, Church of the Brethren, Mennonite, and the German Methodist church ministered to the spiritual needs of those of German descent, often with part of the service in the German language. A German-language press was fighting a sturdy, sometimes vitriolic, but gradually losing battle to keep the second and later generations "Germanized."⁶ Gymnastic, singing, be-

⁵ The 1910 census listed the Indiana foreign born as 159,663 (16.9 per cent of the total population), of which the Germans made up 62,179. Of the 509,873 who were born abroad or had at least one parent so born, the Germans numbered 264,198, or over 50 per cent of the total. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, vol. 2:543.

⁶ Most important of the German-language papers published in Indiana were the Evansville *Demokrat*, edited by Frederick Lauenstein; Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung*, edited by Herman Mackwitz; and the Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune* with its Sunday edition, *Spottvogel*, edited by August Tamm. From outside the state came the Cincinnati *Volksblatt* and its Sunday edition, *Westliche Blaetter*; Cincinnati *Freie Presse*; Chicago *Abendpost*; Chicago *Illinois Staats-Zeitung*; St. Louis *Amerika*; Louisville *Anzeiger*; Milwaukee *Germania Herold*, and others. The editorials of Herman Ridder in the New York *Staats-Zeitung* and of George Sylvester Viereck in the New York *Fatherland* were often reproduced in the local German papers.

nevolent, cultural, religious, patriotic (both German and American) and other societies, meeting in church, Deutsches-Haus, Maennerchor, Turnverein hall, or "German Park," were numerous and active and served to draw those of German blood together in healthful and pleasant activities.

Many of these societies were tied together locally by a German-American Alliance and on a state-wide scale by the German-American Alliance of Indiana, which under the able leadership of Joseph Keller represented approximately 125 separate organizations. Openly and unabashedly the members of this closely knit world referred to themselves as "German-Americans" (their fellow Hoosiers sometimes called them "Dutchmen" as though they came from the Zuider Zee). Before the shots at Sarajevo they were waging war against prohibition, woman suffrage, and nativism and in behalf of the introduction of German and physical culture in the public schools.⁷

The first news of trouble in Europe brought the German element rallying to the cause of the homeland, and from out of the state came the echo:

*"Lieb Vaterland magst ruhig sein,
Fest steht und treu die Wacht am Rhein."*

Factions were submerged in the stronger current of nationalism. Prussian Lutherans joined Bavarian Catholics; German liberals worked with defenders of autocracy; and socialists co-operated with bankers. There was some deviation, as will be pointed out later, but it was so slight that the citizen of 1914 could assume with virtual certainty that every person of

⁷ Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, August 16, 1914, sec. 3, p. 1. The Austrians will be included with the Germans and will not be discussed separately.

recent German descent whom he met would be an ardent German champion.

In the first days of war the German-American press and spokesmen viewed the struggle as one between Slavic barbarism and German civilization and scolded the general public roundly for not seeing it in that light. The Serbs and Russians, it was said, were a people of "unkultur" against whom Germany was fighting in the interest of all western civilizations. "Germany," wrote a local sympathizer, "stands now as she has for thousands of years on the border of European culture and fights against the half civilized Slavic hordes. Germany should be supported in this struggle by England and France for their own interests in civilization and culture, or at least they should remain neutral."⁸ The Chicago *Abendpost*, after voicing the same complaint, asked, "Has the civilized world gone mad? Is it tired of its culture, and does it long to return to barbarism? Does it fear its own spiritual elevation and yearn to plunge again into the depths?"⁹

German *Kultur* was to be much in the mouths of the German-Americans, and they had no hesitation in dubbing it superior to any in the world. Documentation of that thesis was at times excellent, for example, "a professor in an American college is never content until he gets a Ph.D. from a German university, and he has to work to get it. Germany recognizes no easy path to excellence."¹⁰ At other times it was mystical nonsense concerning "*Siegfried Ger-*

⁸ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, August 3, 1914, p. 4.

⁹ Chicago *Abendpost* as quoted in Chicago *Evening Post*, July 31, 1914, p. 4.

¹⁰ La Grange *Standard*, September 3, 1914, p. 2.

manikus” fighting as a “*Kaempfer der Kultur*.”¹¹ The word *Kultur* came to have a sinister meaning in Indiana before many months had passed. The monotonously exaggerated language used and the course of events in Belgium were partly responsible. It was also due in part to the wide difference in connotation between the German word *Kultur* (all aspects of German life, military, scientific, etc.) and the English word culture (the humanities). Assuming the words to be identical in meaning, many Hoosiers could not understand why German remarks on *Kultur* usually started or ended with references to German military efficiency and might. Consequently, it was sometimes said that when a German talked of *Kultur* he first cocked his pistol.

The German declaration of war on “decadent and immoral” France was unanimously approved, and the assertions of the German Government that it had been forced to take the field because French airplanes had violated German soil were faithfully repeated. The invasion of Belgium was defended on the ground of military necessity. It was also generally argued that France would have occupied Belgium if Germany had not beaten her to it,¹² or even that “Germany invaded Belgium only after French airships had crossed Belgian and Dutch territory.”¹³ Later, when the German Government issued documents seized in Belgium purporting to prove that that country had a defensive and offensive alliance

¹¹ See Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, September 27, 1914, p. 5, for a poem by Rev. J. C. Hansen.

¹² Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, August 6, 1914, p. 4; Evansville *Demokrat*, August 3, 1914, p. 4.

¹³ Chicago *Illinois Staats-Zeitung* as quoted in Chicago *Tribune*, August 7, 1914, p. 5.

with France and England, the argument for Belgium was considered closed, and the Belgians were thenceforth relegated to the same category as Germany's other enemies. Consequently, the Belgian relief drive received more opposition than support from the German-American press, societies, and individuals.

When England entered the war she was immediately placed at the head of the hate list and became the object of an unremitting stream of violent denunciation, which was the German-American counterpart of the "*Gott strafe England*" outburst in the homeland.¹⁴ It was believed that England had deliberately plotted and planned the war in order to crush a growing German commercial rivalry. To accomplish this goal she had used France, Belgium, and possibly Russia as her dupes to encircle and destroy the Fatherland. Talk of the possibility of national destruction was more than rhetoric to German-Americans, for they were sensitive to the fact that German unity was fragilely new and had been achieved only after centuries of frustration. To the majority of Indians, however, the German institution that the war had placed in jeopardy was the Hohenzollern dynasty and its attributes. Each group was sincere and neither was ever to appreciate the view of the other. The German-American lauded the Kaiser as the visible symbol of German unity; the average citizen of Indiana condemned him as the symbol of all that was un-American.

¹⁴ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, August 5, 1914, p. 4; Evansville *Demokrat*, August 5, 1914, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung*, August 6, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, October 25, 1914, p. 4; Chicago *Abendpost* as quoted in Chicago *Daily News*, August 28, 1914, p. 4; La Grange *Standard*, September 10, 1914, p. 2.

The intrusion of Japan into the hostilities in mid-August brought an opportunity to emphasize the picture of Germany as the defender of western culture, and the president of the German-American Alliance of Indiana urged all Americans to work for German success in defending the world from Japan.¹⁵ Oscar Mezger, German consul at Cincinnati, wrote an open letter that was reprinted in Indiana pleading for support of Germany because she and the United States had always worked together to block "the way of the Japanese and support the Chinese."¹⁶ Responsibility for loosing the yellow flood was often laid at the door of England. Furthermore, it was asked, if Japan was bound by treaty to come to the aid of Great Britain against Germany, would not the same treaty compel Great Britain to join Japan in war on the United States?¹⁷

The last development of 1914 to which the local Germanophile gave special attention was the British violation of neutral rights on the sea. Throughout the first six months of the war the only serious interference with American seaborne trade came from the Allies, and every German-American spokesman became a voluble champion of the legal rights of that commerce. Strong retaliatory action was demanded in the form of convoy of shipments to Germany, an embargo on arms shipments to Britain, or even an immediate seizure of Canada.¹⁸ It was argued that

¹⁵ Indianapolis *Star*, August 25, 1914, p. 5.

¹⁶ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, August 18, 1914, p. 4.

¹⁷ Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, August 23, 1914, p. 4; Chicago *Abendpost* as quoted in Chicago *Daily News*, August 19, 1914, p. 6.

¹⁸ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, October 26, 1914, p. 4; December 2, p. 4; December 30, p. 4; Evansville *Demokrat*, December 30, 1914, p. 4; Carl Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War . . .* (Ohio Historical Collections, vol. 5, Columbus, 1936), 50, 53.

whereas Germany was fighting for freedom of the seas—that is, freedom from English rule—the interests of the United States and Germany were parallel, and a German victory would be to America's advantage.

Passing from a discussion of specific developments to general aims, all major activity of the German-Americans can be ascribed to one of four objects. The first goal was to secure sympathy for Germany by explaining her version of the war and by emphasizing all anti-American actions of the Allies. The early hope of securing positive aid from the United States was abandoned after the sinking of the "Lusitania," and efforts were bent thereafter toward the more modest goal of keeping the United States non-belligerent. A second object was to raise relief funds for use in Germany, and the extravagantly generous response to this call made all other war relief efforts seem chary. The individual donations of \$4,000 to the "League of 1914" and the liberal response to the "*Gold fuer Eisen*" campaign demonstrated that the much-talked-of love for the Fatherland was more than sound and foam.¹⁹ A third aim was to prevent England and France from floating war loans in the United States, yet German-American papers advertised, and German-American banks bought, German war securities.²⁰ The fourth aim was to secure an American embargo on munition shipments to the war-

¹⁹ Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, October 4, 1914, p. 12; Hammond *Lake County News*, September 24, 1914, p. 1; Peru *Evening Journal*, February 5, 1915, p. 1; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, September 10, 1914, p. 13; Richmond *Palladium*, February 19, 1915, p. 10; La Porte *Argus*, October 11, 1914, p. 2.

²⁰ Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, September 5, 1915, p. 8; October 10, p. 16; October 24, p. 16; December 5, p. 8. On the last date, Austrian, Hungarian, and German bonds were advertised.

ring powers. This, in fact, was the prime aim—the grand goal—of all German-American activity.²¹ The more sanguine went so far as to press for a similar embargo on food.²²

That these aims were not attained was due to a number of reasons, most of them outside the control of the local German coterie. It is evident from the vantage point of a later generation that some of the responsibility for failure was theirs, however, for, as Carl Wittke has cautiously pointed out, “they occasionally overstepped the bounds of discretion and common sense” in their zeal to defend their beliefs.²³ German apologists too often handicapped themselves and hurt their cause by the raucous manner in which they presented their case. They were dogmatic and at times abusive in their arguments, and as though trying to compensate for their fewer numbers they were vociferous in the extreme.

The politician knows that there are two kinds of pleas. One is addressed to party members for the purpose of inspiring confidence, tightening ranks, and mobilizing for action. The other is intended to win the waverer and is pitched on a different level and in different terminology. Generally speaking, the German-Americans confined their pleas to the first category. Their words were most often addressed to one another, and although a high degree of internal unity was thus obtained, there was little to attract

²¹ Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune*, December 31, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, February 27, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, January 29, 1915, p. 10; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, January 12, 1915, p. 2; La Porte *Argus*, January 8, 1915, p. 1.

²² Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, September 24, 1916, p. 10; Indianapolis *News*, October 21, 1914, p. 6.

²³ Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 4.

the outsider. In fact, their arguments in too many instances were designed not so much to convert opponents as to hold them up to derisive ridicule—*Anglo-Amerikanischen* who licked the boots of John Bull. But an opponent who has been made angry is a difficult person to convince. The successful merchant sometimes considers it the better part of wisdom to lose the argument and make the sale.

To the same degree that the war had drawn the German-Americans closer together, it had set them apart from their neighbors. They came to be regarded, and to regard themselves, as a community within a community. A few of their more aroused and vociferous members fell into the habit of criticizing all American action, relevant and irrelevant, domestic and foreign. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the loyalty of German-Americans was sometimes challenged and that they were accused of having interests foreign to the well-being of the country. They were charged with being more German than American, or, at best, of being part one and part the other. Before the war was a month old anti-hyphenate sentiments and voices had appeared locally, and there was much shaking of heads and muttering "if they don't like it here why don't they go back to Germany."²⁴

By keeping in mind this division between the "*Deutschamerikaner*" and the remainder of the people, it becomes possible to understand why the public was so conscious of and unreceptive toward official German propaganda. The propaganda of the German Government was directed chiefly to the German

²⁴ Louisville *Courier-Journal*, September 1, 1914, p. 4; Marion *Chronicle*, August 22, 1914, p. 4.

element in the United States, and appeared therefore to foster racial separatism in America. Consequently, the words "German propagandist" soon became "a term of abuse in America," as Count Bernstorff noted.²⁵ The Allied disseminations, much more plentiful and more likely to pull the country from its peace moorings, were addressed to the general public and agreed with the preconceived views of most of the population. Therefore the people were but little conscious of them.

There was much that could have been said for the German way, but the German-Americans said little of it. Conservation achievements, lack of lawlessness, scientific and educational standards, old-age insurance and other such German accomplishments were inadequately stressed, as were also such aspects of *Gemuetlichkeit* as German Christmas, German cooking, and the comradeship of hikes. Furthermore, bombastic optimism hurt the German standing, because the American people have generally felt that in some way the underdog is a pretty good dog.

There was some nonconformity among German descendants. Some of the German Socialists maintained an analytical attitude toward developments.²⁶ German liberals and descendants of the forty-eighters usually supported the regular German-American line,²⁷ for they too were heir to nineteenth-century German nationalism. Yet there was some difference

²⁵ Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (New York, 1920), 259.

²⁶ Goshen *Democrat*, September 18, 1914, p. 6; Indianapolis *News*, October 26, 1914, p. 15; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 8.

²⁷ Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 11, has noted that in many cases the descendants of the forty-eighters, refugees from

in degree between their attitude and the view of those of the Junker school. To be more specific, there was a slightly more critical attitude toward the German Government among Indianapolis Germans who belonged to the Deutsches Haus than among the more conservative members of the Maennerchor.²⁸ For nationalistic and political reasons the Huntingburg *Signal* frequently took issue with the more violent attitudes of its fellow German papers and did not hesitate to find fault with a number of acts of the German Government.²⁹ In the same part of the state, German-American Congressman Charles Lieb of the Evansville district supported the United States Government in its maneuverings though it sometimes brought him into conflict with his German constituents.³⁰ Politics was probably a greater factor making for disunity among the German-Americans than were religious, economic, occupational, or social differences. To that extent they had become not only American but Hoosier.

Second to the Germans in importance among the

German illiberalism and militarism, were the "staunchest" defenders of German actions.

One German-American, after telling the author that he came to the United States from Munich prior to the first World War in order to avoid military training that was so brutal that "a man who had anything in his head couldn't stand it," went on to review his reactions of 1914-17, which consisted of vigorously defending every act of the German Government and strongly condemning the Americans.

²⁸ For information concerning the attitude of the Indianapolis German-Americans, the author has relied partly on conversations with some of their number.

²⁹ See, for example, the remarks in this paper on the arms embargo agitation throughout January and February, 1915, on the German reply to the first "Lusitania" note in June, 1915, and on the campaign of 1916.

³⁰ *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, pt. 11, pp. 11253-59.

"foreign" groups were the Irish.³¹ They were not numerous in Indiana, but, because of their faculty for organization and self-expression and their prominence in the Catholic church and the Democratic party, their influence considerably outranked their numbers. The Chicago area and Indianapolis were the local seats of greatest Irish influence with smaller musters in other cities. Their organizations, of which the Ancient Order of Hibernians and Emmet clubs were among the most militant, achieved unification of efforts and a common voice in the Allied Irish-American societies. Unlike the Germans, the Irish had virtually no representation in rural Indiana.

From the first news of the war until the entry of the United States, the Irish position was simple and consistent. Viewing the struggle as one between England and England's enemies, they who had been so long the foe of England now gave their sympathies to her new adversaries, not caring particularly who won, so long as England lost.³² It was still a fundamental part of Irish belief that Great Britain was working ceaselessly "to reclaim the United States as a British colony."³³ There was also the hope that a German victory might result in a free Ireland.

Like the Germans, the Irish labored to prevent the sale of Allied war bonds in America, pressed for embargoes on arms and food, stressed the yellow peril,

³¹ In 1910 there were 53,208 people in the state who were either born in Ireland or had at least one parent born there. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, vol. 2:543.

³² *Hartford City Telegram*, December 23, 1914, p. 1; *New Albany Ledger*, August 21, 1914, p. 4; *Hammond Lake County Times*, February 3, 1915, p. 2; *Catholic Columbian Record*, August 14, 1914, p. 4; *Indiana Catholic*, August 7, 1914, p. 1; September 18, p. 4.

³³ George S. Viereck, *Spreading Germs of Hate* (New York, 1930), 215-16.

and favored strong retaliatory measures against English obstruction of American sea traffic.³⁴ Their more extreme spokesmen demanded that the United States take steps that would have meant certain war with the Allied nations. Before the war was fully under way, a prominent Irish leader in Indiana called upon the United States Government to order England out of the Western Hemisphere. "If James Gillespie Blaine was in the Secretary of State's office, that's what would happen to John Bull and his Allies. But the obedient, faithful servant of John Bull and his interests, who now sits in Washington in the Secretary's chair [William Jennings Bryan] would let him shoot the Western Hemisphere to pieces before calling a stop to him."³⁵ Only in the closing days of American nonbelligerency would Irish leaders become reconciled to conflict with the Central Powers, and then they would seek to have the United States make separate war on Germany without joining the Allies.

One of the more successful maneuvers of the Irish was the effort to mobilize all Catholics against Great Britain. The *Indiana Catholic*, organ of both the Indianapolis and Fort Wayne dioceses, took the lead in this movement and became the most influential pro-German paper in the state. Catholic Belgium presented a special problem to Editor Joseph Patrick O'Mahony. He at first excused Germany on the ground that she "entered Belgium only because she

³⁴ *Indiana Catholic*, October 1, 1915, p. 4; Hammond *Lake County Times*, February 3, 1915, p. 2; Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, September 5, 1915, p. 1; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 17, 1915, p. 1. The local Irish placed more emphasis on a food embargo than did the German-Americans, possibly because being consumers and not producers of farm products they did not share in the benefit of high export prices.

³⁵ Joseph Patrick O'Mahony in a letter to the editor, Indianapolis *Star*, August 21, 1914, p. 4.

owned the railroad going into France from that country. Belgium had promised to keep the line open, but the French had seized it on the border."³⁶ Some time later he asserted that "Belgium was laid waste because England dragged her into the war, promised to save her and then deserted her."³⁷

The Irish pleas were better received in Indiana than were the German-American because they harmonized with the Middle Western predilection to distrust Britain, because they were presented in English, and because most Hoosiers felt that the Irish had cause for complaint. However, solicitude for mistreated Ireland lost some of its moral force when the local Irish defended Austrian and Hungarian rule of numerous and unwilling minorities.

Nationalism, like politics, makes for strange bed partners, and the Indiana Germans and Irish who had often been rivals now became co-workers. The Irish brogue and German accent mingled in joint rallies at which their speakers alternated in blasting England. The two groups signed joint resolutions and donated to each others relief funds. Each lauded the high civilization and genuine neutrality³⁸ which the other represented. Subsequent events have tended to obscure the fact that the first suggestions that America

³⁶ *Indiana Catholic*, August 7, 1914, p. 4.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1914, p. 4.

³⁸ Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, September 20, 1914, p. 8; Evansville *Demokrat*, February 16, 1915, p. 1; Hammond *Lake County Times*, February 3, 1915, p. 2; *Catholic Columbian Record*, August 21, 1914, p. 1; *Indiana Catholic*, August 28, 1914, p. 4. For a detailed account of a joint Irish-German meeting in Fort Wayne, see Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 17, 1915, p. 1. At this meeting the chairman was an Irishman, the secretary, a German, and the chief speakers were German-American Congressman Henry Vollmer and Hon. Patrick O'Donnell of Chicago.

enter the war were contained in their strictures against England.

The Hungarians, drawn by a natural sympathy to their warring fellow Magyars of Austria-Hungary, made up a third group that favored the Central Powers. Although this race did not bulk large in Indiana, the cities of South Bend, East Chicago, and Gary each contained a Little Hungary of first- and second- (chiefly first-) generation immigrants.³⁹ In South Bend, where they had been established long enough to gain recognition, they were the most active and influential pro-German group in the city. Still closely attached to their homeland, and full of the virulent national consciousness which had developed in a country closely hemmed in by Slavic and German neighbors, they viewed the war with an intensity of feeling that may have surpassed even that of the German-Americans.⁴⁰ This feeling was directed not against England and France, but against the "uncivilized" Slavs in general and the Russians in particular. In Gary they held enthusiastic parades,⁴¹ and in South Bend a near race riot resulted when two boys placed a Russian flag in the front yard of a Magyar and were slapped for their temerity.⁴²

There were minor deviations from this group reaction. A few recalled that they had left Hungary to avoid its militarism and feudalism. Second, a small

³⁹ For statistics concerning the Indiana Hungarians (and other minority groups subsequently cited), see *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, vol. 2:541-77, and *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, vol. 3:282-311.

⁴⁰ Gary *Post-Tribune*, July 29, 1914, p. 1; South Bend *Tribune*, August 3, 1914, p. 14; Indianapolis *Star*, August 6, 1914, p. 12.

⁴¹ Gary *Post-Tribune*, August 3, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 3, 1914, p. 1.

⁴² South Bend *Tribune*, September 1, 1914, p. 9.

band of radicals regarded the war as one of clashing imperialisms and grew quite caustic in their remarks concerning the parasitic Magyar nobility.

The Poles, concentrated most heavily in the Lake Michigan region, had a difficult task in choosing sides in the war. Primarily, they hoped and prayed that the conflict would somehow bring a free Poland, but there were three nations blocking the way to independence and they were not all on one side in the war. Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany governed contingents of unwilling Poles, and a national state would not be complete unless it obtained territory from all. The local Poles did not talk about "going home to fight," as did other groups in the first two weeks of the war, because they had no home and were not sure where their best interests lay among the warring countries.⁴³ They distrusted Russia. They hated the Germans. They were somewhat inclined toward Austria-Hungary by reasons of common religion and because its government had generally favored the Poles against the other northern Slavic groups in its "divide and rule" policy. In the aggregate, however, the aversion for Germany outweighed the other influences, and a majority of the Indiana Poles were definitely pro-Allied. After all, Editor G. W. J. Kalczynski of the South Bend *Goniec Polski* reasoned at some length, the Poles could not afford to

⁴³ South Bend *Goniec Polski*, August 5, 1914, p. 2, advised its Polish readers to proceed about their business of making a living and let their enemies across the ocean destroy one another. ("Komu jednak dobrze w Stanach Zjednoczonych, ten niech siedzi spokojnie i iczeiwie na chleb powszedni zarabia, a nasi wrogowie po drugiej stronie morza niech sie cznbia i taszerza za lby az im czupryna spuchnie.") See also South Bend *News-Times*, August 31, 1914, p. 2; Indianapolis *News*, August 6, 1914, p. 13.

support Austria in the war because that country was dominated by Germany, and as between Teutonic Germany and Slavic Russia, Poland's future was safer in the hands of the latter.⁴⁴

Poland was the battleground for much of the fighting between the Central Powers and Russia and the resultant suffering was enormous, although little recognized by an American public preoccupied with Belgian woes. To the Indiana Poles, this aspect of the conflict was of heartfelt concern, and the ceaseless campaign which they conducted to raise relief funds constituted their most active participation in matters relating to the war.⁴⁵ In summary, the Poles hoped for a free Poland, a succored Poland, and an Allied victory. Although they often spoke strong words concerning Germany, they were not active interventionists. They tended to follow Administration foreign policy instead of attempting to direct it.⁴⁶

Among the first racial groups affected by the war were the Serbians (Slavic, Orthodox, and "working class"), and from the industrial sections of Gary, East Chicago, and Indianapolis they responded with a zealous Serbian patriotism that must have comforted their warring brethren. In Gary, three thousand cabled encouragement to King Peter. Fights between Serbs and Austro-Hungarians became so frequent that Gary police patrols were increased and simultaneous

⁴⁴ South Bend *Goniec Polski*, August 5, 1914, p. 2. See also *ibid.*, August 19, 1914, p. 2; August 22, p. 2; September 5, p. 2. The Poles almost unanimously supported Wilson in the election of 1916, whereas German sympathizers tended to be anti-Wilson in that election.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, June 2, 1915, p. 4; December 15, p. 2.

⁴⁶ South Bend *News-Times*, August 31, 1914, p. 2; Richmond *Palladium*, February 19, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *Goniec Polski*, August 19, 1914, p. 2; June 12, 1915, p. 2; February 10, 1917, p. 1; April 4, p. 2.

parades representing the different nationalities were banned.⁴⁷ The Indianapolis Serbians held repeated meetings at the Foreigners' House of the Immigrant Aid Association on West Pearl Street, at which they raised relief funds and talked of returning home to join the war. A reporter for the Indianapolis *Star* found them "excited and patriotic and wanting to fight. Every man has a copy of the *Srpski Dnebnik*."⁴⁸

Significantly, the Croatians of both Gary and Indianapolis sided with the Serbians.⁴⁹ In fact, one of the most meaningful developments among the immigrant groups was the virtual unanimity with which the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian minority groups supported the Allies and repudiated the Hapsburgs. The Croatians, Rumanians, Czechs, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Austrian Serbs rejoiced at each Allied victory and remained stubbornly and suspiciously aloof from efforts to woo them from that position.⁵⁰ Among the Austrian Poles the stand was not unanimous, but they generally fell in line with the others.

These Slavic peoples were looking at the much advertised crusade to protect Europe from the "uncultured" and "barbaric" Slavs from the reverse

⁴⁷ Gary *Post-Tribune*, July 29, 1914, p. 1; August 3, p. 1; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 3, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, July 30, 1914, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Indianapolis *Star*, August 6, 1914, p. 12. The *Srpski Dnebnik* was a New York Serbian paper.

⁴⁹ Indianapolis *News*, July 31, 1914, p. 12; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, July 31, 1914, p. 3.

⁵⁰ Hammond *Lake County News*, August 13, 1914, p. 1; Gary *Post-Tribune*, July 31, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, July 31, 1914, p. 12; August 6, p. 13; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, July 29, 1914, p. 2; July 31, p. 3; Indianapolis *Star*, July 30, 1914, p. 2; August 6, p. 12. A majority of the Rumanians (Indianapolis and Gary) and Serbians in Indiana were from Austria-Hungary.

end.⁵¹ Furthermore, they viewed the government of Austria-Hungary much as the Irish looked upon the English and for the same reason. In Indiana, far from the Danube, the failure of Hapsburg leadership was being demonstrated clearly.

The Belgians of Mishawaka,⁵² South Bend, Valparaiso, and Hartford City suddenly found themselves to be objects of much interest, curiosity, and sympathy in the first week of August, 1914. Not being a volatile people, they surmounted the ordeal calmly, and with a moderate amount of clamor followed the war news closely, collected relief funds, and exchanged letters and stories of atrocities suffered by those in the Old Country. The young men spoke rather importantly of plans for going back to Belgium to take a hand in the war.⁵³ In fact, the national groups on both sides talked much of "going home to fight" in the early weeks of the war, and it was conjectured that as many as one million men would eventually join the melee. For a variety of reasons only an insignificant number ever did so, and by the end of the second month of war they had generally ceased to discuss the probability.

Of all the foreign groups, the Italians were probably most ill at ease.⁵⁴ The others had allies to praise

⁵¹ See, for example, the statement of the Bohemian-American Press Association, Chicago, quoted in the Chicago *Examiner*, August 12, 1914, p. 4.

⁵² Mishawaka has at times claimed to have a larger proportion of Belgians than any other city in the United States.

⁵³ Mishawaka *Enterprise*, August 21, 1914, p. 1; South Bend *News-Times*, August 7, 1914, p. 3; August 20, p. 10; Hartford City *Telegram*, October 31, 1914, p. 1; November 25, p. 5.

⁵⁴ In 1910 there were approximately 9,140 persons of Italian blood in Indiana, 6,911 of whom had been born in Italy. They were concentrated in Gary, Indianapolis, Clinton, and Mishawaka. *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, vol. 2:543.

and enemies to hate, but the Italians for a long time had neither. Furthermore, the vacillation and bargaining of the Italian Government brought jeering criticism from the pro-Germans without gaining the respect of the pro-Allies. As a result, the Indiana Italians were placed in a difficult psychological position. Although they fully supported Italy when she joined the Allies, there had been no marked Italian-American counterpart of the Italian interventionist movement.

The same people who read their newspapers with a partisan astigmatism through the week sat in the church pews on Sunday. The reaction of the churches therefore, could be but little different from that of the week-day public. Some differences, however, were to be found among the attitudes of the denominations and also between the clergy and laity.

In the early days of the war, churchmen in many faiths saw the war as the result of spiritual and moral breakdown among the peoples of the world. It was due, they said, to the "presence of sin and rebellion in God's world";⁵⁵ or it was "the Lord's means of chastising the nations";⁵⁶ or whereas "God moves in a mysterious way His wonders to perform," He was using the war to achieve some great end that would be manifest in time;⁵⁷ or it was merely the fulfillment of prophecy and would lead to the millennium and the second coming of Christ.⁵⁸ Incurable optimists that they were, the clergy stressed the hope that the terri-

⁵⁵ *Christian Standard*, August 15, 1914, p. 12.

⁵⁶ *Lutheran Witness*, 33:133 (August 11, 1914).

⁵⁷ *La Porte Argus*, October 5, 1914, p. 8.

⁵⁸ *Indianapolis News*, August 13, 1914, p. 11; *Gospel Trumpet*, September 24, 1914, p. 3; *Baptist Observer*, December 30, 1915, p. 4; *Peru Evening Journal*, February 25, 1915, p. 4. The Seventh-Day Adventists felt certain that Armageddon was at hand.

ble war might result in a general realization of the futility of war, a new brotherhood of man, and the return of a chastised world to the sanctums of religion.

The Lutheran, German Catholic, German Methodist, Evangelical Church of America, and German Evangelical churches sympathized with the Central Powers.⁵⁹ They early became centers of pro-German activity, with the clergy translating efforts to secure arms and loan embargoes into religious phraseology. The Lutherans in particular gave valuable support to the German cause. Their leaders pointed out that Luther had sanctioned justified wars,⁶⁰ and that France was "in the last stages of moral decay."⁶¹ They bade their followers not to be carried away by tears for theocratic Belgium with her "38 per cent illiteracy" when Germany was fighting for the freedom of Lutheran Finland which had "less than 1 per cent illiteracy."⁶² They believed that Germany was an invigorating force in Europe and that she had awakened to that role as a result of the Lutheran revolt.

Whether a member of the Catholic church found logic in the Allied or German arguments depended primarily on the racial group to which he belonged.

⁵⁹ *Lutheran Witness*, 33:133 (August 11, 1914), 34:150 (May 18, 1915); *Der Lutheraner*, 71:51 (February 2, 1915); *Indianapolis Spottvogel*, September 27, 1914, p. 5; *Evansville Courier*, October 5, 1914, p. 3; *Seymour Republican*, September 1, 1915, p. 1; *La Porte Argus*, October 6, 1914, p. 5.

⁶⁰ *Lutheran Witness*, 33:198 (December 1, 1914). The three main branches of the Lutheran church in Indiana were: the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States; the United Lutheran Church in America; and the American Lutheran Church. The first was the strongest.

⁶¹ *Lutheran Witness*, 33:133 (August 11, 1914).

⁶² *Der Lutheraner*, 71:209 (May 25, 1915); *Lutheran Witness*, 34:349 (November 2, 1915).

To the extent that the Church leaders favored one side over another, they leaned slightly toward the Central Powers. The Church periodical *Our Sunday Visitor*, published at Huntington, was neutral. But the *Indiana Catholic* and the *Catholic Columbian Record* (combined in 1916 to form the *Indiana Catholic and Record*) were unreservedly pro-German, and others such as the Jesuit weekly *America*, were officially neutral but carried numerous pro-German articles without balancing them with Allied ones. Not a single openly pro-Allied Church paper was distributed in Indiana in sizable numbers.

One reason for this tendency was that the Irish ranked first in Church leadership and the Germans second. Another factor was that Austria, at that time the most faithful daughter of the Church, was a member of the Central Powers. One of the most notable differences between the Catholic press and the other papers in the early weeks of the war was its practically unanimous defense of Austria-Hungary and her Hapsburg ruler.⁶³ A third cause was antagonism toward the anticlerical government of the Third French Republic. The French Government was described as "infidel,"⁶⁴ "socialist-freemason,"⁶⁵ "anticlerical and inhuman."⁶⁶ Americans were warned that "Our debt to France was from the France of other days. There can be no bond of sympathy between the United States and the present French government. . . . Blush that the necessities of diplomacy force us to recognize the government that finds its duty to blaspheme the

⁶³ *America*, 11:455 (August 15, 1914); *Catholic Columbian Record*, November 27, 1914, p. 1; *Indiana Catholic*, October 2, 1914, p. 4.

⁶⁴ *Our Sunday Visitor*, May 23, 1916, p. 1.

⁶⁵ *Indiana Catholic*, July 24, 1914, p. 4; August 21, p. 4.

⁶⁶ *America*, 12:147 (November 21, 1914).

God of Nations.”⁶⁷ France’s worst enemy, it was sometimes said, was not Germany but “the government of France,” and its triumph would nowhere “bring a greater curse than in France.”⁶⁸

As might be surmised from these views, clerical and “conservative” groups were more disposed toward the Central Powers than were the “liberals.” In most cases those who wanted the United States forcibly to suppress the “radical” government of Mexico favored Germany and Austria in the World War.

Italy’s entry into the war was regarded by the Church press as a further reason for suspicion of the Allies, for that country was keeping the Holy Father “a prisoner in the Vatican.”⁶⁹

The Jews, too, were divided in their sympathies. A large number of influential Indiana Jews had come to the United States from Germany and kept alive their love for the home country in the local German clubs.⁷⁰ The Yiddish dialect itself was a living memento to the interrelationship of Jew and German. Opposing Germany was Czarist Russia, openly anti-Semitic. With the memory of Russia’s pogroms fresh in their minds, some Jews sided with the writer who said in the *Chicago Jewish Daily Courier*, that they must oppose “a war against Germany which means

⁶⁷ This editorial appeared in both the *Indiana Catholic* and the *Catholic Columbian Record* for August 21, 1914.

⁶⁸ *Indiana Catholic and Record*, August 4, 1916, p. 4. Part of this editorial consisted of a quotation from *America*.

⁶⁹ *Indiana Catholic*, June 4, 1915, p. 4.

⁷⁰ *Indianapolis News*, August 6, 1914, p. 13; *South Bend News-Times*, December 1, 1914, p. 6; *Shelbyville Democrat*, August 14, 1915, p. 4; *Indianapolis Telegraph and Tribune*, August 18, 1914, p. 4; Myra Auerbach, *A Study of the Jewish Settlement in Indianapolis* (thesis for master’s degree, Indiana University, 1917).

to help Russia celebrate a victory over the land of philosophers and poets.”⁷¹ Undoubtedly this influence was far less significant in Indiana than it was in New York and other eastern cities with their large contingents of recent Jewish immigrants from the Russian pale.

Forces of perhaps equal balance were pulling the Jews to the side of the Allies. The undercurrent of anti-Jewish feeling in Germany repelled many of the German Jews in the United States. There was also a sincere appreciation of the relative lack of anti-Semitism in France and England. It was not forgotten that Napoleonic France had broken open the ghettos and that—the Dreyfus affair notwithstanding—France had continued to lead the continental nations toward tolerance for the Jew. Men like Rabbi Morris M. Feuerlicht, Samuel E. Rauh, and Gustave A. Efroymson upheld the Allied cause in positive fashion.⁷² Many persons, torn by conflicting influences, cautiously avoided attempts of partisans to commit them to either side. In the long run, one of the most significant influences of World War I upon people of the Jewish faith was to increase their interest in the Zionist movement.

There were five churches in Indiana which officially and consistently denounced war as being outside the precepts of their beliefs. They refused to choose sides in the conflict, at least publicly. They stood out solidly against American sale of munitions abroad, opposed efforts to increase the American army and navy, and

⁷¹ *Jewish Daily Courier* as quoted in *Indianapolis News*, August 6, 1914, p. 13. See also Norman Hapgood, “Jews and This War,” in *Harper's Weekly*, 51:177 (August 21, 1915).

⁷² Much of the information for this section was obtained by personal interviews.

their young men refused to do combatant service in the army. For the most part they were to maintain these views after the United States was at war. To charges that they were not carrying their share of the burden, they replied that there could be no compromise with conscience—"they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." These were the Friends (Quakers), Church of the Brethren (Dunkard), Mennonite, Amish, and Seventh-Day Adventists,⁷³ all relatively strong in Indiana. Other churches which denounced war with particular emphasis but did not carry their opposition to this point included the Free Methodist, Pilgrim Holiness, Church of God, Nazarene, and, widely different from the others, Unitarian.

The Episcopal church, which played an important role in the eastern and southern portions of the United States, was comparatively weak in the Middle West, having but slightly more than eight thousand communicants in Indiana. To virtually the last member they "were, of course, for England from the very beginning."⁷⁴ Their leaders sometimes chided the general public for its failure to see the great issues involved and lamented the tendency in some quarters to regard the war as "no more than a dog fight in the

⁷³ Papers of these groups which were published or distributed in Indiana included: Quakers, *The American Friend* and *Earlhamite*, published at Richmond; Church of the Brethren, *Gospel Messenger*, published at Elgin, Illinois; Old Mennonites, supporters of Goshen College, *Goshen College Record*, and the *Gospel Herald* and *Christian Monitor*, published at Scottdale, Pennsylvania; General Conference of Mennonites, *Mennonite*, published at Berne, Indiana; Seventh-Day Adventists, *Advent Review and Sabbath Herald*, published at Washington, D. C.

⁷⁴ Secretary of Bishop R. A. Kirchhoffer of Indianapolis in conversation with the author. See also *Living Church; Witness*; Indianapolis *News*, April 17, 1916, p. 9; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, February 15, 1915, p. 5.

street.” “In the east the conscience of the people seems to be more outspoken—whether you believe they speak out rightly or wrongly—but here it is silent; here we seem to have mistaken moral indifference for political neutrality.”⁷⁵ Apparently, the bond between England and the Episcopal church in America had not been completely severed.

Although very circumspect in all statements of opinion with reference to the war, the Christian Scientists were also pro-English. The chief strength of the Christian Science movement rested in the United States and the British realms; as was explained by one editor, the British Empire with its globe-girdling possessions and its *Pax Britannica* of the sea had been of inestimable indirect service in the spreading of Christian Science doctrine.⁷⁶

The position of the United Brethren church, influential in Indiana, is more difficult to determine. It was of Pennsylvania “Dutch” origin and some of the Pennsylvania congregations still held part of their services in the German language. However, its members were not of recent immigrant stock and did not refer to themselves as German-American. The result seems to have been that a majority favored the Allies but that enough German consciousness remained to cause some of them to be indifferent.⁷⁷ As was true of most Protestant churches, the members were probably more immediately concerned with advancing pro-

⁷⁵ See *Butler Alumnae Quarterly*, July 1, 1916, pp. 53-67, for address by the Right Reverend Charles D. Williams, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan.

⁷⁶ *Christian Science Journal*, May, 1917, pp. 115-16. See *Christian Science Monitor* for the years 1914-17.

⁷⁷ *Religious Telescope*; *Warsaw Northern Indianian*, September 7, 1916, p. 1; September 14, p. 7.

hibition at home than with the course of a war across the seas.

The average town and community had a Methodist, a Presbyterian, a Baptist, and a Christian (Disciples of Christ) church. They occupied the vast middle ground that lay between the Holiness church on one end and the Episcopalians on the other, and they came very near to being Indiana. They had numerous differences, chiefly traditional and inherited, but they agreed in favoring an Allied victory.⁷⁸ In these churches, the ministers were likely to be more partisan than the lay members, because they felt more emotional antipathy for Prussian militarism and war-lord sovereigns. Yet, it would be a grievous error to picture these clergymen and those of other denominations, as shouldering arms in a crusade for a holy war. The apparent fruits of militarism abroad made them firmly opposed to it at home, and for the first year of the war they unitedly opposed proposals for major increases in the army and navy.⁷⁹ Speeches of a few fire eaters to the contrary, they were following and not leading in the movement toward armament. Primarily they hoped for peace, and their attitude was negative or passive in the succeeding crises that led slowly to participation in the war. In the early years they gave more attention to the fight against whisky, Sunday movies, dancing, and card playing than to the war.

⁷⁸ Hopewell *Herald*, January 16, 1915, p. 2; May 7, p. 2; *Western Christian Advocate*, February 23, 1916, p. 2; *Baptist Observer*, September 17, 1914, p. 1; January 21, 1915, p. 1; *Christian Standard*, August 22, 1914, p. 10.

⁷⁹ Hopewell *Herald*, January 16, 1915, p. 2; *Baptist Observer*, October 1, 1914, p. 4; Indiana Baptist Convention, *Proceedings*, 1915 (Indianapolis, 1915), 69; *Christian Standard*, August 22, 1914, p. 10; September 12, p. 10; Bluffton *Banner*, October 5, 1914, p. 2.

There was little difference between the attitudes of the two major political parties throughout the first two years of the war. More directly affected by the war in its early stages were the Progressive and Socialist parties: for both it was a seriously disruptive force.

The Progressive party was already ailing by the summer of 1914, but the war materially hastened its end. For one thing, the impact of war separated the pacifist and internationalist members of the party, such as Jane Addams, from the "red-blooded" and nationalist faction which controlled most of the party press. The fight over the preparedness movement between these two groups was particularly bitter. The pacifists saw in the war a gruesome object lesson of the inevitable result of large armies, whereas the nationalists contended that the one major lesson that the conflict offered America was the need for large military forces for protection against aggressors.⁸⁰ So deep and wide grew this schism that it is difficult to see how the factions could have joined forces again under the old leaders.

A second source of division lay in opposing war sympathies. Apparently the Progressive party contained a larger percentage of intense partisans, both pro-Allied and pro-German, than did the other parties. Men such as Lucius B. Swift, Edward R. Lewis, Willits A. Bastian, and William Dudley Foulke echoed the strictures of Theodore Roosevelt against Germany.⁸¹ On the other hand, the Progressive party

⁸⁰ Plymouth *Republican*, April 1, 1915, p. 4; Lafayette *Courier*, November 18, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *Star*, August 17, 1914, p. 6; Terre Haute *Star*, March 20, 1915, p. 6.

⁸¹ William Dudley Foulke, *Lucius B. Swift. A Biography* (Indiana Historical Society Publications, vol. 9, Indianapolis, 1930), 100.

had been strongest in the German centers, and many German-American Progressive voices were now lifted in defense of the Central Powers, for example, the *Richmond Palladium* and *La Grange Standard*. The vigorous nationalism of the Progressives which led many of them to take a strong, patriotic stand against German threats to American interests caused others to lean toward Germany as a country with similar ideals. The "strenuous life" and German *Kultur* sounded surprisingly similar when described by their respective friends.

Albert J. Beveridge, leading Indiana Progressive, covered the war as a journalist and sent back a series of dispatches that were warmly recommended to readers of the pro-German press.⁸² He insisted that the mission of America was to serve as a buffer and bulwark against oriental Japan, and sided with Germany on the submarine dispute. His efforts to view *Welt-politik* in a realistic light and his predisposition to find favor with vigorous men and nations resulted in much that was favorable to Germany in the early stages of the war.⁸³

The Socialist party had received the largest vote in its history in 1912, and like the Progressives it was strongest in German quarters. Since it had long

⁸² *Collier's*, February 16, 1915, and succeeding weeks. The first dispatch was from Holland and described the Belgian refugees in that country as being sullen and unappreciative. These reports were later expanded and published in *What is Back of the War* (Indianapolis, 1915). See also *La Grange Standard*, August 5, 1915, p. 2, and Claude G. Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1932), 481-82.

⁸³ In a letter to Theodore Roosevelt, December 12, 1914, William Dudley Foulke wrote, "I was rather surprised when during the campaign Beveridge told me that he was personally in favor of the Germans in this European war." William Dudley Foulke Collection, Indiana State Library. See, however, Bowers, *op. cit.*, 494.

been a major premise of the Socialists that capitalism spawned imperialism and imperialism led inevitably to war, their first reaction was a unanimous denunciation of the conflict as one that would be fought by the workers for the benefit of their exploiters.⁸⁴ This unanimity disappeared as the war dragged on. Party members took sides—one section, led by German members, demanding that the United States cease to feed the war with shipments of food, cotton, and munitions, the other opposing embargoes that would operate wholly to Germany's advantage.⁸⁵ There were two things on which the Socialists did agree. The first was their united and last-ditch opposition to the American preparedness campaign, and the second was in their insistence that the United States should not permit its controversies with the belligerents to end in war.

While professing moral shock at the war, every major economic group in the state became optimistic over its dollars-and-cents effect, a result that was doubly welcomed because 1914 was a depression year. On August 8 the *Farmer's Guide* predicted agricultural prosperity and noted that "in one day ninety millions of dollars were added to the value of the wheat held by farmers in this country."⁸⁶ "Yes," one farmer was quoted as saying a month later, "this here war over in Europe is certainly a terrible thing. How high do you suppose the price of wheat will go by Christmas?"⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 8, 1914, p. 2; Indianapolis *Star*, September 8, 1914, p. 1.

⁸⁵ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, July 13, 1915, p. 14; August 16, p. 1; Goshen *Democrat*, September 18, 1914, p. 6.

⁸⁶ *Farmer's Guide*, 26:866 (August 8, 1914). See also *Indiana Farmer*, August 29, 1914, p. 1; December 26, p. 1.

⁸⁷ Indianapolis *Star*, September 25, 1914, p. 8.

Labor anticipated more and superior jobs,⁸⁸ and businessmen hopefully awaited better times. "Even th' loafer is figurin' on bein' benefited by th' European War," wrote a local humorist.⁸⁹ Trade with Europe was expected to boom, and the American opportunity in South America was likened to that of a merchant whose competitors' stores had "all burned down in one night."⁹⁰ As importing rivals were eliminated from the domestic market, a "made in America" campaign was launched to educate the public to the superior qualities of American wines, dyes, toys, dishes, and other items. If, said business leaders, the Government would only refrain from further socialistic, regulatory legislation that was impairing confidence and "making private enterprise timid," the war would pull the country out of the depression.⁹¹ The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce gave expression to the general business reaction when it telegraphed to the Indiana Senators asking that enactment of the Clayton Anti-Trust Bill be deferred so that nothing might interfere with the new boom.⁹²

When an attempt is made to differentiate between the war sympathies and reactions of persons in different occupations and on various economic levels serious difficulty is encountered, because regardless of the size of their income most Hoosiers insisted upon thinking of themselves as middle class. But if hard-and-fast divisions must be eschewed, a few tendencies and

⁸⁸ Indianapolis *Union*, October 23, 1914, p. 1; November 6, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Indianapolis *News*, February 25, 1915, p. 20. These were the words of Abe Martin, small-town philosopher created by Kin Hubbard. His daily observations appeared in newspapers all over the country.

⁹⁰ Chicago *American*, August 24, 1914, p. 10.

⁹¹ Indianapolis *Commercial*, January 4, 1915, p. 4.

⁹² Indianapolis *Star*, August 23, 1914, p. 22; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 13, 1914, p. 6.

inclinations can be recorded. Those in the middle-income group and above were more vocally pro-Allied than were the others. Farmers were less moved by the war than city dwellers, and laborers, less than their employers.

Yet it would be a gross misapprehension to assume that merchants and industrialists were seeking war. They were immersed in their purchases and sales, were not convinced that involvement of the United States would be to their advantage, and were not particularly responsive to "world saving" appeals. Only on one score did they take the lead in action that would help put the country at war, and that was in the preparedness movement. Their desire for an increased army represented a state of mind, however, and not the presence of a plan for its use abroad.

Farmers and laborers presented a generally united front of opposition to any far-reaching armament program,⁹³ but economically each thought the other was seeking to profit unduly from the war by high prices or high wages.⁹⁴ Organized labor was slightly less pro-Allied than were the rest of the workers because of its aversion to labor-baiting Russia, the strength of the trades-union movement in Germany, and the large numbers of German-Americans in the local unions.

That part of the public included in professional, intellectual, and cultural pursuits constituted the most

⁹³ Forty-fifth Annual Session of the Indiana State Grange, *Journal of Proceedings*, 1915 (n.p. n.d.), 17, 19; *Up-To-Date Farming*, November 15, 1915, p. 3; *Indianapolis Union*, January 1, 1915, p. 4; Thirty-first Annual Convention of the Indiana State Federation of Labor, *Proceedings*, 1915 (Indianapolis, 1915), 91.

⁹⁴ *Indianapolis Union*, February 26, 1915, p. 4; *Indianapolis Indiana Daily Times*, August 7, 1914, p. 4; *Farmer's Guide*, 28:1010 (August 26, 1916); *Farm Life*, July, 1916, p. 15.

actively pro-Allied coterie in the state. In this group were men of letters such as James Whitcomb Riley, William Dudley Foulke, George Ade, Meredith Nicholson, and Booth Tarkington. Tarkington wrote half humorously in 1915, "I begin to shake, shriek, and dribble at the mouth whenever there is a pro-German whisper."⁹⁵ Along with the literati went their followers in the persons of librarians, book reviewers, English teachers, and readers of "good" literature,⁹⁶ all mustered into the ranks by their antipathy for gruff German militarism and by a host of able recruiting sergeants including the dead Shakespeare and the living Arnold Bennett, Rupert Brooke, Rudyard Kipling, and John Masefield.

Newspaper editors and publishers were less a unit in their stand, but men like Henry Watterson of the Louisville *Courier-Journal*, Victor Lawson of the Chicago *Daily News*, and Delavan Smith of the Indianapolis *News* cast a wide pro-Allied influence. Active in the pro-Allied group were many lawyers such as Robert W. McBride, James W. Fesler, William H. H. Miller, and Enoch G. Hogate.⁹⁷ An educational contingent was made up of college presidents, William

⁹⁵ Quoted in Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 483. See also Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, September 3, 1914, p. 1; Evansville *Courier*, September 9, 1914, p. 6; Bluffton *Banner*, October 5, 1914, p. 2; Indianapolis *News*, April 17, 1916, p. 9.

⁹⁶ Vincennes *Western Sun*, November 27, 1914, p. 2; Indianapolis *Star*, September 27, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *News*, October 9, 1915, p. 7.

⁹⁷ William H. H. Miller, attorney general in Benjamin Harrison's administration, wrote in a letter to Robert Taylor on January 5, 1915: "I am annoyed that you could believe for an instant that my sympathies could be with the Kaiser! I think there has been no worse man than he since Nero; and as between the two, I should want to hear argument." Robert S. Taylor Collection, Indiana State Library. See also Indianapolis *News*, July 12, 1916, p. 1.

E. Stone of Purdue University, William Lowe Bryan of Indiana University, George R. Grose of De Pauw University, and George L. Mackintosh of Wabash College, and others—college professors such as Louis Sears, Christopher B. Coleman, Amos S. Hershey, and James A. Woodburn—and the educational proletariat, the Hoosier schoolmasters.⁹⁸

Those physicians whose interests ranged beyond their vocations generally belonged to this band (Dr. John N. Hurty, Dr. David Ross, Dr. Joseph E. Morrow, and Dr. John W. Sluss for example)⁹⁹ as did also many of the clergymen, particularly those who administered to the larger congregations.¹ A very influential contingent was made up of businessmen who were leaders in civic affairs—such as Evans Woollen, Hugh McK. Landon, William Fortune, Henry W. Bennett, George C. Hitt, and Josiah K. Lilly.² Nationalistically inspired members of the patriotic societies were ardently pro-Allied despite the historical distrust of

⁹⁸ William W. Sweet, *Indiana Asbury-DePauw University, 1837-1937* . . . (Abingdon Press, New York, 1937), 215; James I. Osborne and Theodore G. Gronert, *Wabash College, The First Hundred Years* (Crawfordsville, 1932), 317; *Indiana University Alumni Quarterly*, 4:347-61 (July, 1917); *Indianapolis News*, April 17, 1916, p. 9; February 26, p. 1.

⁹⁹ *Indianapolis News*, December 16, 1916, p. 4. These men, with about two hundred others from Indiana, sent a petition to President Wilson on behalf of the Belgians who were being deported into Germany to work.

¹ *Indianapolis News*, December 16, 1916, p. 4. Pro-Allied clergymen included such Indianapolis members as Rev. James P. Cowan (Woodruff United Presbyterian Church), Rev. George S. Henninger (Edwin Ray Methodist Episcopal Church), Rev. Allan B. Philputt (Central Christian Church), and Rev. James D. Stanley (Christ Church, Episcopal).

² *Indianapolis News*, December 16, 1916, p. 4; March 24, 1917, p. 1.

Britain held by some of them.³ A last group was composed of women who were possessed of enough leisure, money, and inclination to take part in club discussions, attend lectures, read rather widely, and help collect kits for Belgium and France.⁴ These men and women would welcome battle "not only for the vindication of American rights and for the honor of the American name, but for the preservation of those ideals of justice and humanity upon which the security of the world must rest."⁵ Stated differently, these professional and articulate groups were more war willing than were the average businessman, farmer, laborer, or politician. It should be noted that many of the persons who could expect to reap the greatest economic profit from United States belligerency were far less warlike than the professional groups who would suffer a loss in purchasing power as prices and taxes mounted faster than their salaries and fees.

Among the strongest influences bearing on these professional and intellectual groups was the almost solid front which the magazines presented for the

³ Wilson C. Oren, state adjutant of United Spanish War Veterans in 1939, told the writer that Spanish War veterans had all been anti-German because of the "sour feeling" caused by German action in that war. On the attitude of the Daughters of the American Revolution, see contemporary issues of the *Minute Man*; *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine*; *Foreign Service*; *National Tribune*. Chief emphasis of these periodicals was on patriotism, preparedness, and anti-hyphenism.

⁴ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, November 17, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, November 9, 1914, p. 7; December 5, 1915, p. 13.

⁵ Indiana University *News-Letter*, May, 1917, pp. 1-2. The national counterpart of these local pro-Allied groups comes readily to mind in the persons of Charles W. Eliot, William Roscoe Thayer, Elihu Root, James M. Beck, James T. Shotwell, Owen Wister, William Dean Howells, John Dewey, Adolph Ochs, Walter Lippmann, etc.

Allies. Because they appealed to a limited audience, were not devoted to local news, and were less subject to pressure they presented their pleas more pointedly than did most newspapers. Most determined in their partisanship were *Life* (which published a "Vive La France" edition in early 1915),⁶ *Collier's* (edited by Mark Sullivan who wrote September 5, 1914, that permanent peace would probably necessitate "dividing Germany and Austria into a number of small countries, about equal to Holland or Switzerland"),⁷ *Harper's Weekly* (edited by Norman Hapgood), *North American Review* (Editor George Harvey divided his talent for the vitriolic between Wilson and Germany), *Current History* (published by the *New York Times*), and the *Ladies' Home Journal* (edited by Edward Bok). Others with almost equal bias were the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Independent*, *McClure's Magazine*, *Current Opinion*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *Century*, *Dial*, *Forum*, *Harper's Magazine*, *Living Age*, *Literary Digest*, *Munsey's Magazine*, *Outlook*, *Scribner's Magazine*, *World's Work*, *McCall's*, *American Magazine*, *Delineator*, *Everybody's Magazine*, and the *Nation*. Their appeals stressed the "larger issues" such as militarism, rights of small nations, representative government, and international law. They made much of Belgium's fate. In the pages of some of their number are to be found atrocity pictures which the researcher looks for in vain in the local press prior to 1917.⁸

On the other side of the picture, *Hearst's Magazine* and the other Hearst publications carried many anti-English articles. The *American Review of Reviews* leaned slightly toward the German side. The *New*

⁶ *Life*, May 27, 1915.

⁷ *Collier's*, September 5, 1914, p. 14.

⁸ This is particularly true of *Life* and *Collier's*.

Republic had enough comment favorable to the Central Powers to be classed as sympathetic to Germany through 1914, but by the next year it too had become an Allied champion.

Like the periodicals, the majority of books widely read by the Indiana public carried a pro-Allied message. An especial influence was exerted by those which recounted Belgian suffering⁹ and the equally large number stressing Prussian militarism.¹⁰ Works of the latter category were generally built around extensive quotations from German advocates of militarism and claimants of race superiority. Only in the publication and dissemination of pamphlets, did the German sympathizers appear to hold their own in the literary struggle.¹¹

⁹ Reginald Wright Kauffman, *Little Old Belgium* (New York, 1914); E. Alexander Powell, *Fighting in Flanders* (New York, 1915); Charles Sarolea, *How Belgium Saved Europe* (Philadelphia, 1915); Walter A. Dyer, *Pierrot, Dog of Belgium* (New York, 1915); Richard Harding Davis, *With the Allies* (New York, 1914).

¹⁰ A few of the more influential included: Owen Wister, *Pentecost of Calamity* (New York, 1915); Paul Rohrbach, *German World Policies* (New York, 1915); Newell Dwight Hillis, *Studies of the Great War; What Each Nation Has at Stake* (New York, 1915); Edward S. Van Zile, *Game of Empires; a Warning to America* (New York, 1915); *Germany's War Mania: The Teutonic Point of View as Officially Stated by Her Leaders . . .* (New York, 1915); Poultney Bigelow, *Prussian Memories* (New York, 1916); William Roscoe Thayer, *Germany vs. Civilization . . .* (New York, 1916). In addition there were numerous American editions of Bernhardi's *Germany and the Next War* and compilations of Treitschke's lectures and of Nietzsche's writings. An early book of a slightly different character was James M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case. A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914 . . .* (New York, 1914), in which the author sought to prove German war guilt by citations from the official "war books" of the belligerents.

¹¹ E.g., Bernhard Dernberg, *Germany and England, The Real Issue* (Germanistic Society of Chicago, 1915); Raymond E. Swing, *How Germany Was Forced into War* (Germanistic Society of Chicago, 1914);

Plainly, the elusive thing called Americanism is not represented by any one group but is the process through which the interests of groups are balanced by democratic methods. It is a functioning—not a definite program.

Alphonse G. Koelble, *An Open Letter to the President of the United States* (New York, 1915); William Bayard Hale, *The Exportation of Arms and Munitions of War . . .* (New York, 1915); *Im Kampfe fuer Wahrheit und Recht* (German-American Literary Defense Committee, New York, 1916).

IV. THE WAR COMES CLOSER

THE year 1915 opened with a debate on the propriety of American munition sales to the fighting nations. Discussion centered upon the embargo resolution which the German-American Congressman Richard Bartholdt, of Missouri, had introduced. The Socialists gave some strength to the movement,¹ the churches that condemned all war (Quaker, Mennonite, etc.) usually favored it,² and from the evangelistic rural and small-town section came a scattering of passive support. But it had begun as, and remained, primarily a maneuver of those who wished Germany to win the war.³ They were the ones who formed the organizations and directed the fight, and throughout the early months of 1915 they pushed the drive with

¹ Goshen *Democrat*, September 18, 1914, p. 6; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, July 13, 1915, p. 14.

² See *American Friend*; *Gospel Messenger*; *Gospel Herald*, 7:681 (January 21, 1915); *Mennonite*; Wilcox, *Seventh-Day Adventists in Time of War*.

³ Evansville *Demokrat*, January 21, 1915, p. 4; La Grange *Standard*, November 5, 1914, p. 2; Richmond *Palladium*, February 19, 1915, p. 4 (letter to the editor); *Lutheran Witness*, 34:230-33 (July 27, 1915); Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune*, December 31, 1914, p. 4; *Indiana Catholic*, February 12, 1915, p. 4; Louisville *Times*, January 7, 1915, p. 11 (letter of Herman Ridder). For general information on the embargo campaign, see Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, Chap. II; Clifton J. Child, *The German-Americans in Politics, 1914-1917* (Madison, Wis., 1939), Chap. III; Clifton J. Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War, 1914-1915," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 25:351-68 (December, 1938); *National German-American Alliance*, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 65 Congress, 2 session (Washington, D. C., 1918); *Senate Documents*, 66 Congress, 1 session, No. 61 (Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda [Washington, D. C., 1919]); *Senate Reports*, 74 Congress, 2 session, No. 944, pt. 5 (Munitions Industry. Report on Existing Legislation [Washington, D. C., 1936]).

vigor and near desperation. "Immense mass meetings," Bartholdt warned Congress, "have been and are being held in the large cities, and the interest manifested at these meetings exceeds anything witnessed since the Civil War."⁴

Indiana Congressmen were showered with letters, telegrams, and resolutions threatening political retaliation for votes against the embargo,⁵ while the general public was courted by means of editorials, "letters to the Editor," pamphlets,⁶ and public meetings. Irish and German efforts were pooled, and under such names as the American Neutrality League they held joint embargo meetings throughout the country. From a platform prominently bedecked with the American flag, speakers at these gatherings argued for a stoppage of the arms traffic on the grounds of "real neutrality" and humanitarianism. It was asserted that since Germany could not be defeated, the continued shipment of arms would only prolong the war, whereas

⁴ Quoted in Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War," in *loc. cit.*, 25:357.

⁵ *Brazil Daily Times*, January 26, 1915, p. 4; *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, January 12, 1915, p. 11; *La Porte Argus*, January 8, 1915, p. 1.

The threat of political action seems to have been inspired and pressed by national leaders and organizations more than by local German-Americans. A nation-wide conference held in Washington, January 30, 1915, adopted a resolution advocating a munitions embargo and ending, "We pledge ourselves, individually and collectively, to support only such candidates for public office, irrespective of party, who will place American interests above those of any other country." *Indianapolis News*, February 1, 1915, p. 3. These political warnings appear to have had very little effect, due perhaps in part to the fact that the next election was almost two years distant.

⁶ E.g., Hale, *The Exportation of Arms and Munitions of War*; Charles Nagel, *Traffic in Arms and Ammunition* (1915); and an *Open Letter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations* (National German-American Alliance, 1915).

an embargo would restore peace in Europe "in ninety days." That the war equipment was sorely needed at home for protection was a further contention, and the recent American embargo on munition shipments to the Mexican Government was held up as a worthy precedent for another embargo.

Responsibility for the unholy sales was placed on the triumvirate of munition makers, "Shylocks of high finance," and "Tory newspapers." Sarcastic references were made to "kind Uncle Sam" who talked of neutrality but handed a blackjack to one set of belligerents; who dispatched nurses, medicine, and bandages to Europe to heal wounds but at the same time sent guns to inflict more wounds. Audiences cheered proposals for the establishment of a "higher and better international law" that would prohibit arms sales, and hissed references to England, J. P. Morgan, the Du Ponts, and William Jennings Bryan (strange company for the Commoner). At the close of each meeting, a previously prepared resolution was read, adopted, and forwarded to local editors and Congressmen.⁷

The embargo advocates tended to single out Sec-

⁷ For a description of such meetings, see Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung*, January 12, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, February 9, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, February 9, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, February 9, 1915, p. 9; Hammond *Lake County News*, February 11, 1915, p. 1; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, January 12, 1915, p. 2; *Indiana Catholic*, February 12, 1915, p. 1.

A typical resolution (adopted at a meeting of the German-American Alliance of La Porte) ended with the following paragraph: "Be it further resolved, That we . . . reject as hypocrisy and national sacrilege the commercial spirit of the country that is answering our supplications for peace by sending the instruments of destruction and death to the serried armies arrayed in struggle through the empires of Europe." La Porte *Argus*, January 8, 1915, p. 1.

retary of State Bryan as chief obstructionist of their policy and to funnel their attacks on him. After he defended the munitions trade in a much-publicized letter to Senator William J. Stone, of Missouri, an advocate of the embargo,⁸ he was held personally responsible for Administration policy and was dubbed "England's obedient servant," "mountebank," "faker," "grape-juice clown," "church-dome politician," "ally of the Allies," and a person who "ought to be buried in Westminster Abbey." He was accused of having sold out to England for "thirty pieces of silver," and of being pro-English because his daughter had married an English naval officer.⁹ Each pronouncement of his name at embargo meetings brought an audible response from the audience. Managers of an American Neutrality League meeting in Indianapolis on February 8 made manful efforts to keep the assembly orderly and succeeded except for the hisses that greeted references to Bryan.¹⁰

The greater part of the citizenry, however, was opposed, actively or passively, to a munitions embargo as a change in existing policy. For one thing, the dominant role played by pro-Germans caused the embargo movement to be associated, not with neutrality,

⁸ Quoted in *Goshen News-Times*, January 25, 1915, p. 2; *Brazil Daily Times*, January 26, 1915, p. 4; *Valparaiso Daily Vidette*, January 25, 1915, p. 1.

⁹ *Indianapolis Telegraph and Tribune*, February 5, 1915, p. 4; *Richmond Palladium*, February 19, 1915, p. 4; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 48-49.

¹⁰ *Indianapolis Star*, February 9, 1915, p. 1. The German-Americans of Indiana stopped short of the abusive and acrimonious heights reached by their blood brothers in neighboring states. Much of the credit for that restraint belongs to Joseph Keller, president of the German-American Alliance of Indiana.

but its opposite. The public knew that if stopping munition exports would end the war in ninety days it could do so only by ensuring the victory of a prepared Germany. Even Indiana's most influential pacifist, David Starr Jordan, was unable to convince himself that traffic in munitions should be debarred, since "prohibition in that matter would play directly into Germany's hands."¹¹

Furthermore, the right of private citizens of a neutral country to sell munitions to belligerents was a long-accepted principle of international law—subject only to rules governing blockade and contraband—and a principle for which the United States had many times contended.¹² An abrupt change of the rules in the midst of war was deemed an unneutral act that would withhold from the Allied powers rights belonging to them under international law.¹³ Bryan's view that it was "the business of a belligerent operating on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral to prevent contraband from reaching an enemy," and that it would be "an act of partiality" on the part of the Government to "equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents," was much quoted in Indiana.¹⁴ It was shown that Germany had encouraged such sales when she was a neutral.¹⁵ It

¹¹ David Starr Jordan, *The Days of a Man* . . . (2 vols. Yonkers-on-Hudson, 1922), 2:652.

¹² Indianapolis *News*, January 23, 1915, p. 6; *Terre Haute Star*, February 20, 1915, p. 6; *Muncie Evening Press*, February 8, 1915, p. 4.

¹³ Princeton *Democrat*, January 27, 1915, p. 2; Indianapolis *News*, April 7, 1915, p. 6; South Bend *Tribune*, January 1, 1915, p. 8; Evansville *Journal-News*, February 9, 1915, p. 8; Louisville *Herald*, April 18, 1915, p. 4.

¹⁴ Bryan to Stone, January 20, 1915.

¹⁵ South Bend *News-Times*, March 8, 1915, p. 8; Indianapolis *News*, April 17, 1915, p. 6.

was further contended that instead of promoting peace, an embargo would place a premium on militarism by necessitating the accumulation in time of peace of great stores of fighting equipment.¹⁶

Divorced from long-range questions of sentiment or precedent was an argument of immediate practical importance to thousands of Indiana citizens. Adoption of the embargo would "shut down many of our largest factories" and "throw thousands of men out of work."¹⁷ Spokesmen for manufacturers, retail merchants, organized laborers, and farmers were united in fearing this result.¹⁸ Finally, albeit the Mexican embargo offered a precedent for the waiving of legal rights, that action had not been inaugurated to establish neutrality but for the express purpose of assisting one side in a civil conflict. And the majority saw no reason for so helping Germany. As summarized by one contemporary: "Instead of occupying a neutral position, this country would incur a financial

¹⁶ Princeton *Democrat*, February 11, 1915, p. 2.

¹⁷ Indianapolis *News*, January 6, 1915, p. 6. See also Brazil *Daily Times*, January 26, 1915, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, March 16, 1915, p. 4.

¹⁸ Indianapolis *Commercial*, January 11, 1915, p. 1; January 21, p. 1; Indianapolis *Union*, September 25, 1914, p. 4; Thirty-first Annual Convention of the Indiana State Federation of Labor, *Proceedings*, 1915, p. 91. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, was supported in Indiana when he warned labor in the fall of 1915 that those who proposed an arms embargo were not considering fully "the disastrous effect upon the workers of our country as well as upon all of the citizens that would come from such a restriction and discrimination of trade which would result in closing so many industries and would quickly reduce thousands of men, women and children of our country to starvation." Indianapolis *Union*, December 17, 1915, p. 8. Farm support was largely negative but no less real therefor. Indiana-published farm papers gave silent consent. See *Farmer's Guide*, *Farm Life*, *Indiana Farmer*, *Up-To-Date Farming*.

loss by the abandonment of a legalized traffic, in order to aid Germany.'"¹⁹

Embargo proponents were to continue their efforts to block the arms trade until the eve of American belligerency, but there was no substantial hope for their success after these early months of 1915 (before the "Lusitania" was sunk and before the American stake in the arms traffic had become excessive). Primarily, they failed because Congress was aware that the general public had not been won to their crusade. Upon that general public, then, rests much of the responsibility for the continuance of the arms flow.²⁰ Influence of the arms manufacturers was inconsequential, for there were no munition tycoons in Indiana in 1915.

One of the most significant results of the embargo campaign was the sharpening of hyphenate and anti-hyphenate sentiments. The drive had fortuitously placed the German-Americans in the role of criticizing the American Government and its policy, and they lacked the temperament and tact to play that part without injury to themselves. Already inclined to press their war views too aggressively, they became even more unpolitic and combative in their attempts to prevent American shot from being used to kill relatives, friends, and former co-patriots in Germany.

¹⁹ *Louisville Times*, January 7, 1915, p. 6. The argument of militarists that munition shipments would expand the productive capacity of the country's armament plants and thereby aid in the preparedness drive did not appear in Indiana.

²⁰ The *Evansville Journal-News*, February 9, 1915, p. 8, said, "maybe . . . the people of this country don't want this brand of Neutrality. Maybe they, too, want to see democracy triumph over monarchy, and maybe they also want to see this vile thing called militarism crushed for once and for all time to the earth."

They made their neighbors' attitude a personal matter, and they leveled too many and too heated assaults at the United States for its "hypocrisy" and "commercial spirit."²¹ The result was to repel sympathy, causing one of their number to warn his brothers, "Germany may well cry out, Defend me from my friends."²²

Judging from a sampling of contemporary reactions, this admonition might better have been heeded. "The sooner the one-sided neutrality meetings are called off the longer will be postponed internal troubles that will be as serious as an outside conflict."²³ "The only foreign element in this country which is assailing the President of the United States and seeking to bulldoze the government of the United States is the German element, and that sort of thing can be easily over done."²⁴ "Regardless of what may be thought of the Secretary of State one can have no respect for the New York audience which hissed Mr. Bryan and cheered for the German emperor."²⁵ Let

²¹ Evansville *Demokrat*, January 26, 1915, p. 4; Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune*, March 29, 1915, p. 4; Richmond *Palladium*, February 19, 1915, p. 4. Dr. Charles J. Hexamer, president of the National German-American Alliance, had helped set the pattern the preceding November at Philadelphia when he harangued against "the lick-spittle policy of our country" toward Great Britain and suggested that the stars and stripes should be replaced by the dollar mark and the *e pluribus unum* by "get the dollar, no matter how you get it." See Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 25:356.

²² Letter of Walter Kessler in Indianapolis *Star*, February 8, 1915, p. 6.

²³ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, February 10, 1915, p. 6.

²⁴ Chicago *Tribune*, February 4, 1915, p. 6.

²⁵ South Bend *Tribune*, March 24, 1915, p. 8. As a matter of fact this editor was very critical of Bryan; his attitude was an indication that the opposition to German-American activity at this time was

those who love another country more than the United States go back and fight for "the dear old Faderland."²⁶ "The hyphenated American who goes around with a chip on his shoulder and an ominous threat on his tongue is a good man to shun and let alone."²⁷ "Put on the soft pedal, brother—the soft pedal."²⁸ "If the esteemed hyphenated Americans don't happen to like the way certain affairs are being conducted in this country, there are two fairly broad oceans to east and west into which they can jump with a running start."²⁹ This lusty denunciation demonstrated that some citizens were beginning to classify pro-German sentiments as anti-American. The association resulted partly from pro-Allied emotionalism. It arose, also, from the belief that it was impossible to uphold German autocracy and American representative government at the same time.

In a broader sense, the sharp remarks directed at German-Americans were but expressions of a general nativistic tendency. The European war, like a strong draft, fanned into flame the old loves and hatreds of immigrants who had brought their high hopes and discordant loyalties to the melting pot during the past

bipartisan. See Muncie *Evening Press*, February 8, 1915, p. 4, for further comment on this score.

²⁶ Winamac *Democrat-Journal*, January 1, 1915, p. 4.

²⁷ Hammond *Lake County Times*, February 18, 1915, p. 4.

²⁸ Rensselaer *Jasper County Democrat*, February 24, 1915, p. 2.

²⁹ Hammond *Lake County Times*, February 13, 1915, p. 4. The Chicago mayoralty election of April, 1915, was the occasion for a partial test of strength between the hyphenates and antihyphenates. William Hale Thompson, Republican, was elected despite the support given to his Democratic opponent, Robert M. Schweitzer, by the Germans and Austrians. However, so numerous and varied were the issues in the campaign that the exact weight of this one factor was impossible to determine. See *Literary Digest*, 50:863 (April 17, 1915).

generation. European governments laid claim to the loyalties of many of them, naturalized or unnaturalized, and their consuls in America printed notices in American papers in the mother tongues calling on reservists to return to fight.

In the consequent bickerings of Serbians, Poles, Germans, Hungarians, English, and Irish, the war was transferred to each American community. As a result many a citizen came to doubt the efficacy of past immigration policy and to express considerable anxiety over the state of American patriotism and nationalism. Disquieted, they wondered if the United States had become a mere international boardinghouse whose inhabitants still regarded some other country as home. National origins appeared to be replacing agrarian sectionalism as the chief threat to American nationalism and unity. Painfully conscious of the tortuous process by which the one had been surmounted, the people struck out instinctively—sometimes blindly—against all forms of hyphenism.

Practically every editor in the state wrote long and feelingly on "United States above all," or "Be an American first."³⁰ "This is America," ran one preachment. "Here we must be all Americans, not only first but last and all the time . . . if we are to live together in peace and unity. There is no other way. . . . Keep the war out of American politics, the American city, the American home. Bar it everlastingly from American citizenship. This we can and this we must."³¹ Unfortunately, but almost in-

³⁰ Columbus *Evening Republican*, February 18, 1915, p. 4; Peru *Evening Journal*, February 19, 1915, p. 1; Bedford *Daily Democrat*, February 23, 1915, p. 2; North Judson *News*, February 25, 1915, p. 4.

³¹ Quoted in Lafayette *Journal*, February 12, 1915, p. 6, from Chicago *Herald*.

evitably, these sentiments were sometimes accompanied by illiberal aspects of "Know Nothingism" (native Americanism), which made it more instead of less difficult for foreign-born groups to become an integral part of the nation. That the antihyphenate emotions made a small contribution to eventual war sentiment by way of increased national sensitiveness should not be overlooked.

Embargo campaigns and hyphenate divisions were not the only avenues by which the war was drawing nearer the United States. Heretofore, judgments on the belligerents had been made in much the same way as a person assesses the characters in a play from a safe seat in the balcony. But now the actors were beginning to infringe upon the immunity of the audience, drawing its very reluctant members into the plot. Early in February, for example, the German reservist, Werner Van Horn, was placed in a Maine jail after attempting to dynamite the bridge of the Canadian Pacific where it crossed into the United States at Vanceboro, Maine.³² Soon afterward the German-American Richard P. Stegler was brought to trial in New York and found guilty of passport fraud. His accusation that Captain Karl Boy-Ed, German naval attaché, had assisted him was widely believed.³³ Of themselves, these events were not of first-rank significance, but they marked the beginning of a source of nationalistic antagonism toward Germany and her agents which in time was to grow to primary importance.

³² *Terre Haute Star*, February 6, 1915, p. 1; *Goshen News-Times*, February 3, 1915, p. 3.

³³ *Indianapolis News*, March 1, 1915, p. 1; March 20, p. 6; *Seymour Republican*, March 20, 1915, p. 2. Dark hints were sometimes made that German Ambassador Bernstorff was among the conspirators.

Meanwhile, American commerce on the Atlantic was being buffeted by the combatant powers. In the early months of 1915 the Allies defined their blockade program, and the Germans first asserted their right to use the submarine against merchant ships in a manner not covered by existing international rules. More important still, this was the period when the United States evolved its official attitude toward these practices and set the wheel on a course that was to end in collision with Germany.

Aggressively pro-Allied papers were quick to take an uncompromising stand against the German position.³⁴ The German-language and Irish papers, at the opposite extreme, proclaimed the need for a new declaration of independence from Britain in the form of ruptured diplomatic relations and a resounding ultimatum.³⁵ However, neither of these extreme groups represented the attitude of the majority, for in the absence of spectacular or challenging incidents public opinion crystallized slowly and irregularly. Under these circumstances, perhaps the most fruitful method of tracing local reactions through the period is to follow the daily comments of a fairly typical newspaper such as the South Bend *Tribune*. This paper was pro-Allied, but not pugnaciously so. Being Republican in politics, its expressions were not mere reflections of those of the national administration.

Three days before the beginning of the year the United States had dispatched its first strong protest note of the war. Addressed to Great Britain, it detailed the illegalities to which American shippers

³⁴ Indianapolis *News*, February 13, 1915, p. 6; April 2, p. 6; Louisville *Courier-Journal*, February 4, 1915, p. 4; February 12, p. 4.

³⁵ Evansville *Demokrat*, February 11, 1915, p. 4; Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, February 10, 1915, p. 4; February 12, p. 4.

were being subjected by Britain's efforts to blockade Germany. A full-page headline, "Wilson Demands Big Damages of England," brought the news to the attention of the readers of the South Bend *Tribune*.³⁶ The editor applauded the note, arguing "that neutral nations likewise have inalienable rights and no country, not even Great Britain, can gainsay those rights. The United States not only spoke for itself in the matter but also for every other neutral nation." Furthermore, "the vigorous and direct protest ought to go far in silencing the assertions that this country is pro-Allied in its sentiment. The note to Great Britain shows that we are pro-nothing except pro-neutral."³⁷ A preliminary reply made on January 10, 1915, left the editor disappointed but still optimistic. "About all that can be or ought to be said concerning the British reply to the American note of protest sent some days ago to Great Britain is that it is apparently satisfactory as far as it goes. Being merely preliminary in character it does not go to the end of the matter." But because of its friendly tone he felt that "there should be relief on both sides of the Atlantic over the progress of negotiations."³⁸

The next development to catch the editor's eye was the controversy over the "Dacia," a formerly German-owned merchantman that had been interned and subsequently sold. When the new American owner proposed to carry cotton to Germany, the British announced their intention of seizing vessel and

³⁶ South Bend *Tribune*, December 29, 1914, p. 1. Frederick A. Miller was editor of the *Tribune*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, December 30, 1914, p. 6. For similar sentiments, see Seymour *Republican*, January 4, 1915, p. 4; Princeton *Democrat*, January 1, 1915, p. 2; Hartford City *Telegram*, December 30, 1914, p. 4; Indianapolis *Star*, December 30, 1914, p. 6.

³⁸ South Bend *Tribune*, January 11, 1915, p. 6.

cargo. This threat was used in an editorial of January 21 as an argument against the pending Ship-Purchase Bill that proposed to create a government-owned merchant marine by the purchase of vessels interned in American ports. It was the editor's opinion that if the Government bought interned German ships and the Allies confiscated them when they appeared on the ocean, the country would run a "grave risk of becoming involved in the European war."³⁹ On the next day he discussed the "Dacia" case on its own merits, criticizing those who argued that the duties of neutrality demanded that the ship not be permitted to leave port. Let it sail, said the editor, a British prize court will determine its status. He did not appear to be greatly concerned as to which way the decision would go, for like most of the public, he regarded the issue primarily as one between Germany and the Allies.⁴⁰

Thus far direct clashes with the belligerents had been confined to the Allies. Though the editor had condemned English action and applauded the American protest, he had not dwelt on the possibility of a serious impasse nor demanded strong action. At least some of the reasons for this mild attitude are easily ascertainable. Those who had suffered most from English sea activity were the meat packers, cotton growers, and importing and exporting firms generally. Except for a slight interest in the first group,

³⁹ *Ibid.*, January 21, 1915, p. 8. Republican leaders in Congress made frequent use of this argument in their efforts to defeat the Ship-Purchase Bill.

⁴⁰ South Bend *Tribune*, January 22, 1915, p. 8. As far as the Indiana public was concerned Ambassador Walter Hines Page's artful suggestion that a French, not an English, warship should do the arresting was helpful but far from vital.

Indiana had virtually no economic stake in these interests.⁴¹ There was little emotional reaction since British illegality had not resulted in loss of life. Although England did not balk at violation of commercial law she observed all the niceties of international etiquette and engaged in no saber rattling, thereby reducing friction at the points of contact. That the South Bend *Tribune* and the public wanted the Allies to win was, of course, a further factor, but one which postwar writers who have puzzled over American unneutrality have almost unanimously ignored or underestimated.

The next move in the commercial war was Germany's. On February 4, 1915, she issued the first of her submarine orders, proclaiming that the waters around Great Britain and Ireland were to be considered a war zone in which all enemy vessels, merchant as well as war, would be liable to attack without warning. The news filled a front-page column in the South Bend *Tribune* under the headings, "German Action Regarding Zone Becomes Grave," and "U. S. Not to Protest."⁴² From the editorial page no comment was forthcoming on this or succeeding days, although space was found for a jibe at the expense of England.⁴³ Most papers fell short of even this limited emphasis. The Seymour *Republican* gave the German order three inches of space, and the Bloomington *Daily Telephone* buried it on the last page.⁴⁴

⁴¹ *Farmer's Guide*, 26:1174 (November 7, 1914), noted that the war had helped the northern farmer but injured the southern agriculturist. See also Peterson, *Propaganda for War*, 80.

⁴² South Bend *Tribune*, February 5, 1915, p. 1.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, February 8, 1915, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Seymour *Republican*, February 6, 1915, p. 1; Bloomington *Daily Telephone*, February 5, 1915, p. 4.

On February 10 the State Department responded to the submarine threat by a warning that the United States Government would hold Germany to "strict accountability" for any American lives and property destroyed in violation of acknowledged principles of international law. At the same time a note was dispatched to Great Britain protesting her ruse of flying the American flag over British vessels while in the danger zone. The South Bend editor carried this double news under the heading, "Pointed Notes Sent by Nation to Two Powers."⁴⁵

The following day the notes were given full approval as being "of the right sort." The remonstrance to Britain was described as being rightly less vigorous than that to Germany because rules governing the use of neutral flags were vague and undefined. For the proposed German action there was deemed to be absolutely no legal basis, and it threatened lives as well as property. "The United States is a neutral nation, but it is also an independent nation. It will permit no other country to put limitations upon what it can or cannot do without warrant in international law."⁴⁶ The "strict accountability" clause was not specifically mentioned. Taking no further notice of the American protests, the editor turned his attention to the subject of hyphenates.

A week later, February 19, German and English replies were received almost simultaneously. The ed-

⁴⁵ South Bend *Tribune*, February 11, 1915, p. 1. The British strategy of raising the American flag over her ships while in the submarine zone caught the public attention and received more censure in Indiana than did any of Britain's previous practices. As a matter of fact, action in this case was probably legal.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, February 12, 1915, p. 8. Only a minority of the editors made mention of the "strict accountability" phrase.

itor bracketed them in a discussion pointing out that neither conceded anything to the American position and that American rejoinders were probably being prepared. "We are advocates of neither belligerent before the other," he wrote. "We have only ourselves to look out for. It is a trying situation; one that will not be bettered by captious criticism of England, Germany or of President Wilson."⁴⁷ Washington's birthday provided the editor with an occasion for expressing his views on a proper American foreign policy. He found its goals to be two: to remain free of Old World quarrels, and to uphold the rights of neutrality.⁴⁸ During the remainder of the month he expressed opposition to an arms embargo, worried over divided national loyalties, and criticized Theodore Roosevelt for his growing bellicosity.⁴⁹

March 1 was greeted with a new British Order in Council which tightened the Allied blockade by providing for the interception of all ships sailing to or from Germany and by placing food on the contraband list. "We ought to speak to the Allies in terms as certain and as plain as those in which we spoke to Germany," was the editor's reaction. He hastened to add, however, "what recourse we shall have if our protests are ignored rests in the future. For the

⁴⁷ South Bend *Tribune*, February 19, 1915, p. 10.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, February 22, 1915, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, February 24, 1915, p. 8; February 26, 1915, p. 8. On the latter date this Republican editor expressed his views on both the foreign situation and the man who had split the Republican party in 1912. "The manner in which our ex-presidents, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft, are now conducting themselves is decidedly typical. Mr. Taft, having coming to the water's edge, is holding up the hands of the administration and calling on every patriot to stand by the President. Mr. Roosevelt is writing inflammatory articles assailing the conduct of our foreign affairs and urging us to butt into the trouble on the other side."

present at least it were better it remain there.”⁵⁰ Increased anti-British feeling was clearly indicated when he remarked two days later that although he was still opposed to prohibiting the sale of munitions it was good strategy to threaten such action, to bring “Great Britain and France to their senses and force from them as favorable consideration to American commerce as Germany has indicated she will give.”⁵¹

On the very day that the British order went into effect, came the news of another event which overshadowed and nullified it as far as public opinion was concerned. For on March 11, 1915, the German cruiser “Prinz Eitel Friedrich” put in at Newport News and announced the sinking of the American merchantman “William P. Frye” after rescue of the crew. This act was a clear violation of American sea rights (as Germany tardily admitted) and meant the loss of one of the best units in the small American merchant fleet. The editor commented, “Germany now has a chance to prove her assertion of February that ‘heretofore’ she has observed the Declaration of London by assuming full responsibility for the destruction of the ‘William P. Frye’ and making full and immediate reparation.” This sinking “has crowded the ‘Wilhelmina’ and ‘Dacia’ cases out of the limelight.”⁵²

A few days later the editor introduced a new

⁵⁰South Bend *Tribune*, March 2, 1915, p. 6.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, March 4, 1915, p. 10. This is the only reference the editor of the *Tribune* made to the German bargain offer which, in fact, seems to have passed almost unnoticed by the general public. Those writers who did comment on it did not feel that it offered a basis for negotiation. “Our rights as against each and every belligerent are complete and are in no way related,” asserted the *Terre Haute Star*, February 19, 1915, p. 6.

⁵²South Bend *Tribune*, March 11, 1915, p. 8; March 12, p. 8.

idea: "the United States protests seem to have more effect upon Carranza than on Great Britain or Germany. Maybe it's because they were backed up by a cruiser."⁵³ What was in his mind was shown more clearly by his conclusion two days later that the uncertain times had made an increase in the army and navy imperative.⁵⁴ The discovery that the way of the neutral was hard was leading the editor to look upon preparedness as a means of increasing American bargaining power. It was not war that he wanted, but a bigger stick. By March 26, however, he had found what seemed to be a more profitable and less dangerous solution to current diplomatic problems. The country should sit tight until the end of the war when damages could be collected and the fruits of American factories and farms sold to a depleted Europe.

"So," he concluded, "while we rage and fume inwardly at the difficulties which beset us and at the annoyances which Europe thrusts upon us, it will be some comfort to remember that there will be a day of reckoning after while when we shall not only demand and receive damages for what we have suffered but when all of Europe will also have to pay us for what we have and what it has not, but which it will most desperately need. Things will have to grow much worse before we can afford to permit ourselves to be drawn into the vortex swirling over Europe."⁵⁵

This program of long-range patience must not have been entirely self-satisfying, for in a few days he

⁵³ *Ibid.*, March 16, 1915, p. 8.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1915, p. 8.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, March 26, 1915, p. 10. For similar sentiments, see Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, March 11, 1915, p. 4.

returned to the "Frye" incident with biting criticism of Germany's failure to "acknowledge its wrong and voluntarily make recompense." This time he had no set solution. "Just what a great neutral nation, which possesses the power to strike in its own defense if necessary, should do to maintain its rights, its friendships and its peace as well is no small problem. While the government is seeking to solve it, the situation emphasizes anew the demand patriotism makes upon us all to stand unitedly and unequivocally behind the President."⁵⁶

The month of April saw few new developments in the commercial war that the combatants were waging against one another and the rest of the world. The editor of the *Tribune* used the lull for criticism of hyphenates,⁵⁷ German air raids,⁵⁸ and the use of poison gas.⁵⁹ In early May he returned to the submarine issue as a result of German attacks on the American tankers "Cushing" and "Gulflight," remarking that "torpedoing neutral ships at sea is always a grave matter for some unfortunate sailors."⁶⁰ On May 6, 1915, he printed without comment the *Chicago Herald's* virulent condemnation of the sinking of the "Gulflight" and carried a cartoon on the front page

⁵⁶ South Bend *Tribune*, March 31, 1915, p. 8.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, April 17, 1915, p. 12.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, April 19, 1915, p. 6. "If these air raids keep up about the only safe place for women and children will be in the armies," wrote the editor on this date.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, April 30, 1915, p. 10. "Which side first resorted to the use of gases is involved in bitter dispute, but, whichever did, had resort to one of the most hellish means of fighting," was the editorial reaction.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, May 3, 1915, p. 6. The editor took no notice of the warning to prospective travelers published by the German Embassy in the New York papers on May 1.

picturing submarines lying in wait for American ships.⁶¹

The next day the "Lusitania" was sunk.

Having come to the eve of the "Lusitania" sinking, one is inclined to look back over the road with some puzzlement as to just what was the attitude of the public during those months. Inattention and indecision seemed almost to outweigh more positive reactions; practically all Indiana editors displayed more interest in Mexico, the Ship-Purchase Bill, and politics than in the war. There were week-long stretches when the smaller dailies made only the most cursory references to the war.

Yet certain attitudes were clear enough. The people of Indiana did not wish nor expect to become a part of the "European war." At the same time, they talked at length about American rights and honor and expected their Government to uphold them. There was no demand for hasty action on this score, however. The public was willing to wait until after the war, when the United States would have "a long list of damages to collect from the people who have transgressed her rights."⁶² "The thing for us to do," suggested the *Fort Wayne News*, "is to confine our activities to protestation and the filing of bills of damage, and to let the nations most concerned fight it out among themselves."⁶³

As long as there was no loss of life, there would be but little excitement over a "matter such as the stoppage of ships."⁶⁴ This tolerance applied to Ger-

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, May 6, 1915, pp. 1 and 10.

⁶² *Plymouth Democrat*, February 25, 1915, p. 4.

⁶³ *Fort Wayne News*, March 2, 1915, p. 14.

⁶⁴ *Evansville Courier*, January 1, 1915, p. 4.

man action almost as broadly as to English practices, for so clear-cut a violation of law and comity as the "Frye" incident roused no war sentiments. Unmoved by German-American charges that he was a hireling of England, and by the fulminations of the more intense Allied partisans that he was apathetic and stolid, the average Hoosier went about the work which spring had brought for him to do.

Intent, however, is not always a measure of responsibility. Despite their honest testimonials for peace, the people of Indiana had helped to lay the foundations for conflict with Germany. Most of them had opposed an embargo on arms shipments. They had not favored challenging the North Sea war zone established by Britain nor testing the English and American interpretations of international law by strong economic measures or by a threat of arms. They accepted the Government's submarine policy. In each case they had chosen what appeared to be the better alternative.

V. SUBMARINE DIPLOMACY

THE morning papers of Friday, May 7, 1915, carried the disquieting report of a drastic twenty-one point ultimatum recently served on China by the Japanese Government. The afternoon papers contained wrathful editorials on the subject, but at the eleventh hour their front pages had been revamped to make room for a story that touched the United States far more closely. The "Lusitania," luxury liner and pride of the English Cunard Line, had been torpedoed and sunk without warning near the Irish coast with nearly two thousand passengers and crew aboard, many of whom were Americans.

The reader found but little definite information in the Friday afternoon newspaper. He read (usually for the first time) of the warning that had appeared in the New York press on May 1, of the American celebrities aboard, and of the size and beauty of the ship. He also read that virtually all of the passengers were believed to be safe, thanks to the airtight bulkheads, adequate lifeboats, and the proximity of other vessels and the shore.¹ By the next morning, however, a tale of confusion, panic, heroism, and death began to unroll. Three names in the list of dead caught the public eye: author Elbert Hubbard; Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, who perished after surrendering his life preserver to a woman; and Broadway producer Charles Frohman, whose half-smiling acquiescence in death as the "most beautiful adventure of life" constituted the perfect exit.² Piteous

¹ Fort Wayne *News*, May 7, 1915, p. 1; Anderson *Bulletin*, May 7, 1915, p. 1; Gary *Post-Tribune*, May 7, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, May 7, 1915, p. 1.

² Elkhart *Truth*, May 8, 1915, p. 1; Anderson *Bulletin*, May 10, 1915, p. 1; Terre Haute *Star*, May 9, 1915, p. 1; Evansville *Courier*,

stories were recounted. Two children "were brought ashore clasped in each other's arms."³ A mother, half crazed by the drowning of her baby, "looked for a moment at the child's face and then said, 'Let me bury my baby' at the same time placing the child in the water."⁴ In Indiana, rumors sprang up, grew, and multiplied like endlessly dividing cells. On Sunday night and throughout Monday morning a report swept parts of the state that President Wilson had been assassinated by a German agent.⁵

Clearly this sinking was not to be regarded as casually as had those that preceded it. The fact that 124 of the dead who lay along the Irish shore or unrecovered in the Atlantic were citizens of the United States brought the "European war" home to the American public. Weekly newspapers shoved aside the subjects of politics and Mexico and took up a discussion of the war for the first time since the excitement of its beginning.⁶

Horror and anger mounted hand in hand. The action was "piratical," "abominable," "sickening," "dastardly," "hellish," and a "massacre," exclaimed the South Bend *Tribune* in a single editorial.⁷ "It is not war," said the Evansville *Courier*, "it is

May 9, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, May 11, 1915, p. 8. Frohman was quoted as saying, "Why fear death? It is the most beautiful adventure of life."

³ Indianapolis *News*, May 8, 1915, p. 1.

⁴ South Bend *Tribune*, May 10, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, May 10, 1915, p. 1.

⁵ Muncie *Evening Press*, May 10, 1915, p. 1.

⁶ See, for example, the Huntingburg *Independent*, Ligonier *Banner*, Hobart *News*, Liberty *Herald*, Bloomfield *News*, Lawrenceburg *Register*, Corydon *Democrat*, English *Crawford County Democrat*, Rockport *Journal*, Petersburg *Pike County Democrat*, Brookville *American*, Mooresville *Times*.

⁷ South Bend *Tribune*, May 8, 1915, p. 10.

the deliberate cold-blooded murder of women and children. . . . It is as wanton, brutal, insensate as any of the acts that have made Attila and Alva cursed through the ages."⁸ A Hammond editor asserted angrily that the "Lusitania" victims "were simply assassinated. Today Germany defends the act by saying to America: You were warned. If one man should write a letter to another saying: 'I'm coming to your house to shoot you tonight,' and did so—would that be any less murder because of the letter? The sinking of the 'Lusitania' horrifies the world. The shades of Attila and Nero are disconsolate these days. None such opportunities were theirs."⁹

"Many stories of the atrocities of war may have been false, but they are easier to believe now,"¹⁰ pronounced the Frankfort *Crescent-News*, while the *Steuben Republican* judged it "a sorry day for the German people when the 'Lusitania' was sent to her doom, for not a nation on earth before that time thought it possible that any civilized people could commit such an act."¹¹

The Vevay *Reveille* drew an analogy between the ocean highway and Main Street in Vevay. "Everybody has a right to travel it so long as he observes the law and the rights of others. Because two families living on opposite sides of the street are at enmity does not warrant closing the street." Furthermore, to give warning "only makes the case the more aggravated. Premeditation in any killing makes it murder in the first degree."¹²

⁸ Evansville *Courier*, May 8, 1915, p. 6.

⁹ Hammond *Lake County Times*, May 8, 1915, p. 4.

¹⁰ Frankfort *Crescent-News*, May 13, 1915, p. 4.

¹¹ Angola *Steuben Republican*, May 12, 1915, p. 4.

¹² Vevay *Reveille*, May 13, 1915, p. 4.

Criticism of the "Lusitania" sinking was based on the "higher law" of humanity, the law of nations, and the Treaty of 1828 between the United States and Prussia. The first was a moral protest and was expressed in the language of the King James Bible, *Pilgrim's Progress*, McGuffey's Readers, and the camp meeting. Belgian and "Lusitania" catastrophes were mentally associated as common manifestations of German ruthlessness. Again Germany had put herself at a disadvantage in comparison with the Allies, by disregarding the strong moralistic convictions of millions of Americans.¹³

Geography and a hundred years of comparative foreign peace had caused American foreign policy to become identified with the accepted norms of the law of neutrality to an extent that was not true of any other country. Under international law Germany possessed the legal right to seize the contraband which a ship carried, and in particular circumstances she could destroy the vessel itself, so long as she fulfilled the obligation of providing for the relative safety of the crew and passengers. But this provision had been ignored in the case of the "Lusitania" and upon that ground the editors rightly took their stand.¹⁴ Because lives were at stake in the submarine quarrel, it could not be left for settlement until the end of

¹³ For further comments on this score, see Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* . . . (New York, 1940), 339-56; David L. Cohn, *The Good Old Days. A History of American Morals and Manners* . . . (New York, 1940), 75; Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (New York, 1943), *passim*.

¹⁴ South Bend *News-Times*, May 8, 1915, p. 4; La Porte *Argus*, May 8, 1915, p. 4; Attica *Fountain-Warren Democrat*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; Kokomo *Tribune*, May 11, 1915, p. 4; Vevay *Reveille*, May 13, 1915, p. 4. For a careful study of this whole topic, see Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the Lusitania," in *American Historical Review*, 41:54-73 (October, 1935).

the war as could commercial disputes. An understanding must be reached with Germany without too much delay. Seeking to place their case on as high a plane as possible, many argued that America's cause was the cause of all neutrals, present and future. As the most powerful nation at peace she had an obligation to protect the gains thus far achieved in the struggle to make warfare as humane as possible. In the words of one writer, "This is a wholly new method of warfare, and one that the neutral nations of the world can not permit to be established. If we are to have wars in the future, we must do everything in our power to see that they are free from such horrors as that of Friday."¹⁵

A third basis for protesting against the torpedoing of the "Lusitania" lay in the provisions of the almost forgotten, but still-effective, commercial treaty which the United States had signed with Prussia in 1828. This agreement was almost unique in the liberality of its mutual concessions, and it incorporated the concepts of international law for which the United States was contending in the submarine issue.¹⁶

¹⁵ Indianapolis News, May 10, 1915, p. 6.

¹⁶ Hunter Miller (ed.), *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (vols. 1- , Washington, D. C., 1931-), 2:170-71, 442-51; 3:427-45. The treaty renewed Article 12 of the Treaty of 1785 and Articles 13-24 inclusive of the Treaty of 1799, including the following: "If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other power the free intercourse and commerce of the Subjects or Citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent powers shall not be interrupted." The provisions provided specifically for mutual recompense for contraband seized. Though the treaty had been made with Prussia, the German Empire recognized it as binding. Legalists placed more emphasis on this treaty than did the average Hoosier; its effect on public opinion was not great. Most Indiana editors showed no awareness of it. The Hammond Lake County Times, May 17, 1915, p. 4, cited it and remarked, "But this also is probably a scrap of paper."

As a realization of the grim seriousness of the situation spread over Indiana, a united cry arose for support of the President in the portentous decision that he must make. Editors advised loyal Americans to refrain from rocking the boat in the meantime. Beyond this display of patriotic unity another facet of public opinion soon showed plainly. Notwithstanding the general agreement that the "Lusitania" sinking was outside the law, it is clear that virtually no one wanted war. For when the editors turned from their outraged descriptions of the event and began to discuss what action should be taken by the Government, they hesitated, floundered weakly, and ended by urging every citizen to support the President in whatever stand he took. Soon they were saying hopefully that they were confident the President stood for peace.

Quite clearly two things were desired: a surrender by Germany and a continued state of peace. Authorities were told to uphold "our rights" and at the same time to avoid the burdens and sacrifices of war, though just how this was to be accomplished if Germany proved intractable was not explained. A statement of the Rushville *Republican* was typical. "While it is quite true no one wants to see his country made the doormat for European powers, there are few who would like to see the United States rush ruthlessly into war when they consider the suffering that would result, not considering the financial loss that would be entailed."¹⁷ It was the consensus of opinion that war would have a harmful effect on the Indiana business world.¹⁸

¹⁷ Rushville *Republican*, May 13, 1915, p. 4.

¹⁸ Plymouth *Republican*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, May 12, 1915, p. 6; Indianapolis *Commercial*, May 11, 1915, p. 1.

DON'T ROCK THE BOAT



Indianapolis News, May 10, 1915

One of the most impressive evidences of the will for peace was the almost unanimous approval given to Wilson's Philadelphia address of May 10 before an audience of newly naturalized citizens.¹⁹ The "too-proud-to-fight" phrase, which was to loom so large in later memories, incited little comment in Indiana at the time. There was more interest in the President's implied promise to proceed cautiously with respect to the "Lusitania" imbroglio and in his admonition to his audience not to consider themselves as belonging to groups. The latter was enthusiastically applauded as a criticism of hyphenates.

Theodore Roosevelt's strident demands for action brought from both Republican and Democratic papers expressions of satisfaction that a less belligerent man was in the White House.²⁰ Even such an ardent Bull Moose advocate as the editor of the *Lafayette Courier* quipped, "We have a great deal of respect and admiration for Theodore Roosevelt, but wouldn't it be just as well to allow President Wilson to deal with the present crisis in his own way."²¹

Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall, whose instinctive reflection of the mood of the Indiana public has often been remarked, spoke at Tupelo, Mississippi, on the day of Wilson's address. He, too, was for peace, perhaps even more outspokenly than the Pres-

¹⁹ Indianapolis *Star*, May 12, 1915, p. 6; Madison *Courier*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, May 11, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, May 12, 1915, p. 8; Evansville *Courier*, May 12, 1915, p. 6; *Lafayette Journal*, May 11, 1915, p. 6.

²⁰ Rushville *Republican*, May 11, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *News-Times*, May 13, 1915, p. 6; Oxford *Gazette*, May 21, 1915, p. 5; Louisville *Times*, May 10, 1915, p. 6.

²¹ *Lafayette Courier*, May 12, 1915, p. 6. The Chicago *Tribune*, leading midwestern Progressive paper in 1912, condemned Roosevelt's utterances as being "inconsiderate and inflammatory." May 13, 1915, p. 6.

ident. In his opinion, there were "too many men in the United States crying for war who would not enlist unless they got a position of selling goods to the commissary department."²²

Generally speaking, peace sentiment grew stronger the nearer it approached the grass roots. The Louisville *Courier-Journal* may have wanted war, and the Indianapolis *News* probably would have met it halfway, but the six- and eight-page dailies and the weekly journals were practically of one mind in their hope for peace.²³ The baffling juxtaposition of the evangelistic spirit and pragmatic realism in the inhabitants of the farms and towns of the Middle West was clearly evident here. They denounced the destruction of the "Lusitania" with a fine moral indignation, but hastened to point out that the burdens of war were too heavy to be shouldered casually in defense of technicalities.

The *Newton County Enterprise* advised those who must travel to do so on American ships. "Our observation has been," said the editor, "that international law is a nice rose-tinted instrument during times of peace, when such laws are not needed. . . ."²⁴ The *Lake County News* suggested that Americans

²² Charles M. Thomas, *Thomas Riley Marshall. Hoosier Statesman* (Oxford, Ohio, 1939), 177.

²³ Frankfort *Crescent-News*, May 10, 1915, p. 4; Seymour *Republican*, May 8, 1915, p. 4; Madison *Courier*, May 11, 1915, p. 2; Hobart *News*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; Paoli *Republican*, May 19, 1915, p. 4; Kentland *Newton County Enterprise*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; Monticello *Herald*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; Attica *Fountain-Warren Democrat*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; Plymouth *Democrat*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; Waterloo *Press*, May 13, 1915, p. 8; Rensselaer *Jasper County Democrat*, May 12, 1915, p. 2; Angola *Steuben Republican*, May 12, 1915, p. 4. See also *Farmer's Guide*, 27:874 (May 22, 1915).

²⁴ Kentland *Newton County Enterprise*, May 13, 1915, p. 4.

stay at home instead of risking their own lives and also running the chance of involving the whole nation in international trouble. "This nation is in no shape to go to war. Besides what could we hope to gain? There can be found a way of escape without sacrifice of honor, and yet [remain] at the head of the great peace loving nations. By continued peace we will also be fifty or one hundred years ahead of all nations involved in the war, and will leave no war burden for generations to lift."²⁵ The editor's interrogation was not often so bluntly put, but it undoubtedly occurred to many.

In fact, the evidence would seem to indicate that a majority of the Indiana public was willing to concede something to Germany if a concession were necessary to insure a peaceful solution. There was great caution about translating this inclination into specific conciliatory proposals, yet enough was written to show that an order for American citizens to refrain from traveling on belligerent ships carrying munitions would probably have been approved; some would have supported the further step of notifying United States citizens that they would lose the protection of their Government if they entered the war zone on other than American vessels.²⁶ That the "Lusitania" was a British ship was constantly in the public

²⁵ Hammond *Lake County News*, May 13, 1915, p. 2. The more zealous crusaders for prohibition resented the intrusion of the crisis and bade the public remember that every week liquor killed more people in the United States than the number lost on the "Lusitania." Logansport *Times*, May 28, 1915, p. 4.

²⁶ Indianapolis *Star*, May 17, 1915, p. 6. See also Madison *Courier*, May 12, 1915, p. 2; Logansport *Journal-Tribune*, May 15, 1915, p. 6; Muncie *Evening Press*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; Chicago *Examiner*, May 14, 1915, p. 18; Paoli *Republican*, May 19, 1915, p. 4; Portland *Commercial-Review*, July 15, 1915, p. 4; New Albany *Ledger*, May 10, 1915, p. 4.

mind. However, it would have been necessary that any deviations from international law appear as voluntary concessions and not as surrenders. There was no suggestion that the American merchant marine be withdrawn from the trans-Atlantic trade, and there was greater determination than ever that munition sales should not be embargoed.²⁷

The sources of much of this conciliatory spirit are obvious, but one of the most vocal contingents was made up of persons who might have been expected to be more warlike—the imperialistic, jingoistic, “red-blooded Americanism” school. Though for years the Hearst papers had carried daily chauvinistic essays; viewed with pride American intervention in Panama, Santo Domingo, Honduras, and Nicaragua; advocated strong measures against Japan; and ceaselessly clamored for American intervention in Mexico, they were models of restraint throughout the “Lusitania” debate.²⁸

The *La Grange Standard* had repeatedly advocated the outright annexation of northern Mexico, and had declared that “If the United States government is so idiotic as to give up the Philippines it is not worth preparing to die for. Such a government has no appeal to the spirit that enables men to suffer, starve, and bleed for their country.”²⁹ But in discussing the American quarrel with Germany, the editor held Germany to be right and the United States

²⁷ *Hammond Lake County News*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; *Monticello Herald*, June 24, 1915, p. 4; *South Bend News-Times*, June 28, 1915, p. 6; *Muncie Evening Press*, July 9, 1915, p. 4.

²⁸ *Chicago American*, May 13, 1915, p. 14; *Chicago Examiner*, May 14, 1915, p. 18.

²⁹ *La Grange Standard*, April 20, 1916, p. 2. See also August 19, 1915, p. 2; August 26, p. 2.

to be presumptuous.³⁰ The *Madison Courier* had wanted the United States to "annex or extend a protectorate over Mexico and the Central American states" and thought the proposal to pay indemnity to Colombia because of the Panama fiasco an insult to national honor—"the United States did nothing more in Panama than every strong nation (ourselves included) has done many times in its history."³¹ Yet this virile nationalism remained unstirred by the German sea challenge.³² Albert J. Beveridge, major prophet of American imperialism and the "white man's burden," proponent of Mexican intervention and the possible administration of her affairs "for the next two or three generations," and opponent of the Panama Canal tolls "surrender," was in favor of conceding many of the points at issue in the submarine quarrel.³³

In part, the spirit of appeasement manifested by those who were normally the least compromising in foreign disputes was an expression of Anglophobia, yellow peril hysteria, and pro-German sympathy. But the explanation lay partly in a state of mind which was more sensitive to the call of the white man's burden in Timbaktu (or Nicaragua or Mexico) than to any suggestion of responsibility in a war against the German military machine which offered no material gain for the United States—an attitude of respect

³⁰ *Ibid.*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; May 20, p. 2.

³¹ *Madison Courier*, June 25, 1914, p. 2; June 30, p. 2.

³² Throughout the "Lusitania" crisis the *Madison Courier* counseled peace with Germany (May 11, 1915, p. 2; May 12, p. 2) and war on Mexico (May 11, 1915, p. 2; June 3, 1915, p. 2).

³³ Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 448, 484. Imperialism and liberalism, usually considered to be antagonistic, bedded together in Beveridge's philosophy.

toward virile countries such as Germany that did not hesitate to follow their "destinies."³⁴ If members of this group could have worked their will the country would have followed a "realistic" policy of national opportunism by making war on Mexico, seizing such lands in the Caribbean as were deemed essential to national interests, and washing its hands of the conflict in Europe, except possibly for such bargaining as could be consummated safely and profitably. Many of these prewar imperialists were to remain opposed to American action against Germany to the last.

Offsetting the desire for peace on the ground that the sacrifices of war were too great to contemplate, was the belief held by many persons that if America should become a belligerent, her role would be a passive one, similar to that of Japan. "Germany could not possibly get at us to inflict a blow of any kind at present," said the *Terre Haute Star* on an earlier occasion. "Nor could we assail Germany except as we might join forces with the Allies. As affairs now stand, talk of a war between this country and Germany is in the same class as would be plans for a naval demonstration against Switzerland."³⁵ The *Indianapolis Star* offered the comforting presumption that a declaration of war against Germany "would amount to nothing more than the recall of the ambassadors of each country."³⁶ A few persons felt that Germany would be so little harmed by American participation that she might be planning to force the United States into the war in order to remove all checks on Germany's submarine policy, and prevent

³⁴ *Chicago Tribune*, August 6, 1914, p. 6.

³⁵ *Terre Haute Star*, February 17, 1915, p. 6.

³⁶ *Indianapolis Star*, May 12, 1915, p. 6.

the United States from shipping armaments that she needed herself to Germany's European enemies.³⁷

One of the more meaningful straws in the wind of public opinion was the reaction of German-Americans to the "Lusitania" crisis. The announcement of the sinking had evoked spontaneous and open rejoicing over the "victory,"³⁸ but as relations between Germany and the United States grew taut this attitude was moderated. Though they continued to justify Germany's action, German-American leaders pledged that should war come, the German element would be found fighting for the country of its adoption.³⁹

Close on the heels of the fateful sinking came two other developments which tended to discredit Germany in local opinion. A former resident of America, after literally pushing his way into the office of United States Ambassador James Gerard in Berlin, poured forth an abusive harangue against William Jennings Bryan until forcibly ejected.⁴⁰ Under the circumstances the incident received more attention than it warranted.

At about the same time there appeared a report on German atrocities in Belgium, prepared by an

³⁷ Indianapolis *Commercial*, May 19, 1915, p. 1; Crawfordsville *Journal* (weekly), May 21, 1915, p. 2.

³⁸ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, May 8, 1915, pp. 1, 4; Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, May 9, 1915, p. 4; Richmond *Palladium*, May 8, 1915, p. 4.

³⁹ Indianapolis *News*, May 10, 1915, p. 4; Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, May 27, 1915, p. 4; Evansville *Demokrat*, May 17, 1915, p. 1; Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 74. In retrospect it is apparent that the danger of disunity was never a real one, but at the time there were those in America who sincerely feared, and those in Germany who hoped, that in a crisis Uncle Sam would find his fighting army palsied by internal friction.

⁴⁰ South Bend *News-Times*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; Indianapolis *Star*, May 14, 1915, p. 1.

English investigating commission headed by Viscount James Bryce, former British ambassador to the United States and possessor of an almost unrivaled reputation for objectivity based on writings as diverse as the *Holy Roman Empire* and the *American Commonwealth*.

Barbarous happenings were reported.⁴¹ At Visé, "The village was completely destroyed." At Sempst, a girl of seventeen "alleged that she herself and other girls had been dragged into a field, stripped naked and violated and that some of them had been killed with a bayonet." At Heure le Romain, "the burgomaster's brother and the priest were bayoneted." At Soumagne, "The eye witness . . . saw . . . twenty bodies, one that of a girl of thirteen." At Eppegghem, ". . . a dead body of a child of two was seen pinned to the ground with a German lance."

Although the report pointed out that the committee investigators had not themselves witnessed these horrors and admitted that some of them were probably exaggerated, it expressed the belief of the commission that "murder, rape, arson, and pillage began from the moment when the German army crossed the frontier." What was more damning was the conclusion that these things had been done as part of a conscious policy of "general terrorization" designed to hasten the submission of the Belgian people.

The report as a whole was more moderate than the selected quotations indicate, but it presented a hideous picture at a time when the "Lusitania" crisis had made the public more credulous of reported German brutality. It would be easy, however, to exaggerate the importance of this untrustworthy docu-

⁴¹ Indianapolis News, May 12, 1915, p. 1.

ment, for the Indianapolis *News* alone in the state carried a detailed summary.⁴² Its influence was greatest among those who recognized and admired Chairman Bryce (the "Atlantic Monthly fellers," as Artemus Ward once named this group), and they were already staunchly pro-Allied.⁴³

Meanwhile, the first note of protest regarding the "Lusitania" had gone forth to Germany, declaring the Government's intention "of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens" and asking for disavowal, reparations, and security for the future. Once more the cry went up for American citizens to close ranks. Editors enthusiastically underwrote the position taken by the Government,⁴⁴ and the Church Federation of Indianapolis documented the tenor of the times by a conspicuous appeal for "confidence in the President," a "God-fearing man."⁴⁵

⁴² Papers which ran shorter summaries included the South Bend *News-Times*, May 12, 1915, p. 1; Evansville *Courier*, May 13, 1915, p. 8; Goshen *News-Times*, May 13, 1915, p. 2; Indianapolis *Star*, May 13, 1915, p. 2. None of these made editorial comments. The Bryce report was to play two dissimilar roles. In 1915 it helped to convince the American people of the rightness of the Allied cause. In the postwar years its demonstrable untrustworthiness was to give impetus to the "disillusionist" reaction.

⁴³ One evidence of this selective influence was the much greater emphasis placed on the Bryce report by periodicals as compared to newspapers. See, for example, the *Nation*, 100:554-55 (May 20, 1915); *Outlook*, 110:150-51 (May 26, 1915); *Independent*, 82:309-10 (May 24, 1915).

⁴⁴ Kokomo *Tribune*, May 14, 1915, p. 6; Huntingburg *Independent*, May 15, 1915, p. 4; Chicago *Herald*, May 14, 1915, p. 6; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, May 14, 1915, p. 4; Liberty *Herald*, May 20, 1915, p. 4; Oxford *Gazette*, May 21, 1915, p. 5; Plymouth *Republican*, May 20, 1915, p. 4; Brookville *American*, May 20, 1915, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Indianapolis *News*, May 15, 1915, p. 19. The only discordant comments came from pro-German spokesmen. The Chicago *Illinois Staats-Zeitung* (as quoted in Chicago *Journal*, May 13, 1915, p. 3)

May 18 had been designated National Peace Day before the sinking of the "Lusitania." The sincere prayers that the United States be spared the horrors of war which rose heavenward from commemorative services in schools, churches and women's clubs were expressions of a basic peace sentiment.⁴⁶ But the unusual emphasis given by the newspapers to the President's coincidental review of the American war fleet showed clearly a heightened nationalism and expanding preparedness sentiment.⁴⁷

While the public waited with varying degrees of impatience for Germany's reply, Italy jumped into the meleë with a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, leaving the United States the lone first-rate power outside the conflict. Perceiving that Italy had sold her sword to the highest bidder, editors handled her action with a roughness tempered only by the fact that she had entered on the "right" side.⁴⁸ No

said sarcastically: "no fair-minded person can take the President's note seriously. We fear it will be looked upon as a poor diplomatic joke in Germany." The *Indianapolis Telegraph und Tribune*, May 17, 1915, p. 4, said Americans should use neutral ships and described "Bryan's note" as having been dipped in poison. "We are told that now is the time for all to stand by the President. On the other hand, the time is here for all patriotic Americans to unanimously and energetically oppose his false and dishonorable policy." The *Evansville Demokrat*, May 15, 1915, p. 4, chided the President for not recognizing that the "Lusitania" was "unquestionably a British auxiliary cruiser . . . belonging to the British Navy."

⁴⁶ *Indianapolis News*, May 18, 1915, p. 1; *Kentland Newton County Enterprise*, May 20, 1915, p. 1; *Valparaiso Daily Vidette*, May 19, 1915, p. 1.

⁴⁷ *Anderson Bulletin*, May 18, 1915, p. 1; *Bloomington World*, May 18, 1915, p. 1.

⁴⁸ *Fort Wayne Sentinel*, May 24, 1915, p. 4; *Crawfordsville Journal*, June 4, 1915, p. 2; *Indianapolis Star*, May 26, 1915, p. 8; *Evansville Journal-News*, May 23, 1915, p. 8. Italy was sometimes defended on the grounds that: (1) she was but seeking "to repay

such restraint held back the friends of the Central Powers. The German-American Alliance of Indiana expressed its scorn by a resolution adopted in its state convention of 1915: "Italy who never values fidelity very highly, has withdrawn from her allies and is fighting against them, because the lust for territory pressed the dagger into her hand."⁴⁹

Within two days Italy was pushed from the spotlight by the German torpedo which smashed without warning into the westward-bound American ship, "Nebraskan." Fortunately there were no fatalities, but many wondered if this blow constituted Germany's answer to the United States note.⁵⁰ On May 29, however, this speculation was brought to an end by receipt of the official reply. Because it ignored most of the points of American protest it was regarded as "evasive." Because it argued justification on the ground that the "Lusitania" was an armed British auxiliary warship it was characterized as an "insult," since no proof was given and American port officials, the State Department, and survivors swore to the contrary. "Worth less than the paper upon which it is written";⁵¹ "reflects on the integrity of the United States";⁵² "quibbling";⁵³ "quite unsatisfactory";⁵⁴ "increases and intensifies the situation";⁵⁵ were typical comments. A popular cartoon

Austria for generations of oppression"; (2) her people had forced her Government into the war; (3) in seeking selfish gains she was but following the example set by the other warring powers.

⁴⁹ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, September 6, 1915, p. 1.

⁵⁰ Indianapolis *News*, May 27, 1915, p. 1.

⁵¹ Plymouth *Democrat*, June 3, 1915, p. 4.

⁵² Lafayette *Journal*, June 1, 1915, p. 6.

⁵³ Decatur *Democrat*, June 1, 1915, p. 2.

⁵⁴ Chicago *Daily News*, May 31, 1915, p. 6.

⁵⁵ Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, June 3, 1915, p. 8.

showed Germany disdainfully snapping her fingers at Wilson and humanity.⁵⁶ Only the pro-Germans found the reply to be satisfactory. "German Answer Demands Truth About the Lusitania," was the page-wide headline of the Indianapolis *Spottvogel*;⁵⁷ and the *Illinois Staats-Zeitung* asserted, the "German reply concedes more than possibly could have been expected and may be taken as a striking argument for the righteousness of the German position in this case."⁵⁸ Contrary to later popular belief little dispute arose as to whether the "Lusitania" carried munitions; that fact was admitted. However, the argument as to whether the "Lusitania" was armed was to be bitter and prolonged.

There followed a week filled with demands that the next American communication speak more pointedly and with rumors that such an epistle was being prepared in Washington. Therefore, when on June 9 the public learned that the rejoinder of the United States was in the German Foreign Office and that Secretary of State Bryan had resigned rather than affix his name to it, it was generally assumed that the note was an ultimatum and war a distinct possibility.⁵⁹ Only after twenty-four uncertain hours was

⁵⁶ *Lafayette Journal*, June 1, 1915, p. 1.

⁵⁷ *Indianapolis Spottvogel*, May 30, 1915, p. 1. See also *Indianapolis Telegraph und Tribune*, May 31, 1915, p. 4.

⁵⁸ *Chicago Illinois Staats-Zeitung* as quoted in *Evansville Courier*, June 1, 1915, p. 2. The National Executive Committee of the North American Gymnastic Union dispatched a telegram to Wilson from its Indianapolis office expressing grief at the possibility of a rupture with Germany, "particularly when the issue under discussion is seemingly based upon disputable facts and theories." *Indianapolis Star*, June 4, 1915, p. 1.

⁵⁹ *Indianapolis Star*, June 9, 1915, p. 8; *Michigan City Dispatch*, June 9, 1915, p. 1; *Gary Post-Tribune*, June 9, 1915, p. 1; June 10, p. 1.

it known that no ultimatum had been sent. When released, this second "Lusitania" note was applauded for its vigorous defense of the American position and was welcomed because it left the way open for further exchange of views.⁶⁰ Though not yet willing to fight, the Indiana public was growing impatient over German procrastination.

It is doubtful if any American, not guilty of open treason, was ever subjected to verbal abuse equal to that which beat upon the head of Bryan as a result of his resignation. Circumstances conspired to leave him almost championless. The Democrats, sensitive to the fact that only Republican disunity in 1912 had enabled them to elect their second president since the Civil War, felt that Bryan had betrayed them by inviting disharmony in their own ranks. To the Republicans, the three-time candidate for president had become the symbol of their partisan enemy, and journals which had lashed him for years with charges of Populism, cheap money, free trade, and lack of "red-blooded" patriotism hastened to cite this new deed as crowning proof of his rascality. He was compared to Judas Iscariot, Benedict Arnold, and Clement L. Vallandigham. Conservatives reviewed his economic heresies. It was generally feared that the resignation would be interpreted in Germany as an evidence of internal disagreement, thereby encouraging her to be less conciliatory.

According to the Progressive Indianapolis *Star*, this "shallow ranter," "incapable of intellectual integrity," and "willing to sacrifice everything on the

⁶⁰ Sullivan *Union*, June 16, 1915, p. 4; Rushville *Republican*, June 11, 1915, p. 4; Chicago *Tribune*, June 11, 1915, p. 6; Lafayette *Journal*, June 11, 1915, p. 6.

altar of his own ambition" preferred to give aid and comfort to a power with which the United States was on very critical terms, a power that was likely to be gravely misled by his show of division and disunion.⁶¹ The Republican Monticello *Herald* described him as "a pilot who deserted the ship just before the storm began;"⁶² and the Goshen *News-Times* thundered, "the Kaiser has awarded the Iron Cross for less valuable service than that rendered by Mr. Bryan."⁶³ The Democratic Evansville *Courier* told its readers, "Mr. Bryan is no more anxious for peace than President Wilson is. The difference is that the President is for peace with honor and Mr. Bryan for peace-at-any-price."⁶⁴

Such support as the battered Bryan received came chiefly from three sources. Quakers and other pacifists upheld him. Some Democrats were inclined to apologize for the man who had been the protector of the party in those long, lean years when it wandered in the wilderness of defeat.⁶⁵ Ironically, the

⁶¹ Indianapolis *Star*, June 10, 1915, p. 8.

⁶² Monticello *Herald*, June 17, 1915, p. 4.

⁶³ Goshen *News-Times*, June 9, 1915, p. 2.

⁶⁴ Evansville *Courier*, June 10, 1915, p. 6. About one hundred citizens of Indianapolis, including Meredith Nicholson, Jacob P. Dunn, Demarchus C. Brown, Hugh McK. Landon, and William Fortune, sent a resolution to President Wilson pledging their support and denouncing "renegade opposition." Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, June 12, 1915, p. 1. The Princeton Chamber of Commerce sponsored a public meeting which sent a note to the President offering congratulations that he was "at last able to be sure of the unanimity" of his official advisers. Indianapolis *News*, June 11, 1915, p. 1. "Several hundred" citizens of Danville and Hendricks County sent a similar message. Indianapolis *Star*, June 15, 1915, p. 8.

⁶⁵ Attica *Fountain-Warren Democrat*, June 10, 1915, p. 3; Rensselaer *Jasper County Democrat*, June 12, 1915, p. 2; Louisville *Times*, June 9, 1915, p. 6; Kendallville *News-Sun*, July 14, 1915, p. 4.

German-Americans and Irish who had formerly possessed "full evidence of his endeavors to serve Great Britain for family reasons or even more discreditable motives"⁶⁶ suddenly discovered that he was the "only really intelligent man in Washington."⁶⁷ Through the following weeks they invited all "Friends of Peace" to rally around Bryan to prevent a dictatorial President from dragging an unwilling country into war. They demonstrated a complete lack of comprehension of public temper (and thus hampered their cause) by insisting that Wall Street and the munition manufacturers were responsible for the agitation following the sinking of the "Lusitania."⁶⁸

Amidst the sound and fury of the assaults on Bryan, the people of Indiana gave little attention to his proposals that the President warn Americans against traveling on belligerent ships, prevent American vessels from carrying munitions, and arbitrate

⁶⁶ Indianapolis *Star*, June 10, 1915, p. 8.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, letter to the Editor. The Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune*, June 9, 1915, p. 4, felt that "Man must be forever thankful" toward Bryan for his "big service to Germany." The *Indiana Catholic*, long inimical to Bryan, now called for a special session of Congress to investigate the reasons for his "forced" resignation. June 11, 1915, p. 4.

German-Americans and Irish were somewhat discomfited by Bryan's assertions that the sinking of the "Lusitania" could not be defended and that the American quarrels with Germany and England should be separately disposed of, and by his continued defense of the munitions trade.

⁶⁸ Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune*, June 9, 1915, p. 4; *Indiana Catholic*, June 11, 1915, p. 4; *Evansville Demokrat*, June 10, 1915, p. 1. S. M. Sexton wrote to the Indianapolis *Star* expressing the belief that if no property had been lost in the sinking of the "Lusitania," there would have been no crisis. June 3, 1915, p. 6. George Sylvester Viereck pleaded with the American people not to go to war "to defend the rights of Wall Street gamblers to their pound of flesh." Quoted in Indianapolis *Star*, July 25, 1915, p. 2.

the dispute with Germany after the fashion provided in the cooling-off treaties. Undoubtedly much sentiment favorable to these ideas remained in the Middle West. But due to the growing impatience toward Germany, the unwillingness to strengthen the impression of national disunity, the compulsion felt by the Democrats to hold up the hands of Wilson, and the congenital inability of the Republicans to agree with Bryan, little mention was made of them at this point.

Flag Day (June 14) and Independence Day took on special importance this year. On Flag Day patriotic paraders, with "Old Glory" to front and rear, trudged through the streets of a number of cities under the sponsorship of the local Elks Lodge.⁶⁹ Sunday, July 4, was designated Americanization Day and dedicated to a "rebaptism of patriotism" for "Americans by birth and Americans by choice." Special services were held in the churches, at which war veterans occupied reserved seats, patriotic songs were reverently sung, and the clergy thanked God for America.⁷⁰ On the crowded highways "it was an exception to see a car without a display of the national colors."⁷¹ All in all, it was an uncommonly patriotic Fourth and the first one for many a year that did not have for its motif antagonism to England.

Four days later the German answer to the American note was handed to Ambassador Gerard. Again there was no disavowal and no promise for the future, and again the editors voiced the public's resent-

⁶⁹ Goshen *News-Times*, June 12, 1915, p. 1; Huntingburg *Independent*, June 19, 1915, p. 2; Indianapolis *News*, June 14, 1915, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Sullivan *Union*, July 7, 1915, p. 7; Evansville *Courier*, June 12, 1915, p. 6; South Bend *News-Times*, July 2, 1915, p. 4; Kendallville *News-Sun*, July 6, 1915, p. 1.

⁷¹ Hammond *Lake County News*, July 15, 1915, p. 2.

ment. "Germany did not even say 'please write again,'" quipped the Frankfort *Crescent-News*.⁷² Back went the American reply on July 21, 1915—the third "Lusitania" note dispatched by the United States. The warning that repetitions of the sinkings "must be regarded by the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly," was recognized as an intended final remonstrance. The United States would write no more on the matter; future relations between the two countries would depend on German action. But so long as that action was correct the public would not insist that Germany set her seal to humiliating words. As one contemporary wrote, "The note calls for no answer, unless Germany wishes. If the Imperial Government is afraid of public opinion in Germany it need not reply, and yet it may continue the friendship of the United States by stopping those naval acts in contravention of American rights."⁷³ The people had grown weary of words, and innumerable facetious remarks were devoted to the necessity of "an extraordinary index and filing system" to keep track of the many communications that had been written.⁷⁴ The "final" word having been said, it was hoped that the submarine danger was laid. So strongly did the public wish such a consummation that it refused to discuss the possibility of a new crisis.

⁷² Frankfort *Crescent-News*, July 14, 1915, p. 4. See also Seymour *Republican*, July 13, 1915, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, July 12, 1915, p. 4.

⁷³ South Bend *Tribune*, July 24, 1915, p. 10. See also Jeffersonville *Reflector*, August 6, 1915, p. 1.

⁷⁴ Monticello *Herald*, August 19, 1915, p. 4. See also Crown Point *Lake County Star*, July 16, 1915, p. 4; Terre Haute *Star*, July 8, 1915, p. 6; Vevay *Reveille*, June 24, 1915, p. 4.

Return to more tranquil relationship with the Central Powers became easier because of tightening relations with England. The latest unsatisfactory explanation of her sea practices had arrived while the third "Lusitania" note still lingered in the newspapers. Its uncompromising tone was generally resented. Editors and politicians welcomed the chance to mollify the pro-Germans and prove their neutrality by salting their comments with sarcastic adjectives and instructing the State Department to dispatch a sharp reprimand.⁷⁵

English citation of Civil War precedents for her deeds was particularly resented by the average citizen. "The less said by British diplomats about what happened during the Civil War the better . . . the people of the North have not forgotten how England sought to take advantage of our misfortunes, even when it involved the lending of aid and comfort to men in rebellion against the national authority and in behalf of the institution of slavery."⁷⁶ Henry James's coincidental exchange of his American citizenship for an English allegiance also drew fire in the Middle West, where expatriates customarily were regarded as high-hat aristocrats or worse.⁷⁷

Yet it is clear that though Indianans enjoyed growling at England, and although they wanted a sharp note sent her way, their anger was firmly leashed by their sense of caution. Any thoughts of definite action dissolved harmlessly before the unchanging facts that most of them wished the war

⁷⁵ Indianapolis *News*, July 27, 1915, p. 6; Indianapolis *Star*, July 28, 1915, p. 6; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, July 26, 1915, p. 4.

⁷⁶ Muncie *Evening Press*, August 7, 1915, p. 4.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

to end in defeat of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg, loss of life was not involved, and English sea actions did little harm to Indiana economic interests. Having opposed war with unpopular Germany over the destruction of life on the "Lusitania," they had no wish to risk conflict with the more popular Allies over property losses suffered by American exporting corporations. By concentrating on the commas and dependent clauses of the sharp diplomatic exchanges between Washington and London some historians of a later period convinced themselves that the United States came down to the edge of war with England on more than one occasion between 1915 and 1917. Had they perused the small-town papers they would have discovered the unlikelihood of such a conflict.

The headline news of August 20, 1915, "Liner Arabic Finds Grave Alongside Lusitania,"⁷⁸ pushed the irregularities of the prize court into the background, and the State Department and public wearily took up again the threads of submarine diplomacy. This time there could be no excuse for Germany on the ground that the Americans were on a munition-laden ship, for the "Arabic" was westward bound with American passengers on their way home.⁷⁹

On the whole, however, the tragedy seems to have been received with more foreboding than anger. The public, though far less emotionally moved than at the time of the "Lusitania" tragedy, would have been less opposed to severing diplomatic relations with Germany. By this time there was a general feeling that, in view of the four written protests in which

⁷⁸ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 20, 1915, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Indianapolis *Star*, August 20, 1915, p. 8; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 20, 1915, p. 1; Gary *Post-Tribune*, August 20, 1915, p. 1.

the United States officially had taken a "position," the Government had no choice but to adopt strong measures if this deed proved to be Germany's answer to the last American warning.⁸⁰

A Goshen editor reflected this attitude in an "open letter" of ironical tone, aimed at both German action and Administration verbiage.

"Dear Kaiser: In spite of previous correspondence on the subject another ship with American citizens on board has been sunk. Under the circumstances we feel constrained to inform you, in a spirit of utmost friendliness, that a repetition of the incident will of necessity require the dispatch of another note to your majesty's most estimable and peace-loving government."⁸¹

Representatives of the German Government demonstrated their awareness of this growing impatience by the dispatch with which they applied diplomatic medication. On August 24, 1915, Ambassador Bernstorff expressed the regret of his country for the loss of life, and more important, announced that the sinking was contrary to the intentions of the German Government. Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow matched this with a conciliatory pronouncement from Berlin, and a few days later, September 1, Bernstorff put in writing the solemn pledge that "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

A few Hoosiers were skeptical, and some were dis-

⁸⁰ South Bend *Tribune*, August 25, 1915, p. 6; Decatur *Daily Democrat*, August 20, 1915, p. 2; August 23, p. 2.

⁸¹ Goshen *News-Times*, August 20, 1915, p. 2.

pleased that the promise applied only to liners, but most persons hailed the German surrender as a "bloodless victory"⁸² which had preserved national "dignity" without the sacrifice of "peace and prosperity."⁸³ Presumably, diplomacy had been proved "more effective than bullets."⁸⁴ Since the victory had been won without resort to the bellicose methods of Roosevelt or the concessions advocated by Bryan, it was regarded as proof of the wisdom of Wilson's policy.⁸⁵ His personal star reached the high point of its peace-time ascent. With the immediate danger past, all hurried to affirm that the United States had demanded nothing that was not rightly hers and that Germany had but bowed to the obviously correct.⁸⁶

Yet submarine disturbances for 1915 were not at an end. A moderate flurry arose in September upon receipt of a new note defending the "Arabic" sinking. It quickly subsided following Germany's October 5 capitulation to the American contention. The "Hesperian," "Ancona," and the "Persia" were torpedoed and sunk with loss of American lives in the closing months of the year. Though not one of these developments was considered of primary importance, to-

⁸² Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 28, 1915, p. 4. The victory was not as complete as most of the citizens wishfully thought it to be, for a number of points remained unsettled. But future attitudes toward the Central Powers would not depend on the arguing of these points but on the realities of German action.

⁸³ Plymouth *Democrat*, September 2, 1915, p. 4.

⁸⁴ North Judson *News*, September 16, 1915, p. 4.

⁸⁵ New Albany *Public Press*, September 21, 1915, p. 1, sarcastically noted that the concessions had been won without benefit of the much-offered advice of "Col. Bryan, Col. Roosevelt, or Col. Watterson."

⁸⁶ Compare the cautious words of the New Castle *Daily Times* on August 23, 1915, p. 4, when war threatened, with the forthright assertions of September 2, 1915, p. 4, after Germany had yielded.

gether they kept the public's sense of irritation alive. "So long as this sort of thing goes on," fumed one citizen after the "Ancona" sinking, "it is pitifully imbecile for Germany and Austria to complain because of American apathy on the maritime excess of the British. You might as well ask a man to examine the fraudulent deed some sharper had given him to his house and lot at a moment when the neighbor's dog is chewing off his baby's arm."⁸⁷

In recapitulation it becomes apparent that of the many factors conditioning America's relation to the European war in 1915 the most consequential was the *Unterseeboot*. The people would never quite cease to view the European strife through the portholes of the "Lusitania" and "Arabic." The humanitarian antipathy toward Germany had deepened. Of far greater significance, a nationalistic antagonism had been added. Preparedness sentiment had risen sharply. Diplomatic victory had strengthened the public's belief in the rightness of the American position; having won through on these issues once, it would prove almost impossible to back down when similar disputes arose in the future. Pro-Germans and Anglophobes had been placed on the defensive. Hereafter, there was less sentiment for an arms embargo or for strong retaliatory measures against Allied commercial policy. Despite the increasing number of jests concerning illimitable note writing, the Administration's handling of the submarine issue reflected the sentiments of the people with singular accuracy.

⁸⁷ Indianapolis *Star*, November 16, 1915, p. 8.

VI. FACTORS FOR WAR AND PEACE

MANY of the public matters with which the average Hoosier concerned himself in the latter months of 1915 seemed at the time to have little relation to one another, or to his attitude toward Germany. Yet, in a broader sense, nothing that occurred during these months was entirely irrelevant to the decision that had to be made in April, 1917. Every topic impinged on the one indivisible mind, and a decision reached on any of them would be inevitably colored to some extent by all. More definitely, the Hoosier attitude toward Germany was not unaffected by prosperity, politics, and the status of Armenian Christians.

In the fall of 1915 Turkey had once again been caught up in the light of public opinion, an unfavorable light as it happened. Confronted with the possibility of invasion from Russia she sought to strengthen her defenses by evacuating Armenian Christians from certain frontier districts, where, it was feared, they would give aid and welcome to the invaders. Haste, administrative inefficiency, and the historical hatred between Turk and Armenian augmented the suffering that must inevitably have accompanied the action. Moreover, the very real woes of the emigrés grew larger in the telling, and local predilections to distrust Moslem Turkey made easier the believing.

Reports of a weary trek filled with the agonies of "emaciated and starved babies," "frenzied mothers," "old women and men dropping out by the roadside, too far gone to go another step," and "unspeakable" outrages appeared in every paper.¹ Bulletins

¹ Seymour *Republican*, October 4, 1915, p. 2; Plymouth *Republican*, October 7, 1915, p. 7; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, September 25, 1915, p. 2; Indianapolis *News*, February 9, 1916, p. 8 (letter of Dr. Richard Hill).

of the American Board of Missions told of tribulations witnessed or reported by their missionaries;² the *Sunday School Times* ran a series of six articles on the plight of the Armenians;³ and each denominational publication carried its quota of sad accounts.⁴ Many of these periodicals displayed deeper concern over the plight of the Armenians than over any other development growing out of the war. A widely quoted report of Henry Morgenthau, Sr., American ambassador to Turkey, served to convince them, and the rest of the public, that Armenian suffering was not a fiction of propagandists.⁵

Unstinted sympathy flowed from Indiana to the Armenians, and local relief drives provided something more tangible.⁶ Church services were dedicated to their martyrdom and the collection plate passed in their behalf.⁷ The bringing of the Armenian problem into the edifices of religion marked the issue as humanitarian rather than political, thus once again placing pro-Allied sympathies on that high ground. More-

² Hopewell *Herald*, December 17, 1915, p. 3, carried a long summary of one such bulletin. This paper was published by the Hopewell Presbyterian Church north of Franklin, Indiana.

³ Cited in *Angola Steuben Republican*, December 29, 1915, p. 2.

⁴ *Western Christian Advocate*, February 16, 1916, p. 15; *Christian Standard*, February 19, 1916, p. 10. Catholic periodicals apparently did not join in the outburst. The very conservative *Our Sunday Visitor* thought it a mockery to protest against Turkish treatment of Armenians when the United States refused to take steps to protect the Church against the "radical" government of Mexico (October 17, 1915, p. 2). The Irish-inspired *Indiana Catholic* said the blame should be placed solely on the English (December 3, 1915, p. 4).

⁵ *Indianapolis News*, October 12, 1915, p. 1.

⁶ *Indianapolis Star*, September 25, 1915, p. 8. The Armenian colony of Indianapolis conducted three relief campaigns during 1915. The last and largest collected \$390, the firm of Ashjian Brothers contributing \$150.

⁷ *Indianapolis News*, October 18, 1915, p. 18.

over, a share of this moral disapprobation fell on the shoulders of Germany because she had brought Turkey into the war, and because she was believed to be in a position to force a change in Turkish policy. "The German alliance with Turkey," said a writer in the *Western Christian Advocate*, "is the price of the blood of thousands of Armenians."⁸

Contemporaneously with Turkey's move against the Armenians, an Austro-German army began the long anticipated steam-roller invasion of Serbia. Three days later, on October 10, Bulgaria suddenly launched an attack on Serbia's flank. Thus the last of the Central Powers came into the war in the role of one who stabs her hard-pressed neighbor in the back. It was recalled that she had begun the Second Balkan War with a similar surprise assault on Serbia, and she was criticized further for joining with her old enemy Turkey, in war on her former protector Russia.⁹

Germany! Austria! Turkey! Bulgaria! By the nature of their governments and by reason of the circumstances under which they had entered the war, they appeared to be all of a kind. There was not one among them to which the average Hoosier of that day was instinctively drawn.

The Serbs, outnumbered, with inferior matériel, and with typhus raging through the country, fought a hopeless campaign. But they fought it so determinedly that they earned the kind of admiration which had been accorded the Belgians at Liége.¹⁰ When Great

⁸ Issue of February 9, 1916, p. 16. See also *Evansville Courier*, September 28, 1915, p. 6; *Indianapolis News*, October 5, 1915, p. 6; *Up-To-Date Farming*, December 15, 1915, p. 3.

⁹ *Evansville Courier*, October 16, 1915, p. 6; *South Bend News-Times*, October 8, 1915, p. 6; *Indianapolis Star*, November 3, 1915, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, October 27, 1915, p. 1; *Evansville Courier*, October 22, 1915, p. 6.

Britain and France sent troops for the aid of Serbia to the Greek port of Salonika, they were criticized more severely for sending insufficient forces than for infringing on the soil of a neutral nation.¹¹ The public believed that the Greek people—as distinct from their king—welcomed the Anzac invaders. Because there had been no resistance there were no “Louvains” and no refugees to stir the emotions. Consequently, the half-hearted comparisons between Allied action in Greece and the German invasion of Belgium essayed by Indiana newspapers read as though they were inspired by nothing deeper than the editor’s desire to keep his record straight. The Indianapolis *Star* observed, “Nobody’s ear drums will be broken in by the outcry against this high-handed violation of Greece’s neutrality by the Allied armies and fleets,”¹² and made no further protest.

Germany, meantime, brought upon herself a fresh storm of resentment by the summary execution of Nurse Edith Cavell. This English nurse, engaged in Belgium on a humanitarian mission at the time the war began, remained there during the German inundation, nursing the wounded of all armies and aiding Allied soldiers and spies to slip through the lines. For the latter activities she was executed by the German authorities on October 12, 1915. It is doubtful if one person out of ten noticed the brief references to the event that appeared in the newspapers of the week following. But after the report of Brand Whitlock, American minister to Belgium, reached the papers, and after English propagandists publicized her

¹¹ There was in fact considerable muttering during this campaign that little Serbia was being neglected by her powerful friends.

¹² Indianapolis *Star*, October 11, 1915, p. 8. Note the recurrence here of the theme of the people against their sovereign.

prewar services as rivaling those of England's Florence Nightingale and America's Clara Barton, the execution took on new significance. The public came to feel that, regardless of legal technicalities, her record of self-sacrificing labor should have "insured her, not acquittal, but mercy."¹³ There was particular resentment at the "hurried, stealthy" manner of the execution that gave the American and Spanish ministers no chance to make final pleas for leniency.¹⁴

The whole matter was another proof of diplomatic ineptitude on the part of the Germans; the mental picture of Nurse Cavell standing before her military executioners exemplified the conflict of two ways of life. One irate editor was moved to prophesy, "Edith Cavell's memory also will have a place in the sun."¹⁵

It was not necessary, however, to cross the ocean to find occurrences which built up anti-German feeling. Ever since the irregular activities of Werner Van Horn and Richard P. Stegler had been uncovered early in the year, there had been a growing uneasiness concerning the activities of German agents or sympathizers in the United States. By the fall of 1915—when the submarine controversy had already polarized the public temper against the Central Powers—the air was thick with rumors of sabotage, the authenticity of which varied according to whether they were based on "they say" or the admissions of German agents.

In mid-August the incriminatory contents of Dr.

¹³ Indianapolis *News*, October 23, 1915, p. 6. See also South Bend *Tribune*, October 23, 1915, p. 10; South Bend *News-Times*, November 1, 1915, p. 8; Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, November 18, 1915, p. 2.

¹⁴ *Nation*, 101:509 (October 28, 1915). See also Evansville *Courier*, October 22, 1915, p. 1; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, October 25, 1915, p. 1; October 27, p. 4.

¹⁵ Indianapolis *Star*, October 28, 1915, p. 8.

Heinrich F. Albert's brief case were spilled through the Indiana press.¹⁶ Here were documented records of efforts of the Central Powers to incite strikes among munition workers, lengthy accounts of German propaganda endeavors, proofs of money grants to the foreign-language press and to George Sylvester Viereck's *Fatherland*, conclusive evidence of German subsidization of the arms-embargo campaign, and other disclosures. Many of these projects were legal (most of them had been failures), but *in toto* they presented the disquieting picture of a swarm of representatives of a foreign power seeking to bind the United States to the interests of their Government and finding an alarming number of nominal Americans who were willing to aid them.

Within a month this picture was brought into sharper focus by the publication of letters that had been entrusted to James F. J. Archibald for delivery in Germany by the Austrian Ambassador, Constantin Dumba, and by the German military and naval attachés, Captain Franz von Papen and Captain Karl Boy-Ed. In all probability the added proof of illegal conspiracy which these papers provided was not as irritating to the public as was a personal message from Von Papen to his wife: "I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they should shut their mouths and be full of admiration [for Germany]." To which the *Steuben Republican* rejoined that the "idiotic Yankees" had "fed Belgium and rescued Serbia from pestilence."¹⁷ As for Dumba, said another contemporary, "We trust that the State Department will

¹⁶ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 17, 1915, p. 1.

¹⁷ Angola *Steuben Republican*, October 6, 1915, p. 2. See also Seymour *Republican*, September 22, 1915, p. 6; Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, October 7, 1915, p. 4.

carefully study his own admission, and then remember what happened to Sackville-West.”¹⁸ When, on September 9, Austria-Hungary was asked to recall her ambassador, instant and whole-hearted applause greeted the news.¹⁹

Mysterious fires, explosions, and labor unrest nevertheless continued to flare in plants engaged in filling war orders for the Allies. Ocean docks caught fire and bombs were discovered on outward bound ships.²⁰ Nor did the arrest of Robert Fay, Dr. Karl Buenz, Franz von Rintelen, and others bring a surcease. The result was a rising, querulous demand that sabotage be crushed at its source by strong action against the “higher-ups.” Popular suspicion pointed to Ambassador Bernstorff, but the threads of conspiracy ran to the attachés Von Papen and Boy-Ed. On December 1, 1915, the State Department notified the German Government that these two attachés had become *persona non grata*. The public hoped these dismissals would teach the “militarist statesmen of Berlin” a lesson.²¹ Before his departure Boy-Ed mud-

¹⁸ Indianapolis *News*, September 7, 1915, p. 6. Lord Sackville-West, minister to the United States from Great Britain, was given his passport in 1888 by the Department of State on the charge of having interfered in the presidential election then in progress.

¹⁹ New Castle *Daily Times*, September 10, 1915, p. 4; Waterloo *Press*, September 16, 1915, p. 8; Decatur *Daily Democrat*, September 11, 1915, p. 8; Evansville *Courier*, September 10, 1915, p. 6; Plymouth *Democrat*, September 16, 1915, p. 4.

²⁰ Evansville *Courier*, September 15, 1915, p. 5; Portland *Commercial-Review*, November 4, 1915, p. 1; Rensselaer *Jasper County Democrat*, November 20, 1915, p. 2. For the single month of December, 1915, the Indianapolis *News* carried twenty-six news articles on sabotage on the front page alone, an average of one for each day the paper was published.

²¹ South Bend *News-Times*, December 7, 1915, p. 6. Also Evansville *Courier*, December 4, 1915, p. 6; Goshen *News-Times*, December 4, 1915, p. 2; South Bend *Tribune*, December 4, 1915, p. 10.

died the waters further with a parting attack on the "irresponsible press" of the United States, reportedly confessing that "We Germans do not understand what you call your 'free press.'"²² It was not lack of spokesmen that hurt Germany's cause in America.

In the final reckoning these illegal activities proved extremely poor investments of money and energy, for their unfavorable influence on American opinion was out of all proportion to the benefits for Germany. Actually, only a small minority of the fires and explosions during the years of American neutrality were the work of foreign agents; it is doubtful whether a single major act of sabotage occurred within Indiana. But after representatives of Germany and Austria had once been proved guilty of subversive measures, there was an inevitable tendency to hold them responsible for each subsequent untoward happening. To the average Hoosier, sabotage carried the connotation of unnatural things done in the dark—it was a hidden serpent which might be coiling its ugly length in the unlighted precincts of his own community. Unable to come to grips with this elusive enemy, the public lashed out at it in panic and anger.

Sabotage was a direct threat to the supremacy of American domestic law within its own territorial frontiers, and averse as people were to joining the war in Europe, they were even more opposed to having it come to America in the form of incendiarism and disunity. Papers such as the *Fort Wayne Sentinel*, *Portland Commercial-Review*, and *Logansport Journal-Tribune*, which had been very cautious during the submarine dispute, spoke out heatedly against

²² Indianapolis *News*, December 28, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, December 29, 1915, p. 2.

saboteurs.²³ To their credit, the German-American leaders hastened publicly to disassociate their activities from those of Von Papen, Buenz, and their colleagues.

A concurrent development, which attracted only a slight measure of the attention given to sabotage, but which was to be eventually of major importance, was the floating of war loans in the United States. At first the Administration had frowned on such loans—the only funds dispatched to the combatants had been collected by war relief agencies—but a reversal of Government policy in August, 1915, opened a new chapter in American relations with fighting Europe. Both sides took almost immediate advantage of the lowered barriers to American credit. On September 5 the Indianapolis *Spottvogel* carried the first of many advertisements of German war bonds, promising 5 per cent return, and calling on Germans in America to do as much as their brothers in Europe.²⁴ In the same month an Anglo-French financial mission arrived in the United States to borrow a half billion dollars from American private investors through the agency of J. P. Morgan and Company.

At first the people of Indiana showed an unmistakable hesitancy in approving a policy which had at one time been labeled unneutral by the Govern-

²³ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, September 13, 1915, p. 4; Portland *Commercial-Review*, September 15, 1915, p. 6; November 4, p. 1; Logansport *Journal-Tribune*, September 12, 1915, p. 6.

²⁴ Indianapolis *Spottvogel*, September 5, 1915, p. 8. See also October 10, 1915, p. 16; October 24, p. 16; December 5, p. 8. Most of the more important papers published in the languages of the Central Powers vigorously pushed the sale of these bonds. Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 37; Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 25:368.

ment. A lack of familiarity with the working of such loans led some to argue that money "earned here" should be invested to ease credit and promote industrial activity in the United States. Others expressed the fear that the combatants were spending themselves into bankruptcy for war's "wherewithal" and would be unable to repay their creditors.²⁵ If the written evidence in newspapers and letters is representative of the whole reaction, the possibility that the loans might help to draw the country into the melee was generally ignored.

Most loans went to England and France, and preference for the Allied cause and prospect of economic gain served in time to make them passively acceptable to the public.²⁶ (Available evidence would seem to justify the conclusion that had either influence been present without the other, the loans would not have found favor with the people.) The weight of the first increased in proportion to the volubility of German-American opposition to the loans. With regard to the second, it soon became evident that credit advanced to the combatants would be spent in America and would serve to lubricate the national economic machinery.

Assured on this point, farm representatives, scorning subtleties, spoke openly and unambiguously of the benefits which the loans would bring them. The *Farmer's Guide* pointed out that half the exports of

²⁵ Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, September 17, 1915, p. 6; New Albany *Ledger*, September 20, 1915, p. 4; Rochester *Sentinel*, October 2, 1915, p. 2.

²⁶ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, September 24, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, September 8, 1915, p. 6; Decatur *Daily Democrat*, September 17, 1915, p. 2; Portland *Commercial-Review*, September 15, 1915, p. 4; Goshen *News-Times*, October 5, 1915, p. 2.

the United States during the past fiscal year were farm products and that "the loaning of money to our best customers" would insure the continuance of that flow.²⁷ "The makers of munitions are not greatly concerned," it was correctly argued, "for they are sure of their market abroad under any condition, and there is no other neutral country that can compete for this trade. But when it comes to foodstuffs the case is very different. South America, Canada, Australia, and India can all furnish wheat."²⁸ Industrial, commercial, and financial groups likewise found the policy beneficial to their interests. They hailed the coming of the Anglo-French mission of bankers as "the biggest thing in financial history," crowning America as the "New King of World's Exchange"—thus combining economic gain and national pride.²⁹ Local labor papers, apparently, were less enthusiastic in regard to the loans than were farm and commercial spokesmen, yet by their silence they gave at least tacit approval.

Against these loans the pro-Germans mobilized all their forces. A committee of influential German-Americans of Fort Wayne formally warned each bank in that city that the loans would be unsound because the Allies could not win the war.³⁰ In South Bend the burden of protest fell on the Hungarians, and

²⁷ *Farmer's Guide*, 27:1429 (October 23, 1915).

²⁸ *Indianapolis News*, September 15, 1915, p. 6. The *Indianapolis Star*, September 16, 1915, p. 6, carried a similar plea.

²⁹ *Indianapolis Commercial*, October 12, 1915, p. 3; *Evansville Courier*, September 2, 1915, p. 6; *New Castle Daily Times*, September 13, 1915, p. 4; September 21, p. 4. For a discussion of the amounts and influence of loans to the Allies, see Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Private American Loans to the Allies," in *Pacific Historical Review*, 2(1933): 180-93.

³⁰ *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, September 22, 1915, p. 15.

fifteen of their most prominent members sent written protests to the local bankers. Their chairman, the Reverend Alexander Valarky, asserting that the action was not directed against the Allies but toward the protection of local depositors, announced that if the banks disregarded the warning his associates would, "from a point of business, request" their countrymen to "withdraw their savings" from such institutions.³¹ The editor of the *Richmond Palladium*, spokesman for the large anti-English population of that city, wrote: "If, as now seems likely, England loses in her great onslaught against Germany, she will have to pay a staggering indemnity as the price of her failure which will make repudiation absolutely certain." "Our great New York bankers, many of whose daughters are married to British lords and dukes, should not be allowed to jeopardize the savings of American bank depositors by underwriting English loans."³²

This concerted action against Allied loans was indicative of the increased tempo of pro-German activity. The primary goal, however, had changed unmistakably since the "Lusitania" crisis, for the group could no longer hope to embroil the United States with the Allies or secure other direct aid of consequence for the Central Powers. Under cover of stubborn rear-guard attacks on arms shipments, war loans, and the "Anglo-American" press, they were retreating to the defensive position of seeking to keep the United States out of the war. Their growing insistence that Americans should cling to salutary peace unless subject to invasion was evidence of this new

³¹ South Bend *News-Times*, September 7, 1915, p. 2.

³² *Richmond Palladium*, August 19, 1915, p. 4.

emphasis, as were also the labeling of Wall Street and munition makers as warmongers and the increasing efforts to divert attention to the dangers of the yellow peril and Mexican bandits.³³

Their methods had undergone corresponding changes. The day was virtually gone when members of a German-American organization would attempt to influence public or Government by resolutions referring to their love for the Fatherland. The terms "German propagandist" and "hyphenate" had become too unpopular for that. Instead, they wrapped the American flag about them and formed societies of peace and neutrality. The Friends of Peace, securing some indirect help from William Jennings Bryan and other pacifists, gave promise of becoming an organization in which all who opposed American beligerency could form a common front. But their proceedings at an injudicious Chicago Labor Day meeting in 1915 disillusioned those who were not working for German victory or English defeat.³⁴

The American Embargo Conference, with more limited objectives and a longer life, was organized August 1, 1915, with Chicago headquarters and more than twenty-five hundred local committees. Practically all of its strength lay in the thriving German communities of the Middle West. Created as an out-and-out pressure group to work for an arms embargo and

³³ Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune*, September 5, 1915, p. 1; January 28, 1916, p. 4; Plymouth *Republican*, July 29, 1915, p. 1; La Grange *Standard*, October 14, 1915, p. 2; *Der Lutheraner*, 71:445 (November 9, 1915). See Fort Wayne *News*, September 6, 1915, p. 1, for resolutions of the state convention of the German-American Alliance of Indiana.

³⁴ Chicago *Tribune*, September 7, 1915, p. 1; Chicago *Daily News*, September 7, 1915, p. 1.

related objects, it was well organized, abundantly supplied with funds, and not hesitant about taking the offensive. From its near-by headquarters there poured into Indiana a copious flood of speakers, pamphlets, blank petitions to be signed and dispatched to Congressmen, and editorial suggestions for the German-language press.

Labor's National Peace Council, a third pro-German organization, sought to indoctrinate the laboring man with the belief that the Allies and American big business had formed a partnership to his detriment. For a time it possessed substantial influence, but as the same arguments, catch phrases, and names that adorned all German efforts appeared, it declined, its repudiation hastened by a biting attack from Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor. The Organization of American Women for Strict Neutrality was set up to carry German arguments to women and to provide a new source of petitions to legislators and editors. Its local interest lay chiefly in the fact that its sponsor, Dr. William Bayard Hale, was a former resident of Richmond, Indiana.³⁵ Two other organizations which co-operated with these groups warrant mention. The American Truth Society and the American Independence League were well-known Irish associations dedicated to the task of creating as much American hatred toward Great Britain as possible.

³⁵ Wittke, *German-Americans and the World War*, 63-65; Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War," in *loc. cit.*, 25:351-68; U. S. *Senate Documents*, 66 Congress, 1 session, no. 61, pp. 1-48. See *Evansville Courier*, October 25, 1915, p. 1, for an account of the meeting of the Evansville branch, American Embargo Conference, as typical of the activities of these organizations in Indiana.

A second alteration in tactics made by the partisans of the Central Powers was a matter of emphasis. From the first days of the war they had sought to link the Allied cause in America with economic royalists and social aristocrats, and they now proceeded to tunnel into this vein with concentrated energy. This, after all, was the trust-busting, monopoly-hating generation, and German-American charges that the worship of profits *ueber alles* by the Du Ponts, J. P. Morgan, and Wall Street was the source of friction between Germany and America were not without effect.³⁶ In the closing months of 1915 there was some attempt to influence the public by suggesting that pro-Germans would vote together to reward their friends and punish their enemies.³⁷ Fortunately for all concerned, Joseph Keller, the president of the Indiana German-American Alliance, showed little interest in the formation of a German-American political bloc at this time.³⁸

When it is remembered that this German-American revival occurred after submarine and sabotage had made an enemy of the German Empire, it is not surprising that it bred antihyphenate anger. Citizens listened with skepticism to lectures on the glories of peace by men who boasted of the invincibility of German armed might and "Hoched" the militaristic Kaiser, and sometimes heckled the speakers by asking if they had come to America to avoid serving in the army they were cheering for.³⁹

³⁶ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, January 28, 1916, p. 4.

³⁷ Goshen *News-Times*, October 18, 1915, p. 2; South Bend *News-Times*, November 1, 1915, p. 8; Evansville *Courier*, December 8, 1915, p. 6.

³⁸ Richmond *Palladium*, May 17, 1916, p. 3.

³⁹ South Bend *News-Times*, September 4, 1915, p. 6.

Outstanding among public figures who challenged German-American sincerity were Booth Tarkington and Lucius B. Swift. To German-American assertions that public antagonism to Germany was the result of Anglophilism, Tarkington replied that Germany had been judged on the basis of her "own deeds and words. Don't the Germans even know that we fought Great Britain twice—both times when we were unprepared? We were raised on those wars in school."⁴⁰

Lucius B. Swift, prominent Indianapolis attorney, and a man of strong convictions, reached an early decision on the war. It was his belief that a German victory would give her the hegemony of Europe and thus place her in a position where she could, and would, jeopardize America's unhindered use of the North Atlantic, threaten the Monroe Doctrine by penetration of South America, and confront the idea of democracy, wherever it existed, with the idea of Kaiserism. Eventually the United States would be forced to accept these challenges "and would fight—alone." On October 4, 1915, Swift appeared before the Indianapolis Literary Club with a paper entitled "Germans in America," that was so well received that it was published in pamphlet form. Within the next few months it went through four editions for a total of forty thousand copies that were sold, lent, and given away until without doubt it fell under the eyes of more Hoosiers than did any other pamphlet during the prewar days.⁴¹ Because of this wide distribution and because it was typical of sentiment in the more

⁴⁰ Booth Tarkington, "American, German-American, and German," in *Collier's*, May 27, 1916, pp. 12-13.

⁴¹ Lucius B. Swift, *Germans in America* (Indianapolis, 1915).

pronounced anti-German and antihyphenate circles in which Swift moved, it deserves a brief examination.

"There is in the German line no Magna Charta, no John Hampden, no Oliver Cromwell, no axe in the hands of the people descending on the neck of a traitor king, no king driven from his throne for betraying his trust, no Bill of Rights, no Declaration of Independence, no Minute Man, no Liberty Bell, no George Washington, no Abraham Lincoln."⁴² There is instead the picture of the Kaiser and his sons riding pompously together "all boots, overcoat, sword, and spiked helmet."⁴³ Despite all this, Swift charged, the German-Americans preferred "Prussian efficiency to American liberty." They displayed "the same kind of infatuation for the Kaiser that the French had for Napoleon Bonaparte," and they thought that "Americans ought to partake of their enthusiasm."⁴⁴

Turning to German-American insinuations of undue British influence in America, Swift countered with a thwacking defense of England's record, past and present. In the forests of Germany, he asserted, the various Teutonic tribes had started even. But the Angles and Saxons upon their migration to England had begun a dogged march toward representative government and civil liberties that in time far outstripped such gains in the German homeland. English colonists had brought these "rights of Englishmen" with them to the New World, where they became the basis of American law and government. After the Revolution had brought American independence, the masses in both countries had made the same struggle to enlarge

⁴² Swift, *Germans in America*, 6.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

their rights and had won substantially the same victories against their respective governments. Germany, in the meantime, had advanced only a comparatively small way on the road to self-government. A victory for the Kaiser would not only check any further democratic gains in Germany but would endanger those in the Anglo-Saxon lands.⁴⁵

That Swift was not alone in these aggressive views was amply indicated by the mail that began pouring in upon him. "Thanks for your 'Germans in America.' It expresses my sentiments better than I can do myself," wrote William H. H. Miller.⁴⁶ From James A. Woodburn, professor of history at Indiana University, came "entire approval." "Your message is sound to the core and it is just such a message as the times call for."⁴⁷ A group of interested friends, including Hugh H. Harrison, Henry W. Bennett, Hugh McK. Landon, Meredith Nicholson, and Dr. John N. Hurty (director of the State Board of Health), subscribed money for further publication and distribution of the pamphlet.⁴⁸

Not all communications were laudatory, however. Constructive critics reminded him, with truth, that the German element in the United States had been a liberal and creative influence.⁴⁹ Ill-tempered critics

⁴⁵ Swift, *Germans in America*, 6 ff.

⁴⁶ Miller to Swift, November 9, 1915, Lucius B. Swift Collection, Indiana State Library.

⁴⁷ Woodburn to Swift, November 16, 1915, Swift Collection.

⁴⁸ See subscriptions of December 29, 1915, Swift Collection.

⁴⁹ For example, William Harrison to Lucius B. Swift, February 26, 1916, Swift Collection. Harrison reminded Swift, one of the staunchest of the state's Progressives in 1912, that: "The Progressive Party counted the best of the German element among its members, had the natives been as faithful, Roosevelt would have been elected, and the U. S. would have advanced a generation."

wrote bitterly of "mole-eyed Angles like yourself" who go through life "kowtowing and truckling" to the British.⁵⁰ Moderate or violent, virtually every protestant enclosed with his letter a brochure on the other side as his contribution to the Battle of the Pamphlets.

These local mutterings against the hyphenates were part of a national movement in the same direction. Unambiguous warnings of President Wilson and ex-President Roosevelt—for once in agreement—were approved by the Indiana press with virtual unanimity. Indiana politicians, however, were more cautious. Experience had taught them that whereas a small organized pressure group never forgets its friends—or enemies!—an unorganized majority displays a notoriously poor memory on election day. A Washington reporter found the Democratic Congressmen from Indiana very skittish when asked for comment on the President's message of December 7, 1915, in which he had bidden Congress face the "ugly and incredible" fact that some were serving "interests alien to our own."

Without exception they refused to go on record, and it was only after receiving a promise of anonymity that one of them ventured the observation, "I am afraid he has dug a political grave for himself and a lot of Democratic members of Congress."⁵¹ His words probably reflected the troubled mood of all his colleagues, especially when they learned that William R. Wood, one of the two Indiana Republicans in Congress and representative from a district that included many Germans, had told the same reporter that he could be quoted as saying that the President had

⁵⁰ W. C. Haussmann to Swift, August 4, 1916, Swift Collection.

⁵¹ Indianapolis News, December 8, 1915, p. 1.

been unjustified in his remarks.⁵² This maneuvering served notice that, until after the presidential election, local attitudes toward each foreign problem would be conditioned to some degree by its incidence on the Indiana political battle. That fact must be constantly under the mind's eye if the path of public opinion during the next year is to be followed with full understanding.

Politics, in fact, was "warming up" during the closing months of 1915, especially for the Republicans. The split in their party in 1912 had given the state to the Democrats, almost lock, stock, and barrel. But now the Progressives were fast returning to the fold, and local conditions were working to the detriment of the party in power. Republican leaders, feeling that their winter was over, were impatient to get on with the sowing that must precede the harvest. At party barbecue (or "burgoo") rallies that autumn the word passed from lip to lip and district to district that 1916 was to be a Republican year. Candidates, thick as locusts, worked their way through the crowds from hand to hand, seeking to secure the nominations which they were confident would lead to election. "Behold how good and how pleasant a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity," Republican State Chairman Will H. Hays told one gathering. "God bless the boys who have come back to the old home. And God bless the boys who stayed around the hearthstone and kept the fire burning."⁵³ As for war issues, local leaders of both parties were watchfully awaiting developments and speaking with utmost caution.

⁵² Indianapolis *News*, December 8, 1915, p. 1. Wood represented the Tenth Congressional District.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, September 22, 1915, p. 1.

A leitmotiv of economic prosperity was stimulating a public far wider than the politically minded group. War's voracious demands, an extraordinary farm yield, and a psychology of optimism juxtaposed with cheap credit had the depression of 1914 in full retreat by the middle of the year. Prime among these influences was the war-induced abnormal trade with belligerents and neutrals. Only a small part of this was made up of munitions. The farmers were doubly blessed, because the war plus favorable weather had brought that combination of high prices and good yield so ardently desired and so seldom realized. Wheat and corn, for example, with banner crops of approximately 50,000,000 and 191,000,000 bushels, were selling for \$1.25 and 68 cents respectively at the end of the year.⁵⁴ Total income of Indiana farms for 1915 was estimated by G. I. Christie, superintendent of Agricultural Extension, Purdue University, to be \$350,000,000, with profits in practically all lines.⁵⁵ There was a lessened dread of tax-paying time and a larger than usual stock of store goods under the spring seat when the family jolted homeward late Saturday afternoon.

Manufacturing, too, was thriving, with heavy industry pointing the way. Steel, iron, and tin-plate factories were particularly busy. Clouds of smoke,

⁵⁴ Indianapolis *Star*, January 1, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, December 31, 1915, p. 1; Indianapolis Board of Trade, *Annual Report*, June, 1917, p. 40. Wheat ran 4,000,000 bushels ahead of the previous year, and corn, 27,500,000 bushels. The yield in oats showed an increase of 20,000,000 bushels, approximately 30 per cent over 1914. Year-end prices of other farm products were likewise satisfactory: hogs (200 pounds and up), \$7.00-\$7.25; eggs, 30½ cents; hens (4 pounds and up), 12 cents; butter, 18 cents.

⁵⁵ Indianapolis *Star*, January 1, 1916, p. 1.

indicative of the stir below, hung in an almost continuous band along the southern shore of Lake Michigan.⁵⁶ Furthermore, as a New Castle editor observed, "When steel mills run all factories are operated."⁵⁷ Prince Corn, who had so impudently pushed King Cotton from his throne in Civil War days, was being inexorably superseded by Sovereign Steel and his strange-tongued retainers. The change was to be more than a mere palace revolution, for the new ruler was purposeful and demanding.

Such thoughts, however, would interest the future social philosopher more than they did the participant in a reviving economic system. Municipal bonds were at a premium as compared to the previous year.⁵⁸ Building permits had "marched right up since the first of August."⁵⁹ Business in "Middletown" (Muncie) was "up and doing," with factories maintaining day and night shifts.⁶⁰ In Indianapolis, retail sales for November, 1915, were 23 per cent higher than the year before and 7 per cent above the average national increase—and the livelihood of Indianapolis was dependent upon retail trade to an extent that was probably not true of any other major American city.⁶¹ The fact that jewelry enjoyed the maximum gain of 45 per cent and that hardware sales ran second with a 33 1/3 per cent increase, indicated the upward trend of luxury and farm buying. From South Bend came

⁵⁶ By the close of August, 1915, the trade journals were estimating that steel production had reached 95 per cent of capacity. *Indianapolis Commercial*, August 25, 1915, p. 1.

⁵⁷ *New Castle Daily Times*, July 21, 1915, p. 4.

⁵⁸ *Indianapolis Commercial*, January 1, 1916, p. 22.

⁵⁹ *Indianapolis News*, December 25, 1915, p. 13.

⁶⁰ *Muncie Evening Press*, August 16, 1915, p. 1.

⁶¹ *Indianapolis Commercial*, January 10, 1916, p. 1.



Richmond Palladium, February 18, 1916

the word of zooming employment figures and of total bank deposits that exceeded the previous December's by \$1,500,000 for a gain of 13 per cent.⁶² In rapidly growing Fort Wayne, the merchants expressed the satisfaction of fellow tradesmen throughout the state when they reported Christmas business to have been the "best ever," with money plentiful and the purchasing public letting loose of it readily.⁶³ One other weighty evidence of prosperity should be mentioned. The Sears, Roebuck catalogue, which this year was more than a "wish book," described its 1915-16 wares in 1,600 pages as compared to 1,100 the previous season; among new items offered to its readers were men's silk pajamas for five dollars.⁶⁴

Desire to keep the indices of prosperity going up strengthened the public's opposition to embargoes on arms, loans, and food, and their determination to uphold American trade rights. Clearly these were factors that helped to put the country eventually at war. Conversely, the people were opposed to subjecting their new prosperity to the unpredictable economic consequences of war, especially this omnivorous one. They wished to devote themselves to their crops and shops and enjoy their increased incomes undisturbed. So noticeable was this tendency, that the more war-conscious spirits sometimes accused their money-minded brethren of "passing by on the other side," ignoring the call of bleeding liberty. In much the same way had Samuel Adams addressed the cautious Boston merchants, the War Hawks of 1812 harangued the New England traders, the Abolitionists talked to

⁶² South Bend *News-Times*, December 31, 1915, p. 1.

⁶³ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, December 27, 1915, p. 4.

⁶⁴ Cohn, *The Good Old Days*, xxiv, 476.

the railroad czars, and Theodore Roosevelt flayed the hesitant financiers of 1898. To epitomize—economic interests (large and small) desired continued peace but concurrently favored measures for the protection of their prosperity that helped place the country in a position where war would be the natural result.

VII. PACIFISM AND NATIONALISM

THUS far, actions of the combatants have been placed in opposite pans of the balance, the philosophy of conduct of each added, the position of the fulcrum determined by American political, ideological, and economic predilections, and the result read in terms of the effect on public opinion. It has shown a balance favorable to the Allies. But in order to understand fully the mutations of public thought there must be added to this picture an account of the increasing tug of war between the forces of pacifism and the more warlike aspects of nationalism.

The Indiana Peace Society and the Indiana Branch World Peace Foundation, most influential of the existing pacifist organizations, bestirred themselves to increased activity with the first shock of the war.¹ The Indiana School Peace League, the Church Peace Union, and the International Christian Endeavor Peace Union were not slow to follow. Shortly after the beginning of the war the Indiana Federation of Women's Clubs created a State Peace Committee to direct its fight against war, and the Woman's Franchise League of Indiana officially added sponsorship of peace to its platform.² Early in 1915 the Indiana Branch Woman's Peace Party was organized,³ and at about the same time units of the Emergency Peace

¹ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, October 3, 1914, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, December 16, 1914, p. 20; Indianapolis *Star*, March 29, 1915, p. 6. The churches furnished much of the moral drive for pacifism, but because of their extensive treatment in Chapter III they will not be discussed here.

² Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, August 14, 1914, p. 14; Indianapolis *Star*, August 14, 1914, p. 9; Frankfort *Crescent-News*, January 16, 1915, p. 2.

³ Indianapolis *News*, April 19, 1915, p. 7.

Federation were formed in a number of communities.⁴ Truly, the Hoosier state did not lack for organized peace sponsors.

The most effective spokesman for these organizations was versatile David Starr Jordan. Following student days at Butler University and years as a teacher in the public schools of Indiana, he had become president of Indiana University and of Leland Stanford University successively. As a national figure in the fields of science and education he returned to Indiana to press the cause of peace in forthright words. "Every war is a brawl in the dark, a panic in an insane asylum. Its finality has nothing to do with its beginning." "The European desire for war is to kill socialism." "What is the world's grimmest jest? What is the costliest failure? It is fighting war with war. It is to bring soldiers to fight soldiers. It is piling up armament higher and higher in the sacred name of peace or as insurance against war." The United States should never "send any form of ultimatum."⁵

For the most part these societies were not laboring to end the current war; nor were they proposing definite plans for world organization. Rather, they

⁴ Richmond *Palladium*, February 26, 1915, p. 8; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, March 2, 1915, p. 4.

⁵ See, for example, the Indianapolis *News*, December 17, 1915, p. 7. See also issues of November 2, 1915, p. 4; December 17, p. 7; Richmond *Palladium*, June 14, 1915, p. 1. Yet there was no doubt as to which side Jordan considered the aggressor. "As Price Collier once said, you have only to press a button in Berlin if you want a war, and the people haven't anything more to do with it than you or I have." Indianapolis *News*, December 17, 1915, p. 7. In fact, the sincere anti-preparedness leaders (pro-Germans omitted) were more unitedly opposed to the existing German Government and army system than were the preparedness extremists, some of whom found much to admire in Hohenzollern Germany.

confined themselves to popularizing peace by public meetings, essay contests, and letter writing. Theirs was the sentiment of the popular antiwar song:

“I didn’t raise my boy to be a soldier,
I brought him up to be my pride and joy,
Who dares to place a musket on his shoulder,
To shoot some other mother’s darling boy?”⁶

Unfortunately for their cause, their influence was confined chiefly to limited economic and social circles. Moreover, their approach to the problems of war and peace too often was based on the tacit assumption that there was somehow an intrinsic difference between “good” peace-loving Americans and “bad” war-inclined Europeans. As a consequence they did not always recognize the face of their enemy nor the direction from which he could be expected. A case in point was the preparedness movement. Some of the individual members, such as Jordan, stubbornly opposed its advance, but the organizations were painfully cautious about taking a corporate stand on the question.

The most weighty peace force in Hoosierdom lay outside the fold of organized pacifism in the ranks of those farmers, laborers, and businessmen who believed that “Europe has always fought and always will” and that there was not much the United States could do to remedy the state of affairs. Basically, this attitude was a denial that America constituted a part of the European balance of power. The great valley of the interior in which Indiana lay had long been absorbed in building its own integrated culture patterns and institutions, all of which it proudly

⁶ By 1916 the vogue for this song had begun to wane. It was thereafter often sung derisively.

labeled American. Its inhabitants had created a positive way of life, and they wanted to enjoy and perfect it free of European quarrels which they believed grew out of cultures inferior to theirs and from conditions which did not concern them. In harmony with this desire they were convinced that the relative strength given to their country by its exceptional size, productive capacity, large and brisk population, and physical isolation made it possible for them to pursue a free choice of foreign policy.

The midlanders were not pacifists. They were not even isolationists *per se*, for they would have entered upon foreign undertakings for American protection—perhaps for national profit. Provincials? But how can the heartland be provincial to the remainder? Nationalists they certainly were, but their nationalism remained unperturbed by European clashes which appeared to result from balance of power politics.

Few realized the fact that much of America's past freedom of action had existed because the maligned balance of power had prevented the European nations from adventuring very far in New World diplomacy. Nor did they recognize that Great Britain had maintained that system, to protect her own interests, but might not always be able to perform that function alone. They shut their eyes to the fact that the European balance of power was becoming a world balance of power, with America in the center. Any admission that might take the United States into world politics would be postponed as long as possible.

This philosophy was plainly shaping the local attitude toward peace planning. Earnestly the people prayed for the end of the sanguinary struggle, yet at

no time did they advocate an aggressive campaign for peace on the part of the Government. On each occasion between 1914 and 1917 when there were rumors of such a move, they averred that the time was not yet ripe—that the combatants were in no mood to listen—that American meddling would be resented—that Uncle Sam might get his fingers burned.⁷ Since the war map favored Germany throughout this period, Allied sympathizers were wary of peace negotiations that would encourage Germany.⁸ A few admonished those who aspired to play the role of peacemaker to remember the first part of the Lord's Prayer.⁹

There was one small coterie, however, that was willing to wrestle with the god of war. Convinced that peoples and governments of the belligerent nations were hungering for peace, Henry Ford proposed to lead a band of Americans to Europe to break down the "rigidity of diplomatic etiquette." In an unguarded moment he expressed the hope of getting

⁷ See, for example, the *South Bend Tribune*, December 1, 1915, p. 8; *Indianapolis News*, September 4, 1915, p. 6.

⁸ Victor Lawson, publisher-owner of the *Chicago Daily News*, outlined the paper's policy with regard to peace movements in a memorandum to his editor in early November, 1915. "Be careful about any editorial expressions on the subject of peace. I do not think peace is possible under the present situation. I think it will not be possible until the issue has been fought out to a more nearly definite conclusion From the point of view of England and France it would be illogical for them to entertain peace proposals with Germany in her present position of advantage. If this is the right view, it is unwise to suggest the possibility of peace negotiations. These could have no other effect at this time than to encourage Germany which, of course, wants to talk peace when it can speak from its present strong vantage ground." Letter of November 11, 1915, quoted in Charles H. Dennis, *Victor Lawson. His Time and His Work* (Chicago, 1935), 354.

⁹ Letter to the Editor, in *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, August 20, 1915, p. 4.

“the boys out of the trenches and back to their homes by Christmas Day.”

From the first the expedition was regarded as ill-advised. A smalltown Republican weekly newspaper reflected grass-roots opinion with the observation that “President Wilson has been strong for peace since the starting of the war, but has not been listened to. If the President of the United States will not be looked up to on such an important question, how can an individual expect recognition?”¹⁰ As sailing time approached (December 4, 1915) and the illustrious scrambled to avoid being caught among the peace ship’s passengers, this sober disapproval changed to the derisive guffaws of cartoonists, editors, and neighborhood wits out to maintain their reputations. “Rev. Wiley Tanger has made engagements fer two weeks ahead fer fear he’ll be asked t’ join the Ford peace excursion.”¹¹ “Anyway, Henry is adding another to the list of Ford jokes.”¹² And somewhat later—
“They stopped building flivvers the day the peace ship sailed, because they ran out of nuts.”¹³ On the last day of the year Mutt and Jeff joined the expedition via comic strip, Mutt becoming its new leader and Jeff designing a coat of arms consisting of a squirrel, a monkey wrench, a nut, and a row of spark plugs on “a field of yellow, denoting courage.”¹⁴

¹⁰ *Waterloo Press*, December 2, 1915, p. 8.

¹¹ Abe Martin in the *Indianapolis News*, December 3, 1915, p. 28.

¹² *Indianapolis Star*, December 1, 1915, p. 6.

¹³ *Indianapolis Indiana Daily Times*, December 18, 1915, p. 8.
For other adverse comments on the undertaking, see *Rushville Republican*, January 5, 1916, p. 4; *Brookville American*, December 23, 1915, p. 4; *Goshen News-Times*, December 14, 1915, p. 2.

¹⁴ *Indianapolis News*, December 31, 1915, p. 10; January 1, 1916, p. 18.

To at least one Hoosier the Ford effort was no joke. May Wright Sewall, of Indianapolis, club woman and pacifist, was an enthusiastic and prominent participant.¹⁵ A letter which she wrote December 16, 1915, to "My Friends in Hoosierland" documented the high-minded sincerity and the credulity of the whole undertaking. "Believe me! we are not hair-brained lunatics bent on a fool's errand—but rather a company of clear-headed but simple-hearted men and women, with no illusions in regard to ourselves but with the faith that *any one* of us, much more *all of us with God*, constitutes a majority in that council where each next step along the path of human progress is determined."¹⁶

Viewed in retrospect, Ford's crusade appears to have been more detrimental than helpful to the cause of peace. The public was left with the feeling that the United States had been made to appear ridiculous in the eyes of the world, and that generation, though it made a point of pretending otherwise, was hypersensitive to world regard. After this fiasco, people were inclined to wait until success appeared virtually inescapable before favoring any new campaign to end the war. When Henry Ford arrived in New York after hastily quitting the expedition in Norway, his

¹⁵ In the pamphlet *Henry Ford's Peace Expedition Who's Who* (1915), Mrs. Sewall was described as "the founder and the honorary president of both the National Council of Women and the International Council of Women. For eight years she was chairman of the executive committee of the National Women's Suffrage Association. She was a leader in the organization of the General Federation of Women's Clubs of which she was the first Vice President."

¹⁶ This was an open letter. For further information on Mrs. Sewall's role in the expedition, consult the May Wright Sewall Collection in the Indiana State Library.

influence was neutralized. He was to spend a fortune buying full-page advertising in the metropolitan dailies for appeals against the preparedness movement, but his signature at the bottom of these pleas called up pictures of a Don Quixote charging windmills in a Model T Ford. To some degree all professional pacifists were henceforth marked as the kind of people who would go on a Ford peace expedition.

A peace plan of a different character was directed to the prevention of future wars rather than the ending of the one in progress. The outbreak of hostilities in 1914 had seemed an anachronistic nightmare. Volubly, citizens deplored the lack of a better method of settling international disputes than trial by combat. Under the spell of that feeling, clergymen, educators, politicians, and editors expressed their belief in a coming day when international law and a world police force would prevent war's madness. The almost complete lack of detail which characterized such prophecies left the basic idea unconfused by controversial questions of method, form, and political and national effect. Under these circumstances, there was virtually unanimous agreement that the world needed some such plan, and even so pronounced a nationalist as William Randolph Hearst talked casually of world courts and international police for a few weeks.¹⁷

As the war lengthened and the public became partly inured to casualty statements, the initial ground swell of sentiment for a planned peace subsided. Some voices, however, continued to be heard. Professor Amos S. Hershey of Indiana University, dean of the state's students of international law, used his classroom and the speaker's platform to present his argu-

¹⁷ Chicago *American*, September 15, 1915, p. 10.

ments in favor of postwar organization.¹⁸ Politicians inserted into their remarks occasional experimental paragraphs on world peace machinery. Of special interest, in light of his later converse attitude, was the appeal of James E. Watson in February, 1915, for a potent international court. "Such a court must come in time," he lectured, "a court whose decrees must be respected and one which will have an efficient navy to police the seas and enforce its findings."¹⁹

The crusaders for internationalism were provided with a program and an organization around which they could rally when a national League to Enforce Peace was organized June 17, 1915, in Philadelphia under the direction of Former President Taft. Its launchers sought to keep their untested craft out of the cross currents of war partisanship by refusing to take sides among the belligerents or on the arms embargo question. It was described by its sponsors as not being a "stop-the-war movement, an anti-preparedness organization, or a peace-at-any price endeavor," but a proposal for "the maintenance of peace after the close of the . . . war by the use of economic and military force."²⁰ Realism was to be the watchword.

In Indiana the gathering received adequate news space but very limited editorial comment. Those who did take cognizance of its program deemed it worthy of respectful and sympathetic consideration although not a matter necessitating immediate judgment or

¹⁸ Bloomington *Daily Telephone*, January 6, 1915, p. 1. Hershey was one of President Wilson's advisers at the Paris peace conference in 1919.

¹⁹ Rushville *Republican*, February 19, 1915, p. 1.

²⁰ From the official invitation to the League's first annual convention, May 26, 1916.

action. They doubted "if it would work" but agreed that it would be a fine thing if it did.²¹ Virtually no one actively opposed the League. On the other hand, few considered its support a personal responsibility. Ministers and church conferences gave it less attention than was accorded the Ford expedition; politicians applied their ears to the ground and hearing little, spoke little.

Chief among its Indiana champions in the early days was William Dudley Foulke, of Richmond, who had been one of the original members of the League's national organization. He was a publicist, author of books as divergent as the *Life of Oliver P. Morton* and *Lyrics of War and Peace*, and Indiana's leading civil-service advocate. Paradoxically, he was a professed liberal and former Mugwump who worshiped the memory of conservative and "stalwart" Oliver P. Morton, a fighting Quaker, and a Bull Moose Republican. Through his guidance an Indiana branch of the League to Enforce Peace was organized, and it was to him that the national secretary wrote requesting the names of local orators known to be sympathetic with the League's efforts. He was cautioned to "refrain from asking those to represent us who are likely in their addresses to offend the great body of citizens who are convinced that our country ought to add to its defenses in order to provide against contingencies that may arise before international guarantees can be provided."²² His prompt reply listed J. Frank Hanly, Booth Tarkington, Henry Lane

²¹ Indianapolis *News*, June 18, 1915, p. 6. Virtually none of the weekly and smaller daily papers made mention of the League on the editorial page.

²² William H. Short to Foulke, March 1, 1916, Foulke Collection, Indiana State Library.

Wilson, Professor Allen D. Hole of Earlham College, Edgar D. Crumpacker, Merrill Moores, James E. Watson, Will H. Hays, and Albion F. Bacon.²³ The presidency of the state branch went to Henry Lane Wilson, a leading Republican who had been chairman of the Indiana Committee for Relief of Belgium and United States minister to Mexico.

By the next spring, 1916, organizations had been formed in more than twenty counties,²⁴ and when the first annual nation-wide convention assembled in May at Washington, D. C., four Indiana men had been appointed to responsible posts in the League's national organization. Foulke and Wilson were on the list of vice-presidents, while Foulke, Crumpacker, and Hanly were members of the General Committee of National Organization—all four were Republicans. A membership drive was launched in Indiana that amassed a roll of nearly 2,500 names by the end of the year.²⁵ However, this success was more impressive on paper than in the field, for it included many who for one reason or another assumed no further responsibility. In actuality, therefore, the guiding force of the Indiana branch of the League to Enforce Peace remained in the hands of a small, vitally interested group throughout the period of American neutrality. An analysis of that band is illuminating.

²³ Foulke to Short, March 4, 1916, Foulke Collection.

²⁴ At an organization meeting at the Claypool Hotel, Henry Lane Wilson said, "The principles on which the League is founded provide for the settlement of all questions arising between the signatory powers by a judicial tribunal or council of conciliation and that the signatory powers shall use their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories." *Indianapolis News*, April 26, 1916, p. 5; *Logansport Journal-Tribune*, April 27, 1916, p. 7.

²⁵ *Indianapolis Star*, January 28, 1917, p. 13.

In the first place, its members were drawn chiefly from the professional and business classes. They were overwhelmingly pro-Allied and very definitely "intellectual." The Republicans outweighed the Democrats both in numbers and influence, a large percentage being drawn from that part of the Republican party which had been Bull Moose.²⁶ Somewhat surprisingly, most of the leaders were intense nationalists and captains in the local preparedness brigade.

Henry Lane Wilson had returned in 1913 from his post as minister to Mexico to launch a campaign for American occupation of that country and to nurse an intense antagonism toward President Wilson and William Jennings Bryan. Currently he was beating the drums for a larger army and publicly questioning the virility of those who talked of being "too proud to fight." Foulke, despite his Quaker background, had been urging military preparedness as the most pressing item of business before the country since the opening shots of the war.²⁷ Quincy A. Myers, chairman of the Marion County organization, had likewise advocated preparedness and had proposed that the United States make the Mexican situation its business.²⁸ The majority of the leaders were of like mind.

²⁶ James Goodrich (next Republican governor) presided at a statewide banquet of the League in January, 1917. Indianapolis *Star*, January 26, 1917, p. 1. John C. Shaffer, Bull Moose Republican, threw his influential newspapers behind the movement in the early stages, endorsing the League's intention "to provide eventually a world police whose duty shall be to establish order among nations on the same principle that local police maintain peaceful conditions in small communities." *Ibid.*, June 19, 1915, p. 8.

²⁷ Foulke to Theodore Roosevelt, December 7, 1914, Foulke Collection.

²⁸ Indianapolis *News*, April 5, 1915, p. 1. The Republican state platform in 1916 favored "a world court for the adjustment of international disputes." *Ibid.*, April 6, 1916, p. 4.

Furthermore, most of them were staunch believers in the magic of high tariff walls. In short, a program of postwar internationalism was being sponsored by economic and political nationalists; plans for preventing future Belgian tragedies were being laid by men, many of whom advocated United States armed intervention in Mexico and approved past action in Panama. Such being the case it is not surprising—it might have been foreseen—that many of those who formed the League to Enforce Peace in 1915-16 would in 1919-20 oppose “Wilson’s League” on national and partisan grounds.

Running counter to the influences for pacifism was a rising virulent nationalism. In part, it was nothing more than a patriotic reaction to European violations of American rights. But it became, also, a positive factor in its own right, for with each measurable increase in the sensitivity of the people toward their country and their country’s rights they advanced one step to meet the conflict. The movement for greater military preparedness was the most common outlet for this spirit and serves, therefore, as a yardstick by which the broader stream may be measured.

In the beginning, the European melee had given promise of discouraging the militaristic spirit in America. Shocked and sickened, Indiana citizens had turned away from war and its appurtenances with revulsion.²⁹ The initial attitude toward large armies was summarized by the popular aphorism, “Give a boy a new rifle and his first impulse is to see how it will shoot.”³⁰ When it was rumored that the Indiana Society, Sons of the American Revolution, was preparing a resolution favoring military drill and rifle

²⁹ See *ante*, 4-11.

³⁰ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 18, 1914, p. 4.

practice in high schools and colleges, protests cascaded upon the organization with such vehemence that the resolution was not presented.³¹ Said the Methodist Ministerial Association of Indianapolis on this score, "We believe that military training in our public schools would tend to create a fighting machine in America, which would be a menace to our peace and prosperity, and would degrade our citizenship to that of some of the military-ruled nations of the old world."³² That this reflected the mood of the majority was further indicated by the approval given to President Wilson's rebuke to clamorous armament advocates in his message to Congress, December 6, 1914.³³ The cry "to arms, to arms" had for the time being been rebuffed.

But slowly and unspectacularly the belief in increased military protection gained respectability and converts as the new year brought friction with the fighting nations. The public became weary of diplomatic exchanges that settled nothing, and began an impatient search for a formula that would achieve definite results. To an increasing number the solution seemed to be such an enlargement of American fighting forces as would convince the Germans (and the Allies in their turn) of the advisability of coming to terms with a muscular Uncle Sam. "The best thing about a large army and a strong navy is that they make it so much easier to say just what we want to say in our diplomatic correspondence,"³⁴ was the way the *Lafayette Courier* put it. If, speculated a dog-

31 Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, October 10, 1914, p. 3.

32 Indianapolis *News*, October 12, 1914, p. 14.

33 Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, December 9, 1914, p. 9; La Porte *Argus*, December 9, 1914; South Bend *Tribune*, December 8, 1914, p. 8.

34 *Lafayette Courier*, May 25, 1915, p. 6.

matic Warsaw editor, "as many as 500,000 sound and true and trained Americans had been in reach of a call to the colors, and there was a supply of the material of warfare, the Kaiser would not have sent an order to launch a torpedo against Americans."³⁵ Many agreed with the philosophy of the frontiersman that "A feller mightn't need a gun very often, but when he did need it, he needed it mighty bad."³⁶

By August, 1915, the debate over the necessity and extent of rearmament overshadowed news from the war front. Whether or not the United States should double, triple, or quadruple its standing army, and whether the navy was "incomparable" or "scrap iron," were topics more discussed than the Russian retreat, the Gallipoli campaign, or the occupation of Serbia. Indiana branches of the Navy League and of the National Security League were formed.³⁷ A drive to secure recruits for a "Plattsburg Camp" to be held at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, was launched throughout the state;³⁸ a mock battle was held in the interest of preparedness at the Indianapolis Speedway during State Fair Week before a reputed crowd of 20,000;³⁹

³⁵ Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, May 13, 1915, p. 4.

³⁶ Hobart *News*, May 27, 1915, p. 4.

³⁷ Indianapolis *News*, August 31, 1915, p. 5; September 27, 1915, p. 7.

³⁸ Despite the urgings of practically every editor and the endorsement of high military, political, and civil leaders, it was with the greatest difficulty that five hundred trainees were assembled at Fort Sheridan.

³⁹ Indianapolis *Star*, September 7, 1915, p. 1. Taking part in the sham battle were National Guardsmen, the Culver Black Horse Troop, United States Cavalry, an army observation balloon, airplanes, and armored automobiles. At the end an aerial bomb unfurled an American flag high above the field as the bands struck up "The Star Spangled Banner." Proceeds were applied to the building of a new National Guard armory.

and an attempt was made to arrange a state-wide conference of all those interested in a "real" program of military and naval security to meet at Culver Academy, October 29 and 30.⁴⁰

The extremists who had talked a year before of doubling the army now demanded universal conscription, giving point to their urgings by describing hypothetical invasions of unprepared America by the battle-trained winner of the war in Europe. With meticulous detail they described the sweet stench of burning flesh, the dead, and the homeless aged that the invader would leave behind him as he penetrated America's pitiful defenses with greater ease than Germany had experienced in Belgium. They scared themselves to the tips of their toes and probably enjoyed the sensation as thoroughly as the teen-age boy who squirms under the impact of the thriller he is reading.

The most widely read of these accounts, and the model for many others, was Hudson Maxim's *Defenseless America*. Published first in 1915, the book went through several editions, including one that retailed for fifty cents. In the preface, Maxim struck the pose, currently popular with leading armament advocates, of an unappreciated prophet who yet found it in his heart to forgive and pity the giddy public. Though he feared that America could not now be saved it was his hope that a warning might

⁴⁰ Plymouth *Republican*, October 14, 1915, p. 1; Plymouth *Democrat*, October 28, 1915, p. 6. The secretary of the Provisional Committee and the champion of this conference was Claude E. Nicely of South Bend. Preparedness advocates of other parts of the state gave it indifferent support and the meeting was called off at the last minute.

“place a few more men and a few more guns on the firing line, and thereby save the lives of a few of our people;” might “save a few homes from the torch;” might “lessen the area of devastation;” might “by adding a little power to our resistance, help to get slightly better terms from the conquerors for our liberation.” To give point to this prefatory prophecy, he described the conquest of the United States by an invading army of only a hundred thousand men. Landing at New York they seized control of an area of 170-mile radius (“The Heart of America”) and secured munition factories, coal fields, and transportation facilities sufficient to furnish enough material and forced labor to subdue the country from sea to sea.⁴¹

The timely drama of this subject was not over-

⁴¹ Hudson Maxim, *Defenseless America* (New York, 1915). Ten thousand copies were distributed to university graduates and “Selected leaders of American thought and shapers of public opinion.” Among those who complimented the author were Former President Theodore Roosevelt and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt. William Randolph Hearst was the publisher.

Another best seller, Julius W. Muller’s *The Invasion of America* . . . (New York, 1916), depicted a small invading force occupying and exploiting New Jersey and all territory east of the Hudson River to the value of billions of dollars (levying tribute on all towns as the Germans did in Belgium). After many months hinterland America raised superior forces, only to have the enemy withdraw, taking his plunder with him and leaving the exploited section sucked dry for years to come.

Other books pressing for extensive armaments included Frederic L. Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States* (New York, 1915); Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick, *The American Navy* (New York, 1915); Theodore Roosevelt, *America and the World War* (New York, 1915), *Fear God and Take Your Own Part* (New York, 1916), and *The Foes of Our Own Household* (New York, 1917). Much read in Indiana was a locally written pamphlet by Lucius B. Swift, *Military Situation of the United States* (Indianapolis, 1915).

looked by the movie makers, and early the next year "The Battle Cry of Peace," based on Maxim's book and starring Norma Talmadge, was released. Preceded by an intensive advertising campaign and sponsored by local patriots, the seeing of it became a duty of every "red-blooded American." He watched insidious foreign spies, aided by sincere but shortsighted peace-at-any-price gospelers, lulling the country into a sense of false security by pacifist propaganda. Then came the enemy in sudden, overwhelming attack. New York City perished in flames, women were led away to unmentionable fates, helpless young men were bayoneted, and pillage proceeded unrestrained. Antipreparedness advocates realized the error of their teachings in time to die in heroic but vain efforts to save their loved ones.

It was a hit second only to the "Birth of a Nation," and was invariably compared to it. As in other war pictures, the villain country was not named, but her warriors followed so closely the pattern of reported German actions in Belgium that she was associated with Germany in the minds of many patrons. Yet the film's main influence was not in its inferential pro-Allied slant but in its fanning of the national spirit. The same can be said for the over-all influence of Hollywood throughout the prewar years. In one sense the "Birth of a Nation" (Reconstruction Period) and the virile, patriotic Westerns may have been almost as consequential in this sphere as were "The Battle Cry of Peace," "Civilization," and the blood-and-thunder serial "Neal of the Navy," all of which had contemporary themes. "War Brides," in which Nazimova appeared on the stage in 1915 and

on the screen in 1916 seems to have been the only truly pacifist show of note.⁴²

To secure more satisfactory answers to American diplomatic notes and to prepare for a possible invasion of hearth and home were only the more obvious benefits claimed for military training of the country's young men. "It would offer straight shoulders for round; strong chests for weak; clear eyes for bleary; alert minds for dull" and reduce the number of "wrecks that now hang around poolrooms."⁴³ College sissies that knew "how to swing a golf stick or a tennis racket" would gain in manliness by learning "to handle a rifle and hit a target."⁴⁴ "Discipline of thought," "the lesson of obedience," "respect for the rights of others," "physical vigor," and "comradeship" would accrue to the man in uniform.⁴⁵ Soldiering would also "combat the spread of doctrines which effeminate the nation's youth" and lessen the threat of radicalism.⁴⁶ It would "inspire a robust patriotism" among foreigners. It would counteract

⁴² Movie advertisements in the Indianapolis *Sunday Star* for 1915-17 include numerous war titles. Thomas Ince's striking "Civilization" (1916) was intended as a pacifist film, but its featuring of the sinking of the "Lusitania" and of a selfish monarch had the opposite effect. A number of foreign-made newsreels such as "France in Arms," "How Britain Prepared," and "The Italian Battle Front" reached the local theaters. German pictures were shown chiefly to German-American audiences after being advertised in German-language newspapers.

⁴³ South Bend *Tribune*, July 23, 1915, p. 8.

⁴⁴ Indianapolis *News*, October 1, 1914, p. 6; Muncie *Star*, November 24, 1914, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Muncie *Evening Press*, July 19, 1915, p. 4; Monticello *Herald*, July 29, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, July 23, 1915, p. 8; Indianapolis *Star*, August 7, 1915, p. 8; Daughters of the American Revolution *Magazine*, 49: 307-9 (November, 1916).

⁴⁶ Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, May 13, 1915, p. 4.

the malicious "harping on the evils of nationalism and the imminence of universal brotherhood" by "preachers, settlement workers, and labor leaders."⁴⁷ More broadly speaking, it would "eliminate the idea that the United States is an agency which delivers letters and collects internal revenue, and set up the idea that it is the idealization of every individual life, the something more powerful than egotism, the something which can be grand and ennobling in every life rather than insignificant and inconsidered in it."⁴⁸ Rising above all the clamor and giving aid to the local champions was the voice of Theodore Roosevelt.⁴⁹

Most of those who talked in this vein were in favor of universal military training, though there was no lack of other plans. Proposals for the adoption of the Swiss system, increases in the Navy, reserve officer training in colleges, federalization of the National Guard, and the creation of a stronger force of military "aeroplanes"⁵⁰ had much to commend them. But along with these was a flood of bizarre schemes cut from the pattern of small boys playing cowboys and Indians. Fraternal organizations solemnly petitioned that their members be constituted a military reserve force and undergo training by officers of the United States Army.⁵¹ Officials of the Chicago Yacht Club

⁴⁷ Chicago *American*, February 23, 1916, p. 6.

⁴⁸ Richmond *Palladium*, August 12, 1915, p. 4.

⁴⁹ One of the most influential of the antipreparedness books of the period compiled some of Roosevelt's most warlike statements. William I. Hull, *Preparedness, The American Versus the Military Programme* (New York, 1916), 12.

⁵⁰ By guess or by foresight, many fresh-water editors predicted the fighting value of the airplane when military minds were skeptical. The Marion *Chronicle*, September 2, 1914, p. 4, called for the creation of ten thousand army planes at that early date.

⁵¹ Indianapolis *Star*, April 9, 1915, p. 8; August 19, p. 1.

proposed the creation of a reserve scout fleet from their boats.⁵² "Plattsburg Camps" providing one month's training to officer candidates were opened throughout the country with great fanfare. In all seriousness it was advocated that a mobile land force be created by supplying postmen with Government-owned, high-powered cars so constructed that "in time of need they could have the mailbox removed and substitute for it rapid-fire guns."⁵³ It was a rather dull day, observed one wit, that did not "bring forth at least one new peace society, a national defense organization and a civilian training camp project or two."⁵⁴ Some allowance should be made for this generation which had not seen a modern war conducted by the United States in a modern manner. If amateurs and dime-novel methods had not actually won the Spanish-American War, accounts of it had been so written as to give that impression.

The apostles of these schemes shunned the term "militarism" as they would have avoided a coiled rattlesnake. They talked of "preparedness," which, being a neutral word of little historical meaning, they sought to endow with connotations of their own selecting. Aggressively they strove to link it so closely to patriotism and virile manhood that those who objected would appear to be "traitors," "water veined pinchpennys," "petticoated men," "peace-at-any-price imbeciles," or "mollycoddles who cannot stand before the Liberty Bell without a blush of shame."⁵⁵

⁵² Indianapolis *News*, August 30, 1915, p. 18.

⁵³ Evansville *Journal-News*, January 2, 1916, p. 9.

⁵⁴ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, September 9, 1915, p. 4.

⁵⁵ Hammond *Lake County Times*, January 15, 1916, p. 4; Madison *Courier*, June 28, 1915, p. 2; Angola *Steuben Republican*, January 26, 1916, p. 3; Chicago *Tribune*, February 23, 1916, p. 6; War-

Defensively they offered preparedness as the "best preventive of war that could be adopted."⁵⁶ "Peace and Preparedness," it was contended, "are synonymous. The words mean one and the same thing."⁵⁷ By holding to this doctrine it was possible to enjoy the emotional excitement of playing at war while working for the high moral goal of peace.

But just how far did the majority of Hoosiers follow these urgings? No hasty answer to that question could reflect adequately the several facets that public opinion presented. In the first place, there was a small group of extremists who believed in militarism for its own sake. They were likely to be the same people who wanted the United States to "take Mexico." Their insuppressible volubility, their relatively high social and journalistic rank, and the un-sleeping vigilance with which they seized every favorable turn of events to push their doctrines gave them an influence out of proportion to their small numbers.

Persons above the average in economic and social position were more likely to favor sizable increases in American armaments than were their poorer neigh-

saw *Northern Indianian*, May 23, 1915, p. 4; *Goshen News-Times*, April 28, 1915, p. 2; *Monticello Herald*, July 29, 1915, p. 4; *Indianapolis Star*, July 28, 1915, p. 6; *Muncie Evening Press*, July 19, 1915, p. 4. The last words quoted above were those of Theodore Roosevelt.

Preparedness rapidly became the word of the hour. Under its incantatory name ministers and insurance salesmen talked of death, advertisers sold stomach bitters, department stores warned Christmas shoppers, and athletes skipped rope. An enterprising hostess gave a "Preparedness Party."

⁵⁶ *Waterloo Press*, July 29, 1915, p. 8.

⁵⁷ *Indianapolis Indiana Daily Times*, February 24, 1916, p. 4. See also *Muncie Evening Press*, July 23, 1916, p. 4; *Crown Point Lake County Star*, June 4, 1915, p. 4; *Richmond Palladium*, February 23, 1915, p. 4.

bors. Their names and money supported the Navy League and National Security League. It was the Knife and Fork Club, the Commercial Club, the University Club, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Rotary Club, the Bar Association, or the Chamber of Commerce that brought the nationally renowned preparedness speaker to the community. For the most part, those who went off to Fort Sheridan in 1915 and who prepared to attend a similar camp at Fort Benjamin Harrison in 1916 were middle-aged men from the same class.⁵⁸

Still another line that cut through the rearmament drive was political. The fading Progressive party was easily the most preparedness-minded of all,⁵⁹ and the Socialist the least.⁶⁰ There was less difference between the major parties, but there could be no doubt that the Republican leaders were more in favor of

⁵⁸ *Bell Telephone News*, June, 1915, p. 1; *Indianapolis Commercial*, August 23, 1915, p. 1; December 23, p. 1; *Logansport Journal-Tribune*, September 14, 1915, p. 3; *South Bend News-Times*, May 4, 1916, p. 4; *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine*, 47: 228 (April, 1915); *Indianapolis Star*, March 18, 1915, p. 5; *Indianapolis News*, December 25, 1915, p. 7.

In August, 1915, the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution endorsing an armory for Indianapolis, a larger navy, a second naval academy on the Pacific coast, a second military academy similar to West Point, a large increase in the size of the regular army, a strong reserve force composed of trained Federal militia, and the requisite store of munitions and war equipment. *Indianapolis News*, August 17, 1915, p. 16. The one preparedness step which the businessmen consistently opposed was the creation of a Government-owned merchant marine.

⁵⁹ *Goshen News-Times*, August 25, 1914, p. 2; *Muncie Star*, November 24, 1914, p. 4; *Terre Haute Star*, March 20, 1915, p. 6; *Liberty Herald*, March 4, 1915, p. 4; *Richmond Palladium*, February 25, 1915, p. 4; *Indianapolis Star*, October 12, 1914, p. 6; *Louisville Herald*, August 23, 1914, p. 4. All of these were Progressive papers.

⁶⁰ *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, January 4, 1916, p. 6; *Muncie Evening Press*, July 13, 1915, p. 4.

increased military establishments⁶¹ than were the Democrats.⁶² Democratic Senator John W. Kern and Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall were outspoken opponents of preparedness in the early stages of the debate and insisted that the vast majority of Indiana citizens felt likewise. It was partly as a result of their pronouncements that many inhabitants of the eastern seaboard regarded Indiana as a leader in antipreparedness circles.⁶³

War sympathies constituted another influence on the individual's views as to the proper size of the army and navy, though it was mainly a difference of direction. The initial reaction of the German-Americans toward the preparedness stir was an instinctive approval that went beyond that of the general public. Pro-German papers such as the Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung*, Richmond *Palladium*, and La Grange *Standard* took an early lead in advocating rearmament and some of them (the *Palladium* for example) continued to hold that position. But when by the mid-summer of 1915 it became evident that a large fighting force was more likely to be used against Germany than any other major power, many of the pro-German

⁶¹ South Bend *Tribune*, January 8, 1915, p. 10; Peru *Republican*, February 22, 1915, p. 1; Evansville *Journal-News*, March 4, 1915, p. 8; Logansport *Journal-Tribune*, March 4, 1915, p. 6; Angola *Steuben Republican*, December 1, 1915, p. 1; Columbus *Evening Republican*, March 4, 1915, p. 4.

⁶² Evansville *Courier*, July 31, 1915, p. 6; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, May 17, 1915, p. 4; South Bend *News-Times*, November 20, 1915, p. 4; New Castle *Times*, August 20, 1915, p. 4; Princeton *Democrat*, March 20, 1915, p. 2.

⁶³ When the Administration developed a preparedness program of its own, however, Kern and Marshall were too strong party men to oppose it, and they supported the Hay bill. Thomas, *Marshall*, 176-78; Kern to Foulke, October 4, 1915, Foulke Collection.

spokesmen shifted their stand. They began to assert that preparedness plans should be drawn for "defense only,"⁶⁴ that an enlargement of the navy "to protect freedom of the seas from England" was more desirable than creation of a huge standing army,⁶⁵ and that "betterment and efficiency not increase in number should be the order of the day."⁶⁶ Allied partisans reversed this direction, starting cold but working up something of a sweat as the break with Germany grew nearer.

In order, however, to demonstrate the involved and contradictory aspects of prewar opinion one needs only to point out that the three Chicago papers of general circulation that came the nearest to being pro-German were also the strongest preparedness advocates, the *Chicago American* and *Chicago Examiner* published by William Randolph Hearst, and the *Chicago Tribune* published by Robert R. McCormick. That fact in turn raises a broader complexity. Was a paper like the *Indianapolis News*, which was determinedly pro-Allied but opposed to excessive preparedness and jingoism, more or less responsible for American belligerency in 1917 than a paper like the *Chicago Tribune*, which advocated concessions to Germany but preached universal military training and chauvinism?

When the researcher turns to an examination of the views of religious spokesmen, he finds complexities multiplied again. Perhaps the most significant development in this field was the disappearance by the fall of 1915 of the unified and vocal opposition

⁶⁴ *Indianapolis Telegraph und Tribune*, January 19, 1916, p. 4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, February 11, 1916, p. 4.

which clergymen had presented to the rearmament agitation upon its first appearance in 1914.⁶⁷ Differences in attitudes among the denominations were vague and tenuous but more discernible than might have been expected. Catholic,⁶⁸ Lutheran,⁶⁹ and Episcopal⁷⁰ leaders accorded more consistent support to augmented armaments than did those of the other churches. The Presbyterians⁷¹ were perhaps slightly more sympathetic to this cause than were the Methodists,⁷² who were in turn a little more militant than were the Baptists⁷³ and Christians (Disciples of Christ).⁷⁴ The Holiness, Free Methodist, Church of God, Nazarene, and churches of similar composition ignored the movement entirely.⁷⁵ The Quakers, Breth-

⁶⁷ See accounts of the state conferences of Methodist, Presbyterian, and Baptist churches in 1915. *Indianapolis News*, October 1, 1915, p. 1; October 2, p. 1; October 7, p. 2; October 15, p. 4.

⁶⁸ *Our Sunday Visitor*, May 28, 1916, p. 1; *Catholic Columbian Record*, October 23, 1914, p. 4; *Indiana Catholic*, October 1, 1915, p. 4; November 26, p. 4; *Indianapolis News*, January 25, 1915, p. 16 (speech of Rev. John Cavanaugh, C.S.C., President of Notre Dame University).

⁶⁹ *Lutheran Witness*, 34: 28, 360 (January 26 and November 16, 1915).

⁷⁰ See the *South Bend News-Times*, November 20, 1914, p. 10, for an address by Rev. William T. Manning of New York, and *Butler Alumna Quarterly*, July 1, 1916, pp. 53-56, for an address by the Rt. Rev. Charles D. Williams, bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan. See also the files of the *Witness*.

⁷¹ *Indianapolis News*, November 11, 1915, p. 10; December 6, p. 4; *South Bend News-Times*, May 5, 1915, p. 2.

⁷² *Western Christian Advocate*, January 5, 1916, p. 5; February 9, 1916, p. 16; *Indianapolis Indiana Daily Times*, February 14, 1916, p. 15; *Indianapolis News*, July 5, 1915, p. 1; August 11, p. 7.

⁷³ *Baptist Observer*, October 15, 1914, p. 4; June 22, 1916, p. 1; *Indianapolis News*, October 15, 1915, p. 14.

⁷⁴ *Christian Standard*, September 12, 1914, p. 10; *Indianapolis News*, August 2, 1915, p. 2.

⁷⁵ *Apostolic Review*, published by one wing of the Church of Christ, and *Gospel Trumpet*. These denominations were characterized by decentralized government.

ren (Dunkers), Mennonites, Amish, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Unitarians were unequivocally opposed to it.⁷⁶ A review of this line-up would seem to indicate that denominational advocacy of preparedness varied with the amount of organizational superstructure. At any rate, those churches with congregational form of government gave less aid to preparedness measures than did those with episcopal organizations, and among the latter the bishop and church paper were more likely to favor rearmament than were the local clergymen and his flock. Jewish rabbis sometimes opposed, sometimes ignored, but virtually never favored large increases in armament.⁷⁷

When these various divisions of opinion are put together the result is confused in detail but clear enough as to pattern. The main body of Indiana citizens did not favor revolutionary changes in American defense policy before 1917, vocal extremists notwithstanding.⁷⁸ Federal inspection of the Indiana National Guard, at a time when at least two-thirds of the editors were thumping for national defense, showed that of 2,677 members, 769 were absent.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Wilcox, *Seventh-Day Adventists in Time of War*, 24 ff.; *Goshen College Record*, February, 1917, pp. 8-9; *Mennonite*, January 22, 1916, p. 5; *Christian Science Monitor*, September, 1915, p. 261; *Gospel Herald*, 9: 325 (August 10, 1915); *American Friend*, n.s. 2: 516 (August 13, 1914), and succeeding issues; *Earlhamite*. Unitarianism and opposition to armaments were joined from the start in America by the influence of William Ellery Channing.

⁷⁷ Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, of New York City, told members of the Northern Indiana Teachers Association that "the present war and all its unspeakable horrors is the answer to those who will not see that war preparation is war provocation." *South Bend News-Times*, April 2, 1915, p. 18.

⁷⁸ William Dudley Foulke, *A Hoosier Autobiography* (New York, 1922), 196, contains a brief discussion of this state of opinion.

⁷⁹ *Indianapolis News*, December 20, 1915, p. 1; December 22, p. 11.

Ratings on general efficiency were so low that the loss of Federal aid was threatened. A South Bend preparedness parade sponsored by local business associations in 1916 had to be called off because the townspeople could not be sufficiently interested.⁸⁰ Politicians referred often to the defense needs of the country, but not one of them was willing to endorse a specific program of major change before 1917. Despite an emotional and patriotic drive to gain recruits for the regular army in prosperous 1916, the number of enlistments was less than normal. After inspecting the recruiting station at one town that year, the officer in charge of the Indiana area announced that he was "thoroughly disgusted." "The people here do not take the right attitude towards army life as a career, and if a man joins from here he often tries to go out on the quiet. The army is no disgrace."⁸¹ It was traditional in the Mississippi Valley to hold the civilian above the soldier in time of peace, and the Valley had not yet abandoned its peace-time scale of values. When war came, the reversal was made ungrudgingly, and volunteering proceeded faster in the Middle West than in the preparedness-minded East.

In spite of all these qualifications and reservations,

⁸⁰ South Bend *News-Times*, May 23, 1916, p. 3; May 26, p. 4.

⁸¹ The officer described a part of his campaign to a newspaperman. "I have written letters to every newspaper, daily and weekly, in Indiana, asking the editor to devote some space to the recruiting campaign. I also have written to every postmaster, asking for the names of men who might be interested. My men on the streets . . . are instructed to approach every man who it seems to them would make a good soldier and tell him about the service." But the comparatively long term of four years service, as against economic prosperity, caused enlistments to lag. Indianapolis *Star*, March 24, 1916, p. 3.

the people definitely wanted some accretions to national arms. They preferred that the first and major part of the increase go to the navy, for "navies have never been a menace to liberty."⁸² At the end of 1915 they still preferred a strengthening of the National Guard to the creation of a powerful "continental" army, but by March, 1916, a clear majority were willing to accept the Hay bill compromise on this score (Indiana Congressmen, Democrats and Republicans, voted unanimously for it).⁸³ Running through all their defense plans was the hope of finding a program that would provide protection without creating an omnipresent and costly military machine,⁸⁴ thus their interest in naval construction, National Guard, civilian rifle clubs, drill for high-school students, Plattsburg camps, the Swiss system of short intense yearly training, and like schemes.

The final accounting remains. To what extent did the drive for rearmament influence the American decision for war? There was more talk than gun casting, therefore any major influence that the preparedness movement exerted must have resulted from the talking. Such, in fact, was the case.

That generation had been nurtured on school histories of more than ordinary patriotism, seen America build the most productive industrial plant of the

⁸² Indianapolis *News*, July 12, 1915, p. 6. See also New Albany *Ledger*, December 9, 1914, p. 4; Hammond *Lake County News*, December 23, 1915, p. 2.

⁸³ Indianapolis *Star*, March 24, 1916, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Hobart *News*, April 15, 1915, p. 4; Attica *Ledger*, March 10, 1916, p. 8; Rushville *Republican*, February 14, 1916, p. 4; Huntington *Herald*, October 13, 1916, p. 1; Elkhart *Truth*, July 9, 1915, p. 6; *Farmer's Guide*, 28: 490 (April 8, 1916); William A. Ketcham to Governor Samuel M. Ralston, January 18, 1916, in Governors' Correspondence, Archives Division, Indiana State Library.

world, drunk of the heady wine of imperialism, gloried in the tenets of the "strenuous life," dug the Panama Canal, and had their heads turned by the fact that to them it had been permitted to see the United States become a first-rate power. The mark of these events was still upon them in 1914, and though their strident spirit had cooled perceptibly the fire had not gone out. War's clamor revived it to a considerable degree. The preparedness boom was at the same time a cause and a manifestation of this mood.

Efforts of school teachers to crowd all the words of "America" and the "Star Spangled Banner" into the mind of every pupil, opening of Rotary Club luncheons with a salute to the flag, and a new solemnity of Memorial Day and the Fourth of July, were each a part of the mounting patriotism. Perhaps even more significant in their own special ways were the organization of the Society of Indiana Pioneers in 1915, the formation of an Indiana branch of the Society of the Mayflower Descendants in 1916, and the extraordinary interest shown by the citizens in centennial celebrations of Indiana statehood.

The closest historical parallel of recent times had been the nationalistic surge of the late eighties and nineties that had begot most of the existing patriotic organizations and had its own preparedness excitement in the creation of a brand new navy. Just as the atmosphere of those days had helped produce the Spanish-American War, the 1914-17 spirit was tending toward a like end. By early 1916 it had brought the public to a point where endorsements of "peace" were replaced by talk of "peace with honor." Men spoke of war's possibility and of its preferability to the "sacrifice of the nation's honor." They had come

to believe that there were "good" wars as well as "bad"—that there were worse things than war.⁸⁵ No doubt they could have discovered the same beliefs in the back of their minds in January, 1915, but now they consciously proclaimed them. A year before, a leading minister of Indianapolis would not have pointed out to his congregation that "we are not in the millenium yet, and much as we deplore an appeal to arms, sometimes a nation is just as much bound to fight to maintain her existence as a city is bound to have a police department."⁸⁶ Nor would evangelist Billy Sunday, who seldom strayed far from current political thought, have torn his shirt and shouted to an Indiana audience:

"God is a God of war as well as of peace. We must fight as well as pray. If it hadn't been for war we would be singing 'God Save the King' instead of 'My Country Tis of Thee'; if it hadn't been for war the bloodhounds would be chasing the black men through the swamps and cane-brakes today; if it hadn't been for war Spain would still be tearing at the heart of Cuba; if it hadn't been for war the flag of Mexico would be waving over Texas, New Mexico,

⁸⁵ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, February 26, 1916, p. 4. See also the Evansville *Courier*, March 31, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, January 11, 1916, p. 8; Louisville *Times*, April 19, 1916, p. 6.

⁸⁶ Sermon of Rev. Albert Hurlstone, Roberts Park Methodist Church, in Indianapolis *News*, February 14, 1916, p. 12. President Wilson had arrived at approximately the same point of view, as was indicated by his words at Des Moines on February 1. "There is a price which is too great to pay for peace, and that price can be put in one word. One can not pay the price of self-respect. One can not pay the price of duties abdicated, of glorious opportunities neglected, of character, national character, left without vindication and exemplification in action." "I know that there is not a man or a woman in the hearing of my voice who would wish peace at the expense of the honor of the United States."

Nevada and California. Yes, I believe in preparedness; I believe in battleships and submarines, and if any of the nations across the sea should care to find out whether the American people believe in the Monroe Doctrine, let them start something. If they do, I would like to be a colonel of a regiment.''⁸⁷

At some indiscernible point back along the road public opinion had crossed a watershed.

⁸⁷ *Waterloo Press*, March 2, 1916, p. 8.

VIII. EARLY 1916

AT THE close of 1915, the Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette* asked several dozen Allen County citizens to express their wishes for the New Year. Phrased in the stilted language of such efforts, the replies displayed a remarkable concentration on two main goals: Peace and Prosperity. Invariably, "Peace" appeared ahead of its partner. Often it was accompanied by the writer's qualification that "of course" he meant peace with honor.¹

The point at which national honor should be considered violated had not been defined, however, as was demonstrated by the confused public reaction to the drowning of United States Consul Robert N. McNeely, when the British liner "Persia" was sunk without warning. One view of the situation was expressed by Senator John W. Kern on January 4, 1916. "Speaking for myself alone, and voicing my individual view, I hope that some way may be found to impress on the minds of Americans that as a matter of loyalty to country they ought not to travel on the vessels of belligerents. They ought to be willing to undergo some personal inconvenience, if need be, for the sake of avoiding international complications."²

The editor of the *Indianapolis News* countered with the opinion that the question had become one of saving "American lives," "international law," and "that still greater law, the law of humanity." "The Senator says that he speaks for himself alone. We think that is about the truth."³ The truth seems to

¹ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, January 1, 1916, p. 1.

² *Indianapolis News*, January 5, 1916, p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, January 4, 1916, p. 6; January 5, p. 6. The *Indianapolis Star*, January 5, 1916, p. 8, also took Senator Kern to task for his statement.

have been that most of the people who took notice of the sinking were more worried than angry.

A clearer test of the public's specific views grew out of the heated armed-ship controversy of February and March. Following the German use of the submarine in the previous year to sink enemy merchant ships without warning, the Allies armed their commercial vessels. As long as this armament was for purposes of defense against illegal attack, international law recognized no change in the status of the merchantman or its passengers, a ruling that had evolved in the days of piracy when such armament had been general. Now, however, the German Government argued that because of the nature of British instructions to gun crews, and because of the extreme vulnerability of submarines when on the surface, armaments on merchant ships should be regarded as offensive and the vessels classed as warships. They contended that armed Allied commerce carriers (and Americans on them) had forfeited the protection of international law. Clearly the crux of the issue was in the definition of offensive weapons.

After preliminary maneuvering by all sides, Germany brought the issue out where it could no longer be ignored by announcing on February 10 that she would treat armed merchant vessels as warships. A week later the Administration replied that the United States would not accept this position for her nationals. Critics in certain Congressional quarters grew first restive and then openly rebellious against the President's stand. Sponsored by Representative Jeff Mc-Lemore, of Texas, and Senator Thomas P. Gore, of Oklahoma, resolutions were introduced in both houses warning American citizens not to travel on armed

ships of the combatant nations.⁴ At least two issues were at stake. Would the United States continue to hold Germany to "strict accountability?" Would the control of foreign policy pass from the executive to the legislative branch of government, resulting in the impression abroad of a divided American foreign policy?

In the early stages of the dispute when the first question overshadowed the other, a majority of Indiana's Congressmen were in favor of conceding this particular point to Germany in the interest of peace. Hoosier correspondent Louis Ludlow reported from Washington that a canvass of Indiana Congressmen showed an overwhelming sentiment for the warning resolution.⁵ "I am for this resolution right out in the open," stated Representative Henry A. Barnhart of the South Bend district. "It certainly would be the part of discretion for the United States government to say to recklessly disposed persons who seem inclined to make trouble for the country that if they take passage they must do it at their own peril."⁶ Representative George W. Rauch reported on February 26 that "A majority of Indiana delegates remain opposed to the President, although the members are

⁴ Concurrently, Senator Wesley L. Jones, of Washington, introduced a resolution asserting it to be "the sense of the Senate of the United States of America that any issue claimed to affect the national honor should be referred for its decision to the Congress of the United States, and no ultimatum should be sent to any belligerent power and no severance of diplomatic relations be brought about by Executive action until after the advice and consent of Congress." The resolution was not adopted. *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, p. 3120.

⁵ South Bend *Tribune*, February 24, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *Star*, February 24, 1916, p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*

loath to express their opinions for publication as long as there is a possibility that the warning resolution will not come to a vote.'"⁷

Before the time for voting arrived, the President's appeal for a united front in foreign policy brought the second question to the front, and on that issue most of the Indiana delegation fell in line (both Senators and eleven of the thirteen Representatives were of the President's party). On March 3, Senator Kern joined the majority that defeated the Gore resolution, announcing at the same time that his sick colleague, Benjamin F. Shively, felt as he did in the matter.⁸ By his own admission, Kern's vote was an expression of his loyalty to the Administration rather than of his views on the merits of the controversy.⁹ Four days later the House tabled the McLemore resolution with the aid of all Indiana delegates present except one, Republican Will R. Wood. The other Republican, Merrill Moores, voted for the tabling motion, as did Democrats Barnhart, Rauch, Cyrus Cline, William E. Cox, Lincoln Dixon, Finly H. Gray, Charles Lieb, Martin A. Morrison, and Ralph W. Moss.¹⁰

Representative Cline's speech on the floor of the House against the warning resolution probably reflected the attitude (or rationalization!) of most Indiana members. He expressed his belief in the prin-

⁷ *Indianapolis Star*, February 26, 1916, p. 1.

⁸ *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, p. 3464. Shively's illness was not political; he was then on his death bed. A last-minute amendment by Gore radically changed the meaning of the resolution, but apparently Kern, and a majority of those who voted as he did, intended their votes to be an expression of opposition to the original motion.

⁹ *Hammond Lake County News*, March 9, 1916, p. 2.

¹⁰ *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, p. 3720. On two

ciple of the resolution and affirmed his conviction that no "citizen of the United States has the moral right to menace the safety and liberty of the United States by taking passage upon a vessel that is liable to be destroyed by submarines without notice." But he was opposed to tying the hands of the President in future dealings with the same kind of "perplexing problems, intricate and far-reaching in character," that he had so successfully handled in the past eighteen months. Nor, Cline asserted, did he favor giving the foreign offices of the world the impression of American disunity.¹¹ As representative of the large German-American population of Fort Wayne and its environs, Cline had committed political suicide, as the election returns in November would plainly show. Lieb, a native of Germany, was almost expelled from the society of some of his blood brothers in Evansville. He did not run for re-election.

The first reaction of the Indiana Congressmen in favor of the warning resolution had reflected the views of their constituents, and the majority of Hoosiers never ceased to support it. With St. Paul the evangelist they believed that all that was lawful was not expedient. It is true that an impressive list of influential men and newspapers agreed with President Wilson that concession in this case would lead inevitably to demands for greater ones until "the whole

preliminary motions, Moores had cast his vote with those who favored the warning resolution. *Ibid.*, 3699, 3700. Moss, Morrison, and Lieb supported the President from the beginning, with Cline leaning the same way. *Indianapolis Star*, February 26, 1916, p. 1; *Indianapolis News*, February 24, 1916, p. 1; *South Bend Tribune*, February 24, 1916, p. 1. Democrats William A. Cullop and John A. M. Adair were absent.

¹¹ *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, p. 3706.

fine fabric of international law" would crumble away.¹² But, as Wilson was fond of saying, the strength of America was in the silent part of it, and most of that part remained unconvinced.¹³ The fact that an admonition against traveling on armed belligerent ships would apparently not affect the flow of economic traffic from American ports may have made their decision easier.¹⁴ Actually there was less cause for alarm than Indianans realized: German secret orders to their submarine commanders were far milder than the threats of her Foreign Office. As in other instances where she had acted secretly or with obvious ill-humor, she failed to get credit for her conciliatory move. In department-store terminology,

¹² Indianapolis *News*, February 28, 1916, p. 6; Indianapolis *Star*, February 27, 1916, p. 16; Vincennes *Capital*, February 26, 1916, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, March 8, 1916, p. 8; Rochester *Sentinel*, February 29, 1916, p. 4; New Castle *Daily Times*, February 25, 1916, p. 4; Evansville *Courier*, February 26, 1916, p. 6; Connersville *Evening News*, February 28, 1916, p. 3; Hammond *Lake County Times*, March 3, 1916, p. 4; Peru *Evening Journal*, February 26, 1916, p. 4. Some Indiana citizens sent telegrams to Wilson expressing support of his stand, one of the "most satisfactory" being from William E. Stone, president of Purdue University. Indianapolis *News*, February 26, 1916, p. 1.

¹³ Jasper *Weekly Courier*, March 3, 1916, p. 2; Logansport *Journal-Tribune*, February 27, 1916, p. 6; Muncie *Evening Press*, February 26, 1916, p. 4; Angola *Steuben Republican*, March 1, 1916, p. 6; Chicago *Tribune*, February 26, 1916, p. 6. Editors opposed to the warning often noted that a majority of the people apparently favored it. See Vincennes *Capital*, March 8, 1916, p. 4, and South Bend *Tribune*, February 26, 1916, p. 10; Evansville *Courier*, February 12, 1916, p. 6; February 25, p. 6.

¹⁴ Alice M. Morrissey, in her *American Defense of Neutral Rights, 1914-1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 107-12, found evidence of economic opposition in the East to classing all armed ships as warships, because technical consistency would then demand that they be excluded from American ports except in so far as permitted by rules governing men-of-war. Apparently this possibility was not recognized in Indiana.

she lost the customer's good will while paying the refund.¹⁵

A halt at this point to compare the reactions of Indiana to the principal sources of direct conflict with Germany throughout the prewar years yields interesting results. A majority of the citizens would have favored admonishing Americans not to embark on belligerent ships carrying either armaments or contraband. Whether they would have approved warning Americans off all belligerent ships entering European waters is impossible to determine. In approximately the following increasing order of intensity, they opposed loan embargoes, munition embargoes, the warning of Americans not to travel into the war zone on neutral ships other than American, the warning of Americans not to enter the war zone on American ships, an embargo on food, the withdrawal of American shipping from trade with combatant and neutral Europe, and a vacillating policy toward sabotage in America.

Scarcely had the armed-ship controversy lapsed when a new dispute was at hand. The unarmed

¹⁵ In later years, some writers emphasized the defeat of the Gore and McLemore resolutions as important among the causes of American belligerency. Charles C. Tansill, *America Goes to War* (Boston, 1938), Chap. XVII; Morrissey, *American Defense of Neutral Rights*, 107-12. Yet the subtraction of the armed-ship dispute from sources of friction between the United States and Germany probably would not have altered the final outcome; it certainly would not have materially affected the more intangible causes of America's action. The virtual impossibility for a submarine commander to distinguish between an armed and unarmed merchantman before loosing his torpedoes undoubtedly would have led to "incidents." In 1917, when Germany launched a desperate effort to cut off all overseas traffic to the Allies, she made no distinction between armed and unarmed enemy merchant ships, between enemy and neutral ships, nor between contraband- and noncontraband-bearing vessels. It would have defeated the purposes of her order to have done so.

English channel steamer "Sussex" was torpedoed without warning on March 24, 1916, with resultant injury to several American passengers. The potential consequences were alarming, for this act was a direct violation of the German "Arabic" pledge. Yet because detailed news was for a time meager, public opinion took shape rather slowly. The reaction grew sharper when a German note of April 10, disclaiming responsibility, opened up the dreary possibility of a drawn-out exchange of notes.¹⁶ On April 18 an American communication to Berlin pinned the issue squarely: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

This was an ultimatum, and headlines in Indiana papers recognized it as such: "Chance of War Described as Toss-Up;"¹⁷ "Wilson Issues Ultimatum to German Government";¹⁸ "All Rests with Germany's Answer."¹⁹ A popular cartoon showed an Uncle Sam of serious and determined mien hanging up the receiver of the international telephone.²⁰ He would discuss the matter no further. Editorially the papers gave unconditional support to the President. Practically no one wanted war, but it was felt that the United States had "been more than patient," and the time had come when the country wanted "no

¹⁶ Indianapolis *News*, April 14, 1916, p. 6.

¹⁷ Richmond *Evening Item*, April 20, 1916, p. 1.

¹⁸ Elkhart *Truth*, April 19, 1916, p. 1.

¹⁹ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, April 19, 1916, p. 1.

²⁰ Indianapolis *News*, April 20, 1916, p. 1.

more assurances, pledges, promises of reparation, and explanations to be followed only by other outrages.”²¹ Nor did the public desire to become involved in another series of long and fruitless negotiations.

German-Americans, realizing full well the possibilities of war in the situation, frantically dispatched peace petitions to Washington. The Chicago headquarters of the American Embargo Conference directed the movement, sending out sample telegrams to Indiana units of the organization and offering to pay the toll for the economically straitened. “Frequently a sheet of seven,” naively explained the office manager, “was sent to some fairly wealthy individual whom we requested to obtain signatures and pay for all of them.”²² Consequently, in the last week of April a flood of 150,000 telegrams converged on Washington from the German-American communities of the Middle West, constituting probably the greatest demonstration of organized mass pressure by way of the telegram that America had experienced up to that point.

“Do all you can to prevent a break with Germany. War is hell,” wired the German-Americans of Richmond to Representative Gray.²³ Several hundred

²¹ Indianapolis *News*, April 19, 1916, p. 6. See also Elkhart *Truth*, April 22, 1916, p. 4; Portland *Commercial-Review*, April 24, 1916, p. 6; New Castle *Daily Times*, April 20, 1916, p. 2; Louisville *Courier-Journal*, April 26, 1916, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, April 20, 1916, p. 4; Winchester *Democrat*, April 27, 1916, p. 2.

²² Indianapolis *News*, April 26, 1916, p. 7. The president of the Embargo Conference was Captain Jasper T. Darling. The blank forms were sent about April 20 with directions to sign and then wait until further orders before dispatching them. On April 26 the order was given to release them.

²³ Indianapolis *News*, April 26, 1916, p. 1.

Fort Wayne citizens petitioned Cline, Kern, and newly appointed Senator Thomas Taggart with vehemence: "Your constituents urge and expect you to stand like a rock against the . . . frenzy of insane and criminal folly on the part of a small portion of the interested persons who are clamoring for war. We want peace. Nothing warrants any other action."²⁴ Representative Lieb received over eight hundred similar messages from Evansville,²⁵ and a peace plea from German-American businessmen of Indianapolis was read into the *Congressional Record*.²⁶

It so happened that this mustering of German-American strength coincided with an Irish outburst of almost frenzied hatred of everything English, brought on by the abortive Easter Monday rebellion in Dublin. As a consequence the two groups tightened their working alliance and marched together against "Anglophiles" and President Wilson. At Indianapolis, for example, August Tamm, editor of the German-language *Telegraph und Tribune*, wrote lyrically of the "beloved green Island."²⁷

To a majority of the public, the question of peace or war appeared to rest with Germany and not America. Her answer to the United States note on the "Sussex" was still awaited. Consequently, persons of German blood were often advised sarcastically to direct their petitions for peace to Ambassador Bernstorff or to Berlin rather than to the American

²⁴ Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, April 26, 1916, p. 20; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, April 26, 1916, p. 5.

²⁵ Indianapolis *News*, April 26, 1916, p. 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, April 24, 1916, p. 2; *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, pt. 7, p. 6624.

²⁷ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, April 25, 1916, p. 4.

Congress.²⁸ Such sentiments were made more intense by fresh evidences of German intrigue in America which came to light with the arrest of German agent Wolf von Igel on the very day of the last American note to Germany.²⁹ On May 4, 1916, Germany made her reply. It was one of peace, and recited orders to submarine commanders to sink no unresisting merchantman without observing in full the rules concerning passengers and crew. A warning was added, however, that if the United States did not bring the other belligerents into line with international law governing sea warfare, Germany would consider herself free to make a new decision on issues between herself and the United States. Four days later the American Government officially accepted the German surrender with the qualification that relations between the United States and one belligerent could not be contingent upon America's relationship with other belligerent powers.

News of the victory was greeted with applause and relief.³⁰ Once more the American contention with regard to the submarine had been upheld—and without war. But the exchange of "Sussex" communications had defined the American position with such exactness that any renewal of illegal submarine warfare must lead to serious complications. Should new disputes arise, the United States would by necessity start its case at the advance point of the "Sussex"

²⁸ Indianapolis *News*, April 24, 1916, p. 4; Louisville *Courier-Journal*, April 26, 1916, p. 6.

²⁹ Indianapolis *News*, April 21, 1916, p. 6.

³⁰ Vincennes *Capital*, May 6, 1916, p. 4; Cannelton *Telephone*, May 25, 1916, p. 4; Winamac *Pulaski County Democrat*, May 11, 1916, p. 4; Ligonier *Banner*, May 9, 1916, p. 2; Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, May 6, 1916, p. 4.

ultimatum of April 18, 1916. For the remainder of 1916, however, Germany kept her undersea dogs tethered with the leash of international law, and relations between her and the United States became relatively tranquil. The friendliness and admiration with which the major portion of the public greeted the arrival of the unarmed cargo submarine "Deutschland" at an American port in midsummer demonstrated clearly the lessened tension.³¹

During the submarine dispute, the irregularities of America's relations with the Allies had fallen into the background. Now public and Government turned to their consideration, spurred on by the quarrels that arose from Allied determination to draw the blockade tighter about Germany in 1916. American mail pouches bound for the European continent were opened and their contents examined. The British government published a blacklist of firms accused of assisting Germany to thwart the blockade. British subjects were forbidden to trade with them and the services of the British Empire (coaling stations, marine insurance, shipping, etc.) were denied them. British and French decrees revoked all that survived of adherence to the Declaration of London. When American protests brought no surcease the local public grew volubly impatient, particularly with regard to the blacklist, which by July contained the names of more than eighty American business units. Now that Germany had made concessions, the public felt that it behooved the Allies to do something along the same

³¹ The "Deutschland" brought valuable German dyestuffs and carried back nickel and rubber. Anderson *Bulletin*, July 10, 1916, p. 1; Ligonier *Banner*, July 10, 1916, p. 1; New Albany *Ledger*, July 10, 1916, p. 4.

line.³² There was still a significant difference, however, in the attitude toward Allied and German maritime policies. The people of Indiana forebodingly discerned the possibility of war hovering behind each submarine crisis. Commercial disputes with England and France simply did not bring to mind such a possibility.³³

The astute German ambassador explained to his government that Wilson's unhurried action was "due in the first place to the fact that no pressure" was "being put upon him by American public opinion to take action with regard to England. . . . No one would take him seriously if he threatened England with war."³⁴ But this state of opinion did not allay the frustrated impatience that produced acrimonious anti-British editorials (never anti-French ones),³⁵ nor did it prevent the wooing of German-American votes by British-baiting politicians.

Actually it was neither Germany nor England but Mexico that excited the greatest emotional antipathy among the Hoosiers throughout these months. That country was convulsed by the efforts of the masses

³² Evansville *Courier*, June 15, 1916, p. 6; Logansport *Journal-Tribune*, July 27, 1916, p. 6; Madison *Courier*, May 17, 1916, p. 2; Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and the Blacklist During the Great War," in *Journal of Modern History*, 6 (1934): 14-35. Whereas blacklisting was essentially a matter of municipal law, it was probably legal. New York agents of the Oliver Chilled Steel Plow Company of South Bend were put on the blacklist. A vigorous protest was lodged with the State Department by Indiana Senator Thomas Taggart. Indianapolis *News*, August 3, 1916, p. 14.

³³ See, for example, South Bend *Tribune*, May 27, 1916, p. 10; Evansville *Journal-News*, April 30, 1916, p. 20; Indianapolis *News*, July 24, 1916, p. 6.

³⁴ Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, 279.

³⁵ Elizabeth B. White, *American Opinion of France from Lafayette to Poincaré* (New York, 1927), 268-77.

to rise by climbing over those who had been their masters during the long dictatorial rule of President Porfirio Diaz. Uneducated, without experience in self-government, and the prey of ambitious Mexican generals and political demagogues, the revolutionaries had been drawn inevitably into excesses. Faction fought faction until political stability ceased to exist. American investments were expropriated and American citizens killed. In the eyes of the United States, Mexico had become a lawless "public nuisance" just beyond the edge of town. Thus far, Wilson had set his face against full-scale intervention in favor of a policy of "watchful waiting."

On March 9, 1916, American relations with Mexico took a drastic turn for the worse when Francisco Villa and his brigands crossed into the United States to raid Columbus, New Mexico. Fortunately for the state of peace, Villa was an outlaw of the Mexican Government, not its agent. Six days after the raid Brigadier General John J. Pershing entered Mexico in pursuit of Villa, gaining the grudging and half-hearted co-operation of President Venustiano Carranza. In June the Indiana National Guard was called into Federal service and soon thereafter dispatched to help guard the border.

"Villa, dead or alive—that's the stuff,"³⁶ rang the enthusiastic response throughout Indiana. Such criticism as reached the papers pressed for even stronger action. "What America did for Cuba, America should do for Mexico."³⁷ The country must not shrink from

³⁶ Indianapolis *Star*, March 11, 1916, p. 8. See also English *News*, March 10, 1916, p. 4; Cannelton *Telephone*, March 16, 1916, p. 4; Liberty *Herald*, April 20, 1916, p. 4; Kentland *Newton County Enterprise*, March 30, 1916, p. 4; Vincennes *Capital*, March 16, 1916, p. 4.

³⁷ Evansville *Journal-News*, April 5, 1916, p. 8.

bearing its share of "the White man's burden in Mexico and elsewhere."³⁸ Talk of annexing Mexico was "dangerously un-American" but it might be advisable "to arrange for a right-of-way to our canal, providing for a military railroad as a measure of canal safety."³⁹ The *Winchester Democrat* remarked: "it won't be long until Uncle Sam is going to be forced to plant the flag in Mexico. And if he does it ought to be planted there to stay."⁴⁰ The *Chicago Tribune*, influential in northern Indiana, argued vigorously that "Fate holds a ripe apple to our lips in Mexico and bitter fruit in Flanders. Yet our president persistently turns from the golden fruit and as persistently seems determined finally to make us eat of the bitter one. . . . In the one case we engage in a relatively short and certainly successful campaign against Mexico, which will result in the inclusion within our sphere of influence, both for its benefit and our own, of a vast, fertile, potentially rich neighboring territory. We need have no more definite political relations with it than we at present have with Cuba, Nicaragua, Hayti." In the other case, the editor continued, "we engage in a war with the chief military power in the world," and "we get—What?"⁴¹ The *Tribune* wanted no war, unless it be one of aggression.

The most vigorous proponents of armed intervention in Mexico consisted of the nationalistic minded, the economic interests that had suffered expropriation, a contingent of Catholic clergy,⁴² and the pro-

³⁸ *Liberty Herald*, April 20, 1916, p. 4.

³⁹ *Indianapolis Indiana Daily Times*, July 5, 1916, p. 4.

⁴⁰ *Winchester Democrat*, March 30, 1916, p. 4.

⁴¹ *Chicago Tribune*, April 21, 1916, p. 6.

⁴² *Our Sunday Visitor*, April 9, 1916, p. 2; *Indiana Catholic*, February 11, 1916, p. 4.

Germans. The last group hoped to divert attention from the European theater. Invariably they linked Mexico and Japan as common enemies,⁴³ a strategy that was to boomerang with the publication of the Zimmermann note the following year.

Though less extreme in viewpoint, the majority of the population would have preferred war with Mexico to one with Germany during these months. The Mexican dispute was not one among European powers over old European problems with which, many contended, America had only an accidental relationship. It was America's own problem, with a direct appeal to American nationalism. Nor was there a Mexican-American bloc to divide emotions.⁴⁴ "If the Mexican trouble does nothing else worth noting, it has set a wave of patriotism in motion over this broad land that thrills the hearts of true men and women," stated the Monticello *Herald*.⁴⁵ This rising nationalism and the quickly demonstrated inadequacies of the small standing army and the National Guard added material support to the preparedness movement, which in turn had its effect on the state of mind with which Americans would view the European belligerents.

In still another sense the "Mexican trouble" probably influenced the public and governmental attitude toward Germany. The indecisive action toward Mexico resulted in a long-drawn-out dispute which in 1917 was still unsettled. For that reason there would be

⁴³ The Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, March 10, 1916, p. 4, rejoiced that the Mexican affair "will give us work in front of our own door and will probably dampen the desire to take part in the European war."

⁴⁴ Indianapolis *Star*, March 13, 1916, p. 8, remarked, "It is easy to judge the strength of the Mexican-American vote by the way our Congressmen act and talk."

⁴⁵ Issue of June 29, 1916, p. 4.

less willingness to try that policy toward Germany. Austria had been driven, in part, to take action against Serbia in 1914 because she had twice in previous years mobilized her army and the minds of her people without taking decisive action. To a limited degree the Mexican quarrel served the same purpose for the United States.

But the day of war was still in the future, for the public was not yet agreed as to their country's exact mission with respect to the great war. Many Indians believed the United States could best serve the warring world by setting an example of nonmilitarism and effective democracy, whose light would shine around the world. Weary nations, heavy laden with war lords and class rule, would throw off their inherited burdens and follow that beacon.⁴⁶ Others felt that the United States could perform its greatest service by a relief program during the war and by the succoring of a bleeding and bankrupt Europe when peace should come.⁴⁷ That a high tariff and chauvinistic sentiments were inconsistent with the idealism and economics of these goals was probably not recognized. A third sentiment envisioned Uncle Sam as peacemaker, re-enacting the role he had played in the Russo-Japanese War.⁴⁸ A considerable number believed that the chief function of the United States as the only great neutral was to act as the "conservator of those principles of international law upon which rest the civilization, the prosperity, and the justice

⁴⁶ *Kendallville News-Sun*, February 19, 1916, p. 6; *Crawfordsville Journal* (weekly), June 4, 1915, p. 2; Curti, *Growth of American Thought*, 589-666.

⁴⁷ *Indianapolis Star*, December 3, 1914, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Muncie Star*, September 18, 1914, p. 1; *Waterloo Press*, June 17, 1915, p. 8; Jordan, *Days of a Man*, 2: 651.

of every nation.”⁴⁹ A fifth group wanted the country to be more than the guardian of existing law. Having solved its own problem of federalization, it was felt that America was especially fitted to hasten the movement for a world court and international federation.⁵⁰ A worried few pictured an inevitable postwar clash between the yellow race and the war-weakened white peoples and looked upon the United States as the logical leader in that struggle. Her strength should be preserved and prepared for that fight.⁵¹ A seventh group, comprising a gradually increasing number of wide influence, was convinced that the country had an obligation to join forces with the Allies to defeat militarism and autocracy for the general good of all and the particular protection of America. This philosophy was most vigorously represented by those Americans who were fighting in the Allied armies.⁵² It was found also among the members of the strong Indianapolis chapter of the American Rights Committee.⁵³

⁴⁹ These were the words of Representative Cline. *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, p. 3706. This philosophy was stressed during each crisis between America and Germany over the submarine issue. See, for example, *Vevay Reveille*, May 13, 1915, p. 4; *Vincennes Capital*, February 26, 1916, p. 4; *Connersville Evening News*, February 24, 1916, p. 3.

⁵⁰ William Dudley Foulke to William H. Short, March 4, 1916, Foulke Collection; *Richmond Palladium*, June 14, 1915, p. 1; *Muncie Evening Press*, April 26, 1916, p. 4.

⁵¹ *Chicago American*, April 24, 1916, p. 14; *La Grange Standard*, June 22, 1916, p. 2.

⁵² *Seymour Republican*, July 29, 1916, p. 1; *Evansville Courier*, June 15, 1916, p. 6. Their activities attracted only very limited interest in Indiana. Short news items and occasional pictures appeared in the press but the editorial columns did not mention them.

⁵³ American Rights Committee (Indianapolis) to Robert S. Taylor, August 28, 1916, Robert S. Taylor Collection. The Indianapolis branch included Hugh McK. Landon, Evans Woollen, Lucius B. Swift, Charles S. Lewis, Charles F. Coffin, and Meredith Nicholson.

Leaning toward the same decision were many of the five hundred Americans who signed the "Address to the People of the Allied Nations" that was published simultaneously in Europe and the United States in April, 1916. "Our judgment supports your cause, and our sympathies and our hopes are with you in this struggle . . ." ran the address to which was affixed such names as John Burroughs, John Dewey, William Dean Howells, Henry L. Stimson, Otis Skinner, Harlan F. Stone, Owen Wister, Claude H. Van Tyne, and Albert A. Michelson.⁵⁴ The sixteen Indiana signers included Booth Tarkington, William H. H. Miller, Episcopal Bishop John Hazen White, Rollo Walter Brown (Wabash College), Dr. Edwin C. Thomas, and from Indiana University, Alfred M. Brooks, Edgar R. Cumings, Will David Howe, Albert F. Kuersteiner, John W. Sluss, Charles M. Hepburn, Enoch G. Hogate, Amos S. Hershey, Samuel B. Harding, James A. Woodburn, and Dr. Thomas C. Hood.

All seven groups thought of these missions as national missions, to be performed by the American people in their corporate capacity as a state. The country could perform none of them if its life was endangered or circumscribed by compulsion of another power or powers. Thus, there was practically unanimous agreement on one point—the nation's rights and honor must be upheld.

This letter speaks of "the suspicion which we are constantly met with that the whole movement is a dishonest commercial scheme backed by Wall Street operators, munition manufacturers, or even by British gold."

⁵⁴ Muncie *Evening Press*, April 19, 1916, p. 4; Indianapolis *News*, April 17, 1916, p. 9; Indianapolis *Star*, April 17, 1916, p. 16.

IX. A HOST OF ISSUES

INDIANA takes its politics seriously and the participation of its citizens in the electoral process is far above the average. The voters are not inclined to scratch their ballots, and normally they are averse to "throwing away" their votes on a third party. The individual believes in the platforms and miracles of the party to which he belongs. His neighbor who has not become associated with any party is likely to be regarded as either lacking in political fortitude or desirous of selling his vote for money or attention.

The margin of victory in elections before 1916 was usually so small that a shift of a few votes would have changed the outcome. In half of the presidential years since 1872 a deflection of 1 per cent would have elected the defeated party in Indiana, and, if 1912 be omitted, the marginal vote had averaged less than 2 per cent with a maximum spread of 7.58 per cent over the whole period.¹ For that reason the state was a sensitive barometer of relatively small changes in the political attitude of the nation. Normally, these marginal voters were more inclined to follow the Republicans than the Democrats, as was demonstrated by the very small majorities which the latter managed to eke out in their winning years.

Perhaps, however, 1916 would not be a normal presidential election year. That would depend largely on the extent to which the breach in the Republican party had been healed. The Progressives had outvoted the Republicans in 1912, and the Democrats had garnered practically all the offices with a minor-

¹ See the *Biennial Report* of the Secretary of State of Indiana for the election returns of the relevant years.

ity vote.² Two years later the Progressives had fallen to third place, but their vote of 108,381 still held the balance of power between the Democrats' 272,249 and the Republicans' 226,733.³ With this situation clearly in mind the candidates descended upon the sovereign voters. Their progress was followed with interest by party leaders of the whole nation, for, with the exception of the irregular election of 1876, Indiana had given its votes to the winning presidential candidate in every year since the formation of the Republican party.

In addition to the division of their opponents, the Democrats possessed whatever advantages came from control of most of the state offices. They would have a local candidate for Vice-President, Thomas R. Marshall, and a popular Senator and campaigner in John W. Kern. More important still, they had Wilson. Both parties planned their campaigns on the assumption that the President was stronger than his party this year.⁴ A national foreign policy that reflected the desires of most of the population could be expected to bring in votes. Presumably, also, the Democrats would get an increased share of labor support because of the liberal legislation of the national government.

² *Ibid.*, 1912, pp. 92-159. In the vote for first presidential elector, the Democrats received 281,890, the Progressives, 162,007, and the Republicans, 151,267.

³ *Ibid.*, 1914, p. 14. The figures given here for the three parties were the votes for United States Senator received by Albert J. Beveridge, Benjamin F. Shively, and Hugh Th. Miller. The remainder of the Progressive ticket fell short of Beveridge's vote by about 18,000.

⁴ Late in the campaign the Republican Muncie *Star* carried the editorial sally that "a recent careful analysis indicates that the Democratic party is sixty-five per cent Woodrow Wilson and thirty-five per cent solid South." October 31, 1916, p. 4.

Finally, the Democrats had the advantage that accrues to a party which is in power when the financial page shows an upsurge in bank clearings, a new awning appears in front of the local drugstore, and repairs are begun on the old Jones house.⁵

Against these advantages, the Republicans could place the unsavory reputations of the Democratic municipal machines at Terre Haute and Indianapolis. Members of the first had been in Federal prison since the year before, and the Indianapolis junto led by Mayor Joseph E. Bell had antagonized many voters and demoralized the Marion County Democracy. Reaction against the higher tax rates which a rising price level and expanded government services of the "Progressive Era" had fixed upon the state voters could be counted on, also, to help the Republican party. Farmers were particularly sensitive on this score because their cash income was relatively small and because the general property tax bore disproportionately upon them. And they voted in greater proportions than did their city cousins. A third Republican advantage would come from the protest vote of all groups whose toes had been stepped on during the Democrats' eight years in the statehouse and four years in Washington. In 1916 that vote was likely to be larger than usual because of the German, Irish, and Hungarian disapproval of the Administration's foreign policy and the opposition of an overwhelming portion of business, especially big business, to the recently enacted regulatory laws, lower tariff, income and corporate taxes, and prolabor legislation. Republicans counted on winning many churchgoers by way

⁵ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, April 3, 1916, p. 4; Indianapolis *News*, April 23, 1916, p. 3.

of the dry vote, thus consummating the Hamiltonian alliance of the good and the rich against the poor and the wicked. The general dissatisfaction with the festering sore that was Mexico might possibly add other votes. Decidedly, the political organization which State Chairman Will H. Hays had put together under the guidance of former Chairman James P. Goodrich was a valuable asset.

What promised to be a close campaign got off to an official start with the March primaries. A threatened division of the Republicans over the nomination for United States Senator elated the Democrats.⁶ But the death of Democratic Senator Benjamin F. Shively a few days after the primary led to the obvious compromise by which Harry S. New ran for the full-term senatorship and James E. Watson for the short term. Thus far, Republicans and Democrats alike had said as little as possible about the European war.

In early April the Republican State Convention assembled at Tomlinson Hall, Indianapolis, to hammer out its program under the watchful eye of Hays. The keynote speaker, Quincy Myers, stressed high tariff, preparedness, patriotism, and Mexico.⁷ The platform adopted by the convention took the same patriotic tone. "We favor such preparedness as may be necessary upon land and sea to protect American citizens in their persons and property at home and abroad." "We oppose the Democratic policy of scuttling the Philippines." "The Mexican policy of President Wilson has been weak and indecisive. It has

⁶ Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, March 14, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, March 20, 1916, p. 8.

⁷ Indianapolis *News*, April 5, 1916, p. 1; South Bend *Tribune*, April 5, 1916, p. 1.

brought us increasing confusion and national humiliation. . . . The President has exhausted our patience and should surrender to the Republican Party the problem he is incapable of solving." As for the raging war, the Republicans demanded "that the United States observe an attitude of strict neutrality toward the nations engaged," but "that the rights of American citizens be firmly upheld and our national dignity and national honor maintained." The platform opposed entangling alliances but favored "a world court for the adjustment of international disputes." Greater than on any other issue was the emphasis on high tariff. "We reannounce our confidence in the protective tariff system, with which the name of President McKinley was so conspicuously identified. It has been the foundation of industrial and commercial activity." At the same time, "the systematic extension of our markets into all quarters of the world" was advocated. Opposition was expressed to excessive regulation of business, and, lastly, delegates to the National Convention were instructed to support Fairbanks for president until he was "nominated, or his name . . . withdrawn from consideration of the convention."⁸

As an overture to the Progressives, the convention had bestowed the permanent chairmanship on a former Progressive, Horace C. Stillwell, of Anderson. In his opening address he thanked his "Fellow Republicans" for the honor on behalf of the 160,000 voters who were not in the party in 1912 and asserted, "We don't intend to come back; we are back." His selection, however, represented almost the full meas-

⁸ Indianapolis *News*, April 6, 1916, p. 4; Fort Wayne *News*, April 6, 1916, p. 1.

ure of the concessions to his band,⁹ for the "regulars" had made a sweep of the chief nominations. James P. Goodrich was selected to run for governor, Harry S. New for Senator (long term), James E. Watson for Senator (short term), and Ed Jackson for secretary of state. Together with Charles W. Fairbanks, these men comprised the very group that had led the fight to deny seats to the Roosevelt delegates at the 1912 National Convention and were the ones whom all good Progressives had thought of when they harangued the "Old Guard." Watson, more than any other, had been unacceptable to the Bull Moose bolters and had become the symbol of their enemy—just as Albert J. Beveridge had been the incarnation of their positive program.

It was a conservative, nationalistic, and cautious convention. The platform was composed of the kind of generalities which a party makes when it feels that the tide is so running in its direction that a gamble of positive action is not necessary and may be dangerous. Patriotism was the leitmotiv of the convention, but care was taken to say nothing that would alienate the German-Americans. The gathering closed with a night session that brought out an enthusiastic crowd filled with the spirit of "get together, work together, win together."

Yet, despite this show of harmony, the leaders were uncomfortably aware that a minority of Progressives were still outside the fold, and that among them was Beveridge. Apparently, too, there had been

⁹ Indianapolis *News*, April 6, 1916, p. 1. The only other noteworthy concession to the Progressives was the choice of Edward C. Toner, of Anderson, as one of the delegates-at-large to the National Convention.

more rubbing of old sores than outward appearances had indicated. The Indianapolis *Star*, a Bull Moose paper that had "come back home," struck out sharply against those who held the Progressives responsible for the election of Wilson four years before. "Any man who says that Taft would have been elected but for Roosevelt is either a fool or a knave, and most likely he is both together. The war is over. Why not be gentlemen and forget it."¹⁰ Whether these differences would be widened or healed depended to a large extent on the answer to the omnipresent question of that spring: Would either, neither, or both the Republican and Progressive national conventions nominate Theodore Roosevelt for President? The local Progressives hoped against hope that the Republicans would select him as a unity move, but the slate adopted by the Republican State Convention made them gloomy regarding their prospects.

The Republicans now had the offensive; the Democratic State Convention that met later in the month set out to regain it. Under the direction of their beloved political despot, Thomas Taggart, the real work had been done in advance. Most of the candidates were unopposed. Governor Samuel M. Ralston as keynote speaker lauded the party's "conservatively progressive and progressively conservative" history.¹¹ Pointing out that people were more prosperous than ever before, he asserted that "more of them ought to vote the Democratic ticket . . . than ever before!" The President, he asserted, "will make any sacrifice to keep the peace and pacify the world, except the sacri-

¹⁰ Indianapolis *Star*, April 8, 1916, p. 6.

¹¹ Indianapolis *News*, April 26, 1916, p. 12.

fice of honor and you would not have him to surrender national honor and self-respect at any price."

The platform, like the keynote speech, was general in tone and stressed Wilson. It hailed the freeing of the country from rule by "special privilege" and enumerated a long list of Democratic liberal legislation such as the Federal Reserve System, Underwood Tariff, Federal income tax, Clayton Anti-Trust law, and Federal Trade Commission law. It indorsed, and favored the strict enforcement of, local option laws. This was certain to be unsatisfactory to the forces which were working for state prohibition. It favored greater "military and naval preparation" and asserted with pride: "mid the threatened chaos of war's carnage, our great President, broad of mind and stout of heart, correctly interprets the aspirations of the people of this great republic for honorable peace, exact justice, righteousness and humanity."¹² To stand on this statement of policy the Democrats selected John A. M. Adair for governor, Kern and Taggart for long and short terms in the Senate, and Homer L. Cook for secretary of state.¹³

One of the most significant features of the rival conventions was their basic agreement on policy with regard to the European war. Certain viewpoints had become so much a part of public thinking that both parties proclaimed them as a matter of course. The Democratic program for "honorable peace" was from the same cloth as the Republican assertion that American rights must "be firmly upheld and our national dignity and national honor maintained." Each of the parties was convinced that it could best preserve both peace and honor. The Progressives were to adopt the

¹² *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1, 13.

same formula.¹⁴ There was equal unity in the things omitted in speeches and platforms. No one of the parties came out for an embargo on arms. Beginning in late August, the Indiana papers carried a series of advertisements of Allied war notes offering "99 and 5% interest,"¹⁵ and no political leader raised his voice in protest.

The Socialists met in early May and nominated a full ticket. One of the sharpest planks in their precise confession of faith was a denunciation of "any form of compulsory military service."¹⁶ In the previous presidential year they had polled 37,000 votes in Indiana, the largest returns coming from the German districts. The national prohibition party nominated J. Frank Hanly, former Indiana governor, as its candidate for President, adopted a broad platform of economic change, and invited wandering Progressives to join.¹⁷ What per cent of the many prohibitionists in the state they could persuade to vote their ticket remained to be seen. Prognosticators were certain that a large Prohibition vote would detract more votes from the Republicans than from the Democrats.

During May, political leaders consolidated the work begun at the state gatherings and laid plans for the

¹⁴ Indianapolis *News*, July 20, 1916, p. 1. In his acceptance speech before the Democratic convention, Taggart voiced a pledge which every leader of the three parties could have endorsed as his own. "I promise you that I shall do everything that is honorable within my power to assist in maintaining peace for the United States with all nations of the world, but it must be peace with honor. Should it eventually transpire that war is inevitable, I will always be found standing with the administration to protect the honor of the country." *Ibid.*, April 26, 1916, p. 13.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, April 23, 1916, p. 13.

¹⁶ Indianapolis *Star*, May 2, 1916, p. 1.

¹⁷ Indianapolis *News*, June 20, 1916, p. 12.

national conventions. The Republicans took up the task of securing the presidential nomination of Fairbanks with enthusiastic fanfare, seeking to convince the country that he was the "McKinley type."¹⁸ Their best chance for success would be a convention deadlock between Hughes and Roosevelt. Lacking a corresponding stimulus, the Democrats got under way more slowly. Patriotism was the word most frequently in the mouths of both parties, reiterated like some magic chant that would open the doors of political fortune. Preparedness sentiment, though still stronger on the editorial page than at the recruiting office, was on the rise and more than ever a part of the political stream.

June brought the national conventions, at which Republicans, Democrats, and Progressives alike expressed their love of peace and ardent determination to uphold American honor and rights.¹⁹ As in the Indiana state platform, the Republicans nationally were more definite with respect to Mexico and the Philippines than Germany. They nominated Charles Evans Hughes of New York for President and Indiana's favorite son as his running mate. The Democrats renominated Wilson and took their stand on his record, domestic and foreign. The high point of their convention came with the cascading applause accorded Chairman Ollie James's proud boast that "without orphaning a single American child, without the firing of a single shell, Woodrow Wilson wrung from the most militant influence that ever brooded over a battlefield a concession to an American demand for the

¹⁸ Indianapolis *Star*, May 6, 1916, p. 1.

¹⁹ For the platforms of the parties, see Edward Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (2 vols. New York, 1916), 2: appendix.

rights of humanity.”²⁰ Here was not only an assertion that “he kept us out of war” but an unmistakable criticism of Germany as well.

The Progressive National Convention nominated Roosevelt, only to learn in a short time that he had declined the honor and mounted the stump for Hughes. His action created a thorny problem for those who remained beside the ailing Bull Moose in Indiana. Should they, too, go back to the Republicans,²¹ go over to the Democrats, or make a last-ditch fight to maintain a separate state organization? That was the pressing question before the Progressive State Committee when it met in Indianapolis on June 28 to plot the future. From the moment when State Chairman Edwin M. Lee opened the meeting, the storm raged amidst heated debate and recrimination.²²

²⁰ Indianapolis *News*, June 15, 1916, p. 1.

²¹ A few of the Progressives of 1912 had been Democrats, as is demonstrated by a study of the election returns. Counties such as Cass, Crawford, Floyd, and Vigo, which normally returned clear Democratic majorities, in that year gave a larger combined total to Republicans and Progressives than to the Democrats. It is doubtful, however, if the Democrats had contributed more than 10 per cent of the Progressive vote. Almost all of them had returned to their old party by 1914.

²² The following day William Dudley Foulke wrote a long letter to Theodore Roosevelt, whom he had staunchly defended: “At a meeting of Progressives from all parts of the state yesterday, the feeling of about two-thirds of those who attended was very bitter against you, Perkins, Garfield, Dye (our national committeeman) and others, for what they were pleased to call a betrayal of the party.” He continued, “Many of those who attended, acted like wild men. I tried to call their attention to the greater need of the country and to dangers from without but to no effect. This was all a scheme they thought to run them back into the Republican party, and the danger from within was much greater than that from without, etc.” Foulke to Roosevelt, June 26, 1916, Foulke Collection.

Roosevelt replied on July 5, denouncing the continuing Progressive state organization as “small derelict parties of the kind that are the natural prey of cheap crooks.” Foulke Collection.

National Committeeman William Holton Dye defended the action of the National Committee in endorsing Hughes a few days before, receiving his chief support from those who dwelt on Wilson's shortcomings. Edward R. Lewis expressed a sentiment frequently heard when he upheld Hughes but rejected Fairbanks and Watson as "reactionary." Throughout the debate ran bitterness against Roosevelt and a determination not to be delivered to the Republican standard like so much personal property. In the end a majority agreed with Lee that the nature of the Republican ticket and platform necessitated a state convention and a separate slate of Progressive candidates.²³

By the time the Progressive State Convention assembled on July 20 their forces had been further depleted by the return of a number to the Republican fold. When a resolution opposing a state ticket was lost at the opening of the convention, its sponsors, too, withdrew.²⁴ On the same day the delegates learned that Beveridge had agreed to undertake a speaking tour on behalf of Hughes. The Simon-pure Progressives who remained continued their work of writing a forthright platform of economic change, governmental reorganization, preparedness, antihyphenism, and defense of American rights. It found the Republican platform to be "pitifully reactionary" and the Democratic record to consist chiefly of missed opportunities. A full ticket of state nominees included Thomas A.

²³ Indianapolis *Star*, June 29, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, June 29, 1916, p. 1; Carl Painter, "The Progressive Party in Indiana," in *Indiana Magazine of History*, 16 (1920): 173-283. In a private letter of July 5, Lee characterized the Republican state platform as comparable to the "Whig platform of 1852" and the candidates as "the very men whom Progressives have been combating politically, for twenty years." Letter to William Dudley Foulke, Foulke Collection.

²⁴ Indianapolis *News*, July 20, 1916, p. 1.

Daily, of Indianapolis, for governor, Judge James B. Wilson, of Bloomington, for Senator (full term), and Clifford F. Jackman, of Huntington, for Senator (short term).²⁵

The Republicans counterattacked with vigor. Many of the Bull Moose candidates were persuaded to withdraw from the race for local office. "Nonpartisan" organizations were formed, sometimes under the name of Hughes Alliance and sometimes as the Progressive League, wherein the bolters of 1912 could work for Hughes without becoming Republicans.²⁶ In many cases the most diligent labor to bring the holdouts into line was performed by former Progressives.²⁷ Having pronounced the Bull Moose dead, they wanted no refutation from a cadaverous creature with reproachful eyes. Harold L. Ickes, who had been a leading Illinois Progressive in 1912, was attached to the Chicago headquarters of the Hughes campaign committee to woo former Progressives of the Middle West. He gave Indiana special attention. At a much later date he wrote satirically: "Considering the dollars

²⁵ Terre Haute *Star*, July 20, 1916, p. 1; July 21, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, July 20, 1916, p. 1. Wilson and Jackman later withdrew from the race and were replaced by John Napier Dyer and John F. Clifford. Indianapolis *News*, October 16, 1916, p. 20.

²⁶ William Dudley Foulke to Willitts A. Bastian, September 6, 1916, Foulke Collection; Indianapolis *News*, July 20, 1916, p. 11. The Hughes Alliance was organized September 5, 1916, with Willitts A. Bastian, president; S. F. Max Puett, secretary; Winfield Miller, treasurer; Clarence R. Martin, field secretary.

²⁷ Goshen *News-Times*, June 2, 1916, p. 2; Indianapolis *Star*, July 22, 1916, p. 8; La Grange *Standard*, July 20, 1916, p. 2; Attica *Ledger*, June 23, 1916, p. 4. The last major activity of the Progressives in the state was the national conference on August 3 at Indianapolis that included such national figures as the Progressive candidate for Vice-President, John M. Parker, and Bainbridge Colby.

that were poured into Indiana when Progressive organizations in other states were being denied nickels, the campaign paraphernalia and the man power that were literally dumped into the Hoosier campaign, any second-rate precinct committeeman could have delivered it to Dopey the Dwarf. Not that I would disparage Will Hays.'"²⁸

Hughes was more acceptable to the Indiana Progressives than were the candidates for state offices.²⁹ Though Beveridge toured the country for Hughes he did not speak in Indiana until the very eve of the election, and then entirely on national issues. The *Muncie Star* and *Richmond Palladium*, Progressive papers in 1912, went through the campaign with very little editorial mention of politics and none of Watson. There was, in fact, a "New and Taggart" slogan running through Progressive circles that worried both Watson and Kern.³⁰

Meanwhile, the major parties had been busily perfecting the appeals and strategy which had been launched at the state conventions. Unmistakably, the offensive remained in the hands of the Republicans. From state headquarters a constant stream of queries and directions flowed to every corner of the state, enabling party workers to push concerted programs. "The speakers," directed one mimeographed letter, "should emphasize more extensively the conditions of American industry and American labor before the

²⁸ Harold L. Ickes, *The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon* (New York, 1944), 189. For an indication of Ickes' activities in Indiana in 1916, see the correspondence between him and William Dudley Foulke in the Foulke Collection.

²⁹ See, for example, Albert J. Beveridge to William Dudley Foulke, September 18, 1916, Foulke Collection.

³⁰ *Indianapolis News*, July 1, 1916, p. 2.

war and what the same will be after the war.”³¹ Or again, “I think it would be well for all speakers to refer to what the Republican party has done for the old soldiers.”³² To a fellow worker Chairman Hays disclosed, “We are, by phone and letter, asking *all* employers of labor to lend their aid in having their employees receive every opportunity to know the facts on the issues.”³³ Extensive state funds were available for the lubrication of his organization, and the National Committee, fully aware of Indiana’s strategic position, poured in money, speakers, and advice. The first two, at least, were welcome.³⁴

The selecting of issues gave the Republicans more trouble than did the perfecting of tactics. General satisfaction with the status of foreign affairs and the surge of war prosperity somewhat limited the area in which they could maneuver.

The tariff issue remained, however, and was proclaimed the “real issue” of the campaign.³⁵ Economic and political history was reduced to the formula that a Republican tariff meant prosperity and Democratic low rates bred depression. The “Cleveland Depression” and economic decline in 1914 following the

31 Will H. Hays to Lucius C. Embree, October 13, 1916, Embree Collection, Indiana State Library. Embree was a leading Republican of Princeton.

32 Hays to “Dear Friend,” an undated letter in the Embree Collection.

33 Hays to Embree, October 27, 1916, Embree Collection.

34 Claude Bowers, *The Life of John Worth Kern* (Indianapolis, 1918), 378-80; Ickes, *Autobiography*, 189.

35 *Farmer’s Guide*, 28: 1285 (October 28, 1916); *Muncie Evening Press*, November 1, 1916, p. 4; *Kokomo Daily Tribune*, October 26, 1916, p. 6; *Kendallville News-Sun*, February 19, 1916, p. 1; *Oxford Gazette*, October 27, 1916, p. 4; *Hammond Lake County Times*, September 23, 1916, p. 4; *Rushville Republican*, February 21, 1916, p. 4; *Petersburg Press*, October 20, 1916, p. 4.

These Americans are Working Today



Because: These Europeans are Not



When These Europeans Go Back to Work



What Will These Americans Do Without
the PROTECTIVE TARIFF?



VOTE FOR HUGHES AND THE PROTECTIVE TARIFF

Underwood "free trade" law were cited as proof. Party leaders asserted that depression would come again after the war unless the Republicans were allowed to erect barriers against the inevitable flow of cheap goods when the fighting men of Europe went back to work. "The speakers should emphasize more fully the need of protective tariff—that the greatest labor law in the world is protective tariff, etc.,"³⁶ ran one of Hays's instructions. The tariff plea in graphic form reproduced on another page appeared as a full-page spread in virtually every Republican paper in the state and was the most widely printed pictorial plea of either side.

Accompanying the tariff appeal was one of economic conservatism. The state platform opposed "such regulation of business as shall put any undue burdens upon honest and wholesome enterprise, or penalize or unduly vex honest business."³⁷ Editorials denounced Democratic nostrums and asserted the need of another McKinley Administration. It was a fruitful appeal among businessmen, who for some time had been muttering "No more professors for mine,"—or, cynically, "Oh, of course those fellows in Washington know more about my business than I do."³⁸ Senator Kern's secretary was to complain later that this year "In Indianapolis there were not among merchants in the shopping district half a dozen Democrats,

³⁶ Will H. Hays to L. C. Embree, October 13, 1916, Embree Collection.

³⁷ Indianapolis *News*, April 6, 1916, p. 4.

³⁸ Sullivan *Union*, March 17, 1915, p. 6; Huntingburg *Independent*, February 23, 1915, p. 4; Vincennes *Capital*, February 23, 1915, p. 4. These quotations were part of a series of such statements that originated in the New York *Sun* and went the rounds of the Indiana press in 1915. Purportedly, they were remarks overheard wherever businessmen gathered.

and among the manufacturers an even smaller number.''³⁹ Hughes Business Men's Leagues were formed in the various cities to combat "Wilson the theorist."⁴⁰ Factory whistles blew when Hughes came to town, and factory workers were assembled during work hours to hear Republican speakers. Letters such as the following were distributed to employees: "The question is, are you as employees whose interests are so closely identified with this industry going to help destroy it by voting for Wilson and all that that means, or are you going to help keep the business in a healthy condition so that you may individually be benefited?"⁴¹ Goodrich, who conducted practically his entire campaign on the state tax burden, omitted any reference to a net income tax, which offered perhaps the best hope of relief to farmers and laborers. In the latter part of the campaign the Republican organization was thrown enthusiastically into the fight against the Adamson eight-hour-day law for railroad workers.

In foreign affairs the Republicans had a difficult problem. They must plead superior patriotism, do nothing to alienate the pro-Allied majority of the people, and at the same time take advantage of the antagonism of the German-Americans toward Wilson. They must also convince the public that Republican leadership could as ably protect the peace of the land as had the Democrats.

At notification ceremonies at Indianapolis, Fairbanks made an obvious bid for the German-American vote, stirringly condemning "the attempt to impute treasonable motives to any one class of our citizens

³⁹ Bowers, *John Worth Kern*, 378-79.

⁴⁰ Indianapolis *News*, October 14, 1916, p. 4.

⁴¹ Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, November 3, 1916, p. 8.

because of their original nationality or the sympathies which go with it.”⁴² In a similar move, Watson in a Muncie address on the eve of election attacked the Administration for following a servile policy toward Mexico and a strong one toward Germany.⁴³ “And then, when a few American citizens, bent on pleasure or profit or adventure, went on board the ‘Lusitania,’ an English ship under an English flag, a vessel they had been repeatedly warned to stay off of . . . [Wilson] flared out with a flaming declaration against Germany in direct contradiction to his announced policy with reference to American citizens in Mexico.” For the most part, however, the Republicans courted the pro-Germans by avoiding all matters touching on Germany. As long as they did nothing positively to antagonize those of German blood they could count on many of them voting against Wilson—provided Hughes was equally cautious and the outspoken Roosevelt did not enter Indiana. Most of the vocal elements among the Germans (and Irish) were urging the election of Hughes. Editor August Tamm, for example, conducted a vehement campaign against Wilson in the pages of his Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune* that never slackened. According to Tamm, “All enemies of Germany will be celebrating if Wilson should win.”⁴⁴ “‘He kept us out of war’ is absolutely correct, but ‘he’ is the German Kaiser.” Paradoxically, the most extreme partisans of both Germany and Great Britain seem to have favored Hughes—though not without some misgivings as to his position. Just

⁴² Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times*, August 31, 1916, p. 1.

⁴³ Muncie *Star*, November 5, 1916, p. 5.

⁴⁴ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, October 30, 1916, p. 4; November 7, p. 4.

as Roosevelt and Viereck labored for him in the national arena, Lucius B. Swift joined with Tamm in pushing his election in Indiana.

Avoiding mention of Germany, the Republicans made a strong plea for Americanism. They accused the Democrats of neglecting the nation's defenses. They attacked the refusal of the Administration to replace the "gentleman's agreement" regarding the entry of Japanese laborers by a law of Congress. They viewed with alarm the repeal of the Panama Tolls Exemption Act, the proposal to apologize and pay "blackmail" to Colombia, the reported mismanagement of the National Guard on the Mexican border, the Jones bill to grant independence to the Philippines, and the rumor that the Democrats favored pensions for Confederate veterans. The untimely assertion by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker that the Mexican revolutionaries had much in common with American revolutionaries of 1776 raised a ten-day tempest and a unanimous Republican call for his impeachment. Rising above all else was a condemnation of their opponents' record in Mexico and the promise of a more vigorous policy.⁴⁵

Cartoons labeled "Watchful Waiting" displayed American graves in Mexico.⁴⁶ Others showed voters preparing to choose between two flags—one American (Republican) and the other a white one with a large

⁴⁵ For examples of these patriotic pleas, see *English News*, September 12, 1916, p. 4; *Angola Steuben Republican*, July 5, 1916, p. 4; *Lafayette Journal*, October 13, 1916, p. 6; *Liberty Herald*, November 2, 1916, p. 1; *Peru Republican*, November 3, 1916, p. 4; *Seymour Republican*, August 4, 1916, p. 4; *Petersburg Press*, October 13, 1916, p. 1; *Rockville Republican*, November 1, 1916, p. 2.

⁴⁶ *Indianapolis Star*, September 22, 1916, p. 1.

yellow streak.⁴⁷ A full-page Republican advertisement, headed "Think of the Flag, Boys, When You Go to Vote," detailed American wrongs in Mexico but did not mention Germany.⁴⁸ The Administration, said the *Steuben Republican*, had "hailed down the flag at Vera Cruz," was "sneaking it out of Mexico," and wanted "to haul it down in the Philippines."⁴⁹ Placards carried in Republican parades read, "Lost by Wilson: National Honor. Restore by Electing Chas. E. Hughes." "Wilson Policy: We Surrender to Everybody."⁵⁰ Throughout the campaign, Republican editors carried a picture of the flag and the slogan "America Always First—G. O. P." above the editorial column.⁵¹ Said the *Kokomo Daily Tribune*, "'Anything to keep us out of war' is the Wilson cry. 'Peace with honor!' is the retort of stalwart Americanism, voiced by Charles E. Hughes."⁵² The Republican campaign, John C. Shaffer summarized in a letter to Beveridge, was one of "Americanism, preparedness, and a protective tariff."⁵³

By contrast with the Republicans the Democrats were weak in organization. They suffered from a lack of funds, which made it impossible for them to match the Republican meetings, full-page advertisements,

⁴⁷ *Chicago Post*, October 28, 1916, p. 10.

⁴⁸ *Louisville Herald*, September 4, 1916, p. 4.

⁴⁹ *Angola Steuben Republican*, May 31, 1916, p. 4.

⁵⁰ *Chicago Daily News*, November 4, 1916, p. 5.

⁵¹ For example, *Logansport Journal-Tribune*, July 14, 1916, p. 6; *Seymour Republican*, August 4, 1916, p. 4; *Crown Point Lake County News*, August 18, 1916, p. 4.

⁵² *Kokomo Daily Tribune*, November 3, 1916, p. 8.

⁵³ Quoted in Bowers, *Beveridge and the Progressive Era*, 489. Shaffer was owner and publisher of the *Indianapolis Star*, *Terre Haute Star*, and *Muncie Star*.

the creation of peripheral "nonpartisan" organizations, and distribution of pamphlets to all minority groups. The national organization, which might have furnished aid, showed a disheartening indifference toward Indiana's needs. Reportedly on the assumption that the state was irretrievably lost, it failed to send adequate money or speakers.⁵⁴ Not one of the leading Progressives who were at the service of the Democratic National Committee was sent to the state. A speaking tour by Wilson, or perhaps even better by Bryan, would have given much-needed help. But they were not forthcoming, and the burden fell on Marshall, Kern, Taggart, and Adair. Marshall was effective, but Kern was ailing. Adair was a disappointing campaigner, and though Taggart was popular with his audiences, his name was connected with machine politics.

The irresponsibility of the Marion County Democratic machine hurt the whole ticket. Its activities led the Methodist Ministers' Association, the Christian Ministers' Association, and the Church Federation of Indianapolis to call for the election of the Republican candidates in Marion County. "If a ballot must be scratched in order to cast a vote for these men—then scratch," ran the appeal of the last named.⁵⁵ According to the later judgment of a participant, the campaign "was a cross between a comedy and a tragedy. A political battle had never before been so miserably

⁵⁴ Bowers, *John Worth Kern*, 378-80.

⁵⁵ *Indianapolis News*, October 30, 1916, p. 1; November 4, p. 23. The October 17 issue of the *American Issue*, official organ of the Anti-Saloon League, announced that "Taggart and Adair Won't Do." Quoted in *Indianapolis News*, October 21, 1916, p. 2.

mismanaged in the history of the state accustomed for half a century to fierce fights."⁵⁶

Democratic speakers stressed the liberal legislation of the Wilson régime and pictured Hughes as the candidate of the "Interests." They made a special appeal to labor to stand by its friends and were in turn endorsed by most of the labor leaders. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, appeared in Indiana to urge the re-election of Wilson, and "Mother" Jones toured the coal mining section on behalf of Kern in particular.⁵⁷ Democratic campaigners bade the farmers consider the Smith-Lever Act, the rural credits law, and the current prices of wheat, corn, and hogs. They sought to attract Progressives by an appeal to the record of the past four years, and attempted to frighten them into the fold by holding up the picture of a state Republican party dominated by such conservatives as Goodrich, Watson, New, Fairbanks, and James A. Hemenway.⁵⁸

Democrats concentrated their main efforts on the twin appeal of "Peace and Prosperity," and placards bearing that slogan were distributed for telephone

⁵⁶ Bowers, *John Worth Kern*, 377. It was Bowers' belief that Indiana was lost to the Democrats primarily because of defects of organization and tactics. He divides the blame among the wealthier Democrats who refused their usual contributions, the Marion County and state organizations, and the national organization.

⁵⁷ *Indianapolis Union*, October 27, 1916, p. 1; *Evansville Courier*, September 5, 1916, p. 1. The State Federation of Labor was bitterly opposed to Watson, and called upon trade unionists to send him "down to such an overwhelming defeat as to serve notice on political parties for all time to come that if they want the support of the men of labor they must be more discriminating in the selection of their candidates." *Indianapolis Union*, October 6, 1916, p. 1.

⁵⁸ *Cannelton Telephone*, July 6, 1916, p. 1.

poles and parlors. On all its printed matter the Democratic State Committee used the slogan, "The nation is out of war; the state is out of debt. The Democrats did it."⁵⁹ Marshall in his acceptance speech asserted, "The real issue of this campaign is that thought which goes with the father to his work or business, which engrosses every mother, wife and sweetheart, which sits down with them at every fireside and goes to bed with them in every home—and that thought is 'Can the President of the United States continue to so patiently manage our international affairs as to maintain honorable peace?' "⁶⁰ Representative Barnhart told his public, "This 'Blessed night' in twenty million homes in America the fathers and mothers can gather their children about them and thank Woodrow Wilson for working heroically to preserve our honor and at the same time preserve peace and happiness in our country. . . . We have a president who thinks more of the value of your boy's lifeblood than he does of the speculative possessions of the Hearsts, Duponts, and Morgans in Mexico and who leads us in safety through shot and shell and hell all about us."⁶¹

"He kept us out of war." This was the favorite Democratic slogan. Like most slogans it was a condensation. It covered Mexico as well as Europe, and was effective because up to that time the American contention with regard to the submarine had been upheld without resort to war. It carried the implied promise that Wilson would conduct future policy along the same line. Personified, it meant the Wilson Method instead of the Roosevelt Method of foreign policy.

⁵⁹ Indianapolis *News*, September 4, 1916, p. 1.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1916, p. 1.

⁶¹ Plymouth *Democrat*, November 9, 1916, p. 1.

There was no implication that an arms embargo would be adopted or that American shipping rights would be in any way abrogated. Administration attitudes on those points had been unmistakably demonstrated in the tabling of the McLemore and Gore warning resolutions in March and in the exchange of "Sussex" notes in April and May. Each party vied with the other in its pledges to uphold American rights, and no party which advocated surrender could have been elected that autumn.

The Democrats' emphasis on peace made it possible for them to challenge the Republican claim to the pro-German vote. In his major speech of the campaign, Adair told his Fort Wayne audience that because the President had avoided war the German-Americans were not faced with the necessity of fighting their Fatherland.⁶² Over and over, Democratic editors asserted that if Hughes were elected, Theodore Roosevelt would probably be Secretary of State and soon would have the country at war with Germany.⁶³ German-born Congressman Lieb from the Evansville district delivered a long address in the House of Representatives urging German-American votes for Wilson; his speech was considered of sufficient importance to be printed in the Democratic campaign book.⁶⁴ The rift in the German vote was widened in the closing days of the campaign by a statement made by Hughes at Columbus, Indiana, on October 31. Asked by a member of the audience if he would favor

⁶² Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, August 19, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, August 19, 1916, p. 18.

⁶³ Decatur *Daily Democrat*, October 24, 1916, p. 2; Evansville *Courier*, June 28, 1916, p. 6.

⁶⁴ *Congressional Record*, 64 Congress, 1 session, pp. 11253-59.

an embargo on munitions or the passage of a resolution warning Americans not to travel on vessels of the belligerents, he put aside generalities. In unequivocal language he expressed his opposition to both.⁶⁵ Without doubt a majority of the professional German-Americans continued to work for Wilson's defeat, but more than ever it was a case of opposing Wilson rather than favoring Hughes.

Curiously, the exchange of telegrams between Wilson and Irish leader Jeremiah O'Leary was concurrently bringing pro-Allied support to the Democrats.⁶⁶ O'Leary, president of the American Truth Society, had sent Wilson an insultingly phrased telegram threatening him with political defeat because of his "truckling to the British Empire." Wilson replied forthrightly, "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans, and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them."

Election day, November 7, passed with less excitement than had been anticipated in Indiana. Precinct workers passed along the word that there was little "scratching" of tickets.⁶⁷ Nightfall brought the first telegraphic reports, and by ten o'clock a decided trend toward the Republicans was evident in state and nation. The papers of the following morning proclaimed the election of Hughes and Goodrich. Though a complete tabulation showed that Wilson had been re-elected President, Indiana remained in the Republican camp to the extent of its fifteen electoral votes,

⁶⁵ Indianapolis *News*, November 1, 1916, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Lucius B. Swift to Theodore Roosevelt, October 23, 1916, Swift Collection.

⁶⁷ Muncie *Evening Press*, November 8, 1916, p. 1; Indianapolis *News*, November 7, 1916, p. 1.

both United States Senators, nine of the thirteen Representatives, and the full state ticket.⁶⁸ Wilson led Kern and Taggart by almost 8,500 votes and lost the state by only 6,942. Probably because of the Wilson influence, Kern and Taggart led the Democratic candidates for state offices by between 1,500 and 2,000 votes. The Progressives polled only 3,898 votes for presidential electors and 4,573 for governor.⁶⁹ They had not held the balance of power.

Statehouse Democrats, when questioned by reporters, attributed their defeat chiefly to the Bell-Perrott machine in Indianapolis and Marion County, defection of the German vote, and mismanagement of the state campaign.⁷⁰ Marion County had given the Republicans a 5,500 majority. Without doubt a larger percentage than usual of the German-Americans had voted Republican. In 1912 Allen County had given the Democrats a majority of 990 over the combined Republican and Progressive votes, but in this year the Republican and Progressive total had exceeded the Democratic vote by 1,627, most of the gains coming in the German precincts of Fort Wayne.⁷¹ The German-American districts of Evansville, Richmond,

⁶⁸ The nine Republican Representatives were Oscar E. Bland, Everett Sanders, Daniel W. Comstock, Merrill Moores, Albert H. Vestal, Fred S. Purnell, William R. Wood, Milton Kraus, and Louis W. Fairfield. The Democrats were George K. Denton, William E. Cox, Lincoln Dixon, and Henry A. Barnhart.

⁶⁹ See the tables, *post*, 257-61, and Secretary of State of Indiana, *Biennial Report*, 1916, pp. 174-237.

⁷⁰ Indianapolis *News*, November 9, 1916, p. 1. Samuel V. Perrott was Indianapolis chief of police. With the German-Americans, the dry vote, the reform element, and the Negroes against them it is surprising that the Democrats ran as well as they did in Marion County. The Negro vote had been justifiably antagonized by Perrott's police methods of the past years.

⁷¹ See the table, *post*, 258.

Indianapolis, Hammond, La Porte, and other communities likewise gave increased totals to the Republicans,⁷² though nowhere in proportions as large as in Fort Wayne. Significantly, Wilson trailed the local Democratic ticket in these precincts though he led in the state as a whole. It is quite possible that Wilson lost enough German-American Democratic support to swing the electoral vote of the state against him. Part of the effect of this hyphenate vote must have been canceled, however, by an antihyphenate vote for the Democrats. Basically, the Republicans carried the state for reasons of local origin, as was demonstrated by the fact that their state and local candidates ran ahead of those on the Federal ticket. As one observer stated, "It was in the cards for the Republicans to carry the state largely on account . . . of the desire of the people for a change in the control of the state and local governments."⁷³ A conservative, Republican trend was under way that would be stronger by 1918 and a flood by 1920.

The campaign served to strengthen the existing trend of Indiana thought with regard to the war. Speakers of both parties had continued to support the American position of neutrality, but with lyric protestations of patriotism had pledged their maintenance of American rights under international law. When a new and stronger clash with Germany occurred, the entire Indiana Congressional delegation elected in this November voted for war.

⁷² See, for example, *Plymouth Democrat*, November 16, 1916, p. 4; *Hammond Lake County Times*, November 9, 1916, p. 1; *Evansville Courier*, November 9, 1916, p. 1; *Fort Wayne News*, November 9, 1916, p. 1; *Muncie Evening Press*, November 10, 1916, p. 6.

⁷³ *Plymouth Democrat*, November 16, 1916, p. 1.

X. INDIANA GOES TO WAR

THE LULL in the submarine controversy continued through the summer and autumn of 1916. In the weeks immediately following the election, the country seemed to be far from war and the public appeared to be even more neutral in thought than in earlier months. Editorials with an anti-German import were few and scattered, and, except for general warnings by those who were pushing for military conscription, there was little talk of the possibility of war. Prohibition, woman suffrage, religious revivals, and an abnormal rise in prices occupied most of the news space.

These casual impressions were misleading, however, for a categorical policy had been adopted with regard to the submarine, and the people took for granted that future controversies must begin where the "Sussex" exchange of views had left off. The spirit of nationalism had risen to the point where "too proud to fight" and "peace at any price" had become opprobrious phrases. The public still regarded the German Government as the embodiment of many undesirable ideological traits that western civilization was striving to surmount. Added substance was given to this viewpoint by the arbitrary deportation of Belgian men into Germany in November and December, 1916, to perform forced labor. About four hundred leading Indiana citizens joined in a statement to the President approving his protest against the deportations.¹

¹ Signatures included such names as Demarchus C. Brown, Evans Woollen, William Fortune, Lucius B. Swift, Booth Tarkington, Christopher B. Coleman, John H. Holliday, Dr. John N. Hurty, William P. Hapgood, Barton W. Cole, Hugh McK. Landon, Dr. John Courtland Van Camp, and George J. Marott. *Indianapolis News*, Decem-

Finally, economic prosperity had become definitely bound up with a continued flow of trade across the Atlantic Ocean to Allied ports. When a rapidly mounting cost of living led to a movement in some quarters for an embargo on exportation of food, it was impatiently rejected by Indiana's farm journals and organizations. The *Farmer's Guide* announced that the farmers would "oppose any legislation that would prevent them from sharing in the prosperity . . . coming to this country because of the war demands abroad."² A resolution adopted by the Indiana State Grange in December rejected such an embargo as "unfair and unjust to the American farmer and un-Christian to needy humanity."³ Thus, the necessary elements were present for war. They needed only to be brought into focus by challenging events.

On December 12, however, came news of a German proposal for a peace conference. The Indiana public recognized the unsatisfactory potentialities of the offer, but hoped for a series of bargaining maneuvers that would stop the killing and miraculously untangle America's complicated relations with the belligerents.⁴ As they had done before, editors generally

ber, 16, 1916, p. 4. The major effect of the "slave drives" was to recall the whole chain of German actions which the public had considered to be violations of moral law. See *Petersburg Press*, December 8, 1916, p. 4; *South Bend News-Times*, December 15, 1916, p. 6; *Indiana Farmer*, February 10, 1917, p. 12.

² *Farmer's Guide*, 28: 1434 (December 9, 1916). See also *Indiana Farmer*, December 16, 1916, p. 6; *Farm Life*, January, 1917, p. 7; *Purdue Agriculturist*, April, 1917, p. 45.

³ Forty-Sixth Annual Session of the Indiana State Grange, *Journal of Proceedings*, 1916, p. 59. See also Indiana Livestock Breeders' Association, *Thirteenth Annual Report*, 1917, p. 15; Indiana State Dairy Association, *Twenty-Seventh Annual Report*, 1917, p. 11.

⁴ *Ligonier Banner*, December 19, 1916, p. 2; *Huntington Herald*,

stated that now was no time for the United States to intrude with peace proposals of its own.⁵ But Wilson had long been preparing just such a move, and on December 18 he dispatched a note to all the warring powers requesting them to state their peace terms so that mankind might learn how near was the haven of peace for which all longed. He was not, he said, at this time offering mediation.⁶ The note's timing and impartiality of language raised resentment in the more intensely pro-Allied quarters: one cartoon showed Wilson inquiring of little Belgium, "What are *You* fighting for?"⁷ Most of the public, however, hoped for good results and manifested impatience toward uncompromising partisans of both sides. "A lot of people in this country, also will fight Germany down to the last Frenchman and Colonial," said the *Muncie Star*.⁸ A short time later the same editor asked in an equally satirical vein, "Would George Sylvester Viereck mind telling on what conditions he

December 14, 1916, p. 4; *Hobart News*, December 14, 1916, p. 4; *South Bend News-Times*, December 13, 1916, p. 8; *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, December 18, 1916, p. 4; *Plymouth Democrat*, December 14, 1916, p. 4.

⁵ *Lafayette Journal*, December 15, 1916, p. 6; *Evansville Courier*, December 15, 1916, p. 6; *South Bend Tribune*, December 18, 1916, p. 8. On December 22 the editor of the *Muncie Evening Press* remarked that just as he was getting set to write an editorial praising Wilson for not writing a peace proposal at this time he "goes and does it." December 22, 1916, p. 4.

⁶ For discussions of the peace efforts of this period, see particularly, Tansill, *America Goes to War*, Chap. XX, and John Bach McMaster, *The United States in the World War* (2 vols. New York, 1918, 1920), 1: Chap. XI. The first has the advantage of greater perspective, but McMaster's account deals more fully with American public reactions.

⁷ *Peru Evening Journal*, January 1, 1917, p. 1.

⁸ *Muncie Star*, December 14, 1916, p. 4.

would be willing to let the Central Powers make terms of peace?"⁹

Within a month it was evident that peace was not to be easily secured. The Germans, at the height of their conquests, were unwilling to purchase peace at the price of their gains, while the Allies were convinced that they could change the war map to their advantage in the coming year. Both still dreamed of a victor's peace.¹⁰

With this situation for a background, President Wilson appeared before the Senate on January 22, 1917, to sum up his views on America's present and future role in world affairs. To prevent future catastrophes, he said, the war must be followed by a "League for Peace" in which the United States should shoulder its proportionate responsibility. To give this league the maximum chance of success the coming peace "must be a peace without victory" and include such guarantees as freedom of the seas and self-determination of peoples. Thus, he argued, would the Monroe Doctrine become "the doctrine of the world." His suggestions as to desirable peace terms were favorably received by the Indiana editors, though some were skeptical of their practicality.¹¹ The proposal that the United States enter a concert of powers was viewed less enthusiastically, as being likely to lead to

⁹ *Muncie Star*, January 24, 1917, p. 4.

¹⁰ The Allies refused to enter a peace conference without a statement of enemy terms. The Germans clung to their plan for a conference and rejected Allied and American requests for a list of the requisites on which they were willing to make peace. They did, however, eventually transmit a list of terms for Wilson's secret perusal.

¹¹ *Williamsport Pioneer*, January 26, 1917, p. 4; *Indianapolis Star*, January 24, 1917, p. 6; *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, January 23, 1917, p. 8; *Waterloo Press*, January 25, 1917, p. 8.

“entangling alliances.”¹² As an augury for the future, one of the most significant effects of the President’s endorsement of a league was the resignation of Republican Henry Lane Wilson as head of the Indiana Branch of the League to Enforce Peace. He charged that the President had warped the movement and was seeking to use it for partisan advantage.¹³ He could have taken no other action, the Indianapolis *Star* noted approvingly, because the national organization had apparently “fallen under the spell of Watchful Waiting, with an apparent diversion of its aims in a partisan direction.”¹⁴ Political division of opinion toward American participation in a league of nations had begun.

Unknown to the participants, this discussion had been carried on under the shadow of events of greater immediate portent. On the day when the President spoke before the Senate, the German ambassador already had in his possession a communique stating that his Government had determined on unrestricted submarine warfare, and would initiate the drastic gamble on February 1. On the last day of January he delivered the note to the State Department, and the following morning the news was in Indiana. The lull in American relations with the Central Powers

¹² Columbus *Evening Republican*, January 23, 1917, p. 4; Kendallville *News-Sun*, January 26, 1917, p. 4; Winamac *Democrat-Journal*, January 26, 1917, p. 4.

¹³ Indianapolis *Star*, January 27, 1917, p. 1; Huntington *Press*, January 28, 1917, p. 4.

¹⁴ Indianapolis *Star*, January 29, 1917, p. 6. The Indianapolis *Indiana Daily Times* remarked that “Editors of Republican newspapers seem generally to be opposed to the League of Nations to Enforce Peace. They are against it because Woodrow Wilson is for it. If Wilson were against it they would find a lot of good in it.” January 31, 1916, p. 6.

had ended with startling suddenness. Henceforth, submarine commanders would attempt to sink all ships—American included—that entered specified zones of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Exception was made to the extent of one American ship a week in each direction, provided it fulfilled stipulations that were repugnant to a major power.¹⁵

A stir of excitement ran through Indiana. "Break with Berlin Near" ran a page-wide headline in the Fort Wayne *Sentinel*.¹⁶ The United States should abandon "empty threats," said the Muncie *Star*, and send the ambassador home "as an evidence of her intention to stand firmly for her rights and her faith."¹⁷ "Germany has had abundant warning from this government, more, as many people think, than she was entitled to," said the Indianapolis *News* in the same tenor. "She is entirely familiar with the position of this government and she knows that, in adopting the policy outlined in the note, she is traversing every principle insisted on by it. In plain words, her declaration is a clear note of defiance. There can be no negotiations in regard to it."¹⁸

The German-language *Telegraph und Tribune*, however, took the attitude that the Central Powers

¹⁵ The German order provided that there must be on this one ship's "hull and superstructure three vertical stripes, one meter wide each, to be painted alternately white and red. Each mast should show a large flag checkered white and red and the stern the American national flag. Care should be taken that, during dark, national flag and painted marks are easily recognizable from a distance, and that the boats are well lighted throughout." It was to follow the fiftieth parallel and dock only at Falmouth, arriving on Sunday and leaving on Wednesday.

¹⁶ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, February 1, 1917, p. 1.

¹⁷ Muncie *Star*, February 2, 1917, p. 4.

¹⁸ Indianapolis *News*, February 1, 1917, p. 6.

had followed the only course open to them after the Allies refused to enter into peace negotiations. The furor over the note, fumed this editor, was the work of the "Anglo-American press and millionaire munition manufacturers."¹⁹ The *Kendallville News-Sun*, which had extolled peace with crusading fervor for the past two and a half years, deplored the attitude of both the German-Americans and those who snorted and cavorted with Colonel Roosevelt. "Americans, apart from the war-mad crowd and the self-elected critics, will hope every minute that such wisdom will prevail at Washington that this long-threatening danger will pass us without harm. We want no war."²⁰ Although the *News-Sun* was probably more pacifist minded than was the general public at this point, it was unquestionably right in believing that a majority of the people hoped that the United States Government would not press the issue too rapidly and that Germany would in the meantime back down. Impatiently or fearfully, as the case might be, Hoosiers wondered what action their Government would take.

They did not have long to wait. On February 3, 1917, diplomatic relations between Germany and the United States were formally severed. The President announced, however, that America would await definite "overt acts" by Germany before taking further action. The Indiana House of Representatives, then in session, immediately interrupted the business at hand to sanction by unanimous vote "the

¹⁹ Indianapolis *Telegraph und Tribune*, February 1, 1917, p. 4; February 2, p. 4. See also the Fort Wayne *Freie Presse und Staats-Zeitung*, February 3, 1917, p. 4; Richmond *Palladium*, February 2, 1917, p. 4; Logansport *Journal-Tribune*, February 1, 1917, p. 6.

²⁰ Kendallville *News-Sun*, February 1, 1917, p. 1.

action of the President of the United States and express full confidence in his integrity and patriotism in the serious and trying situation" which confronted him.²¹ Social and patriotic organizations joined with editors in calling upon all to display the flag and close ranks.²² War and peace teetered on a razor-edge balance. As a Presbyterian minister told his Fort Wayne congregation, "The thrillingly terrible thing is this: While we were sleeping last night; while we are watching here this morning" the wanton attack may have come "that must mean war."²³ Yet there was very little hysteria.

The Columbus *Evening Republican* found satisfaction in the local state of mind. "The local situation, it is hoped, reflects the national feeling with reference to the threatened hostilities between Germany and America. People in this city have refused to grow excited. . . . If the people of Columbus are needed they will be ready, but in the meantime they are going about their business and treating their neighbors in a

²¹ Indiana *House Journal*, 1917, p. 258. The Senate was not in session on Saturday, February 3, but immediately upon convening on the following Monday, adopted a similar resolution. *Senate Journal*, 1917, pp. 455-56.

²² Lafayette *Courier*, February 3, 1917, p. 6; Fowler *Benton Review*, February 8, 1917, p. 1; Rockville *Republican*, February 14, 1917, p. 2; Goshen *Democrat*, February 7, 1917, p. 4; South Bend *Tribune*, February 5, 1917, p. 8; Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, February 8, 1917, p. 4; Huntington *Herald*, February 6, 1917, p. 4; Peru *Evening Journal*, February 3, 1917, p. 1; Angola *Steuben Republican*, February 14, 1917, p. 8; Muncie *Evening Press*, February 3, 1917, p. 4.

²³ Sermon of Rev. Henry B. Master, in Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, February 5, 1917, p. 14. Theodore Roosevelt was already making plans for the fateful day. On February 13 he wrote to an Indiana friend asking for names of two or three men fit for officers so that he could consider them in the event of war, should he be allowed to raise a division. "I would love to have some Indiana men," he said. Roosevelt to Swift, February 13, 1917, Swift Collection.

neighborly way. Mouth fighting never won a very big war anyhow.’’²⁴ That a sense of humor had not been submerged entirely was demonstrated by one editor’s remark: “If it must be, we hope the Germans’ll pick out a ship with a simple name to make the cause of war. Wouldn’t it be awful to have to cry ‘Remember the Kristianiafjord!’?”²⁵

The cessation of diplomatic relations had radically altered the position of the German-Americans. For over two years they had held before them the belief that American sentiment in favor of the Allies was an Anglo-American sentiment, fostered by eastern socialites, the “Anglo-American” press, munition makers, Wall Street, and English propaganda. Consequently they now found it hard to adjust themselves to the new situation of the United States versus Germany. Most of them, however, succeeded in doing so, and though they pleaded for peace they hastened to promise full loyalty to their adopted country if war came. The influential German-controlled North American Gymnastic Union from its Indianapolis headquarters called on its constituents to remember that America was their country “should the stern call of duty be heard.” In the meantime, they were advised to “support President Wilson in all efforts intended to prevent the present situation from culminating in war.”²⁶ The fulminations of the vociferous few who found the adjustment impossible made it more instead of less difficult for the majority of Indiana citizens to maintain a reasoned attitude toward Germany.

²⁴ Columbus *Evening Republican*, February 6, 1917, p. 4.

²⁵ Peru *Evening Journal*, February 14, 1917, p. 4.

²⁶ Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, February 6, 1917, p. 6.

Days passed and no ship sinking occurred that constituted a clear-cut "overt act." Hope revived that perhaps America's door had not been marked by the "blood of the lamb." Tension relaxed a little. A Negro editor pledging the loyalty of the colored people, prayed that the President, in his great wisdom, might "with honor, maintain a peaceful attitude and refuse to be drawn into this world-wide conflict."²⁷ The Williamsport *Pioneer* on February 16 admitted that the people were ready for war if Germany forced the issue, but added: "Sherman had the right name for war and that is not what we Americans want. If America can honorably retain her neutral relations with Germany it will be done."²⁸

In part, the absence of war-provoking acts had resulted from the simple fact that American shippers had been afraid to risk their valuable cargoes and ships upon the high seas. In order to break this virtual blockade, the President asked Congress on February 26 for authority to supply American merchant ships with defensive arms. The request met practically no opposition in the House, but in the Senate a small, determined minority led by Robert La Follette and William J. Stone launched a filibuster to prevent its passage in the few days remaining of the "lame duck" session. Considering the significance of the step, the debate attracted comparatively little interest in Indiana in its opening phases.²⁹ But the loss of American lives on the Cunarder "Laconia" and the disclosure of the Zimmermann note brought new

²⁷ Indianapolis *World*, February 17, 1917, p. 4.

²⁸ Williamsport *Pioneer*, February 16, 1917, p. 2.

²⁹ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, February 27, 1917, p. 4; Columbus *Evening Republican*, March 1, 1917, p. 4.

interest in the measure, and opinion swung against the filibusterers as "obstructionists." A majority of the public was inclined to agree with Wilson that "A little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible." Cartoons pictured Uncle Sam being stabbed in the back as he went out to defend his own.³⁰ The filibusterers "prevented a majority of 8 to 1 from doing its duty in this national emergency," wrote an aroused editor.³¹ Yet the minority who supported the "little group of willful men" was stronger in Indiana than in the Eastern states. Partisan divisions were more pronounced than in the East, and many wanted to make sure that if war came there could be no question as to which party initiated it. There was some hesitancy about giving "the Franklin Steamship Company or some other interested party, the right to give the word when the first shot shall be fired."³² In the end the filibusterers had their way in the Senate, but assured by the Department of Justice that he possessed the necessary authority, Wilson began to arm the American merchantmen by executive order.

With war threatening, the German Government turned to America's potential enemies for aid. At the height of the dispute over arming of merchant

³⁰ Peru *Evening Journal*, March 10, 1917, p. 1.

³¹ Huntington *Press*, March 6, 1917, p. 4. See also Fowler *Benton Review*, March 8, 1917, p. 1; Kentland *Newton County Enterprise*, March 15, 1917, p. 4; Fort Wayne *Journal-Gazette*, March 6, 1917, p. 4; Huntington *Herald*, March 6, 1917, p. 4; Ligonier *Banner*, March 6, 1917, p. 2; South Bend *Tribune*, March 5, 1917, p. 8; Indianapolis *News*, March 6, 1917, p. 4; Winamac *Democrat-Journal*, March 9, 1917, p. 4.

³² Kendallville *News-Sun*, March 6, 1917, p. 4.

vessels, the papers of March 1, 1917, carried the news of a projected alliance of Germany, Mexico, and Japan against the United States that was contained in an intercepted note from German Foreign Secretary Alfred Zimmermann to the German Minister to Mexico. In the event of war between Germany and the United States, the communique proposed "an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona." Furthermore, the Minister was instructed to suggest to the President of Mexico that he should "communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan."

The effect of this proposal on Indiana opinion was to link Villa, the yellow peril, and Prussian militarism and to channel American animosity toward all three in the direction of the German Foreign Office.³³ It pretty well cut the ground from under the German-Americans who had missed no opportunity to picture Germany as the defender of white civilization and had attacked England for allying herself with the yellow race. So well did the note fit the propaganda purposes of the Allies that German-Americans gen-

³³ *Lafayette Courier*, March 1, 1917, p. 6. See also *Fort Wayne Sentinel*, March 1, 1917, p. 4; *Anderson Bulletin*, March 1, 1917, p. 4; *Gary Post-Tribune*, March 1, 1917, p. 4; *Evansville Courier*, March 1, 1917, p. 6; *Indianapolis Star*, March 2, 1917, p. 4; *Muncie Evening Press*, March 1, 1917, p. 4; *Huntington Herald*, March 1, 1917, p. 4; *Huntington Press*, March 2, 1917, p. 4; *Fowler Benton Review*, March 8, 1917, p. 1; *Indianapolis News*, March 1, 1917, p. 6; *Marion Chronicle*, March 2, 1917, p. 4.

PLOT AGAINST U. S. REVEALED

EXTRA FORT WAYNE JOURNAL-GAZETTE EXTRA
THIRTEEN PAGES (BY ASSOCIATED PRESS) PRICE TWO CENTS

Plan Divulged to Set Japan and Mexico Against America

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28.—The Associated Press is enabled to reveal that Germany, in planning unrestricted submarine warfare and counting its consequences, proposed an alliance with Japan and Mexico to make war on the United States, if this country should not remain neutral. Japan, through Mexican mediation, was to be urged to abandon her allies and join in the attack on the United States. Mexico, for her reward, was to receive general financial support from Germany to reconquer Texas, New Mexico and Arizona—lost provinces—and share in the victorious terms Germany contemplated. Details were left to German Minister von Eckhardt in Berlin City, who by instructions signed by German Foreign Minister Zimmermann, at Berlin, January 19, 1917, was directed to propose the alliance with Mexico to General Carranza and urge Mexico seek to bring Japan into the plot. These instructions were transmitted to von Eckhardt through Count von Bernstorff, former German ambassador here, now on his way home to Germany on a safe conduct obtained from his enemies by the country against which he was plotting war. Germany pictured to Mexico, by broad intimation, England and the entente allies defeated; Germany and her allies triumphant and in world domination by the instrument of unrestricted submarine warfare. A copy of Zimmermann's instructions to von Eckhardt, sent through von Bernstorff, is in possession of the United States government. The copy is as follows:

COPY OF DOCUMENT

BERLIN, Jan. 19, 1917.—On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful we propose an alliance with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement. You are instructed to inform the president of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the president of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan, at same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. Please call to the attention of the president of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

(Signed) ZIMMERMANN

Plan Kept Secret

This document has been in the hands of the government since President Wilson broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. It has been kept secret while the president has been asking congress for full authority to deal with Germany, and while congress has been hesitating. It was in the president's hands while Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg was declaring that the United States had placed an interpretation on the submarine declaration "never intended by Germany" and that Germany had promised and honored friendly relations with the United States "as an heirloom from Frederick the Great."

Of itself, if there were no other, it is considered a sufficient answer to the German chancellor's claim that the United States "involuntarily" broke off relations without giving "authentic" reasons for its action.

TO PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR MORE POWER IS PASSING RAPIDLY

Death of Two Americans on Board Has Changed Situation Among the Members of Congress May Act Today

RELEASE OF FOUR AMERICAN CONSULS

Consuls of the United States in Germany are being released. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened.

BULLETIN

The Bulletin of the United States in Germany is being released. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened.

Today's News

The Bulletin of the United States in Germany is being released. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened.

REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES LEAD IN THE PROTEST

Senator La Follette opens a single-handed filibuster in upper house. Wisconsin Man Starts Debate Against Armed Neutrality Bill. But is Later Induced to Withdraw Objections and Agree to Report Tomorrow; Stormy Night Session.

THE WEATHER

The weather in the Fort Wayne area is expected to be clear and cool. The temperature is expected to range from 30 to 40 degrees Fahrenheit.

SENATOR LAFOLLETTE OPENS A SINGLE-HANDED FILIBUSTER IN UPPER HOUSE

Wisconsin Man Starts Debate Against Armed Neutrality Bill. But is Later Induced to Withdraw Objections and Agree to Report Tomorrow; Stormy Night Session.

BULLETIN

The Bulletin of the United States in Germany is being released. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened. The release of the four American consuls in Germany is being hastened.

REPUBLICAN COLLEAGUES LEAD IN THE PROTEST

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erally condemned it as a British forgery until its authenticity was acknowledged by the German Government.³⁴ More than ever, war waited only on a submarine act that would constitute a direct challenge.

The people had grown a little more tense than formerly, a little more impatient of German-American criticisms, and most of the daily papers were advocating universal conscription. Yet they remained relatively calm. They still hoped for a change in German policy that would forestall war, but, as had been the case since February 1, they were willing to accept what came. They still preferred that the first blows be left to Germany.

While they waited for those blows, extraordinary news arrived from Russia. A mid-March revolution had forced the Czar's Government to give way to a provisional republic. Thereby, one more barrier to America's siding with the Allies was removed. From the first days of the war there had been a tendency on the part of many Hoosiers to view the struggle as one between democracy and autocracy. But the picture of autocratic Russia fighting beside her more democratic Western Allies had pointed up the fact that not all monarchical and militaristic nations were

³⁴ George Sylvester Viereck asserted, "The letter is unquestionably a brazen forgery, planted by some British agents to stampede us into an alliance and to justify violations of the Monroe Doctrine by Great Britain." Quoted in *Columbus Evening Republican*, March 5, 1917, p. 4. The *Indianapolis Telegraph and Tribune*, March 2, 1917, thought the "contents and tone of the letter give the impression that it was written by someone other than a German. It doesn't go into detail for one thing. Germany would not be so foolish as to make such a proposal. . . ." The editor urged all readers to write or telegraph Indiana Congressmen on behalf of peace. Ten sample telegrams were printed for this purpose, each ending in a plea for a special session of Congress to serve as a check on the President.

on the same side. Now only the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs seemed to bar the path to a republican Europe, and they appeared to be endangered. "There is not a king in Europe whose crown is as firmly set on his head as it was a week ago," judged one contemporary. "The influence of the movement has been felt in Germany and Austria Hungary . . .'"³⁵ American belligerency on the side of the Allies might possibly constitute the extra weight needed to defeat the remaining autocratic nations and thus make the world a safe place for democratic principles.

Meanwhile, the submarine controversy was hastening to its close. On March 15 the public learned that the American steamer "Algonquin" had been destroyed by shell fire from a German submarine. Four days later the news came that the "Vigilancia," the "Illinois," and the "City of Memphis" had been sunk without warning. Fifteen lives were lost in the sinking of the "Vigilancia." All three ships were American owned and manned; two were homeward bound in ballast. They were unarmed. No extenuating circumstances were present to confuse the issue. Spontaneously the conviction took hold throughout the state that "As sure as sun-up, as certain as nightfall, it is coming."³⁶ Many went a step further. "There is no getting away from the plain facts of the situation. A state of war now exists between the United

³⁵ Indianapolis *News*, March 19, 1917, p. 8. See also the Salem *Democrat*, March 21, 1917, p. 2; Columbus *Evening Republican*, March 21, 1917, p. 4; Muncie *Star*, March 17, 1917, p. 4; Evansville *Courier*, March 19, 1917, p. 4; Huntington *Herald*, March 20, 1917, p. 4. Editor Tamm of the Indianapolis *Telegraph and Tribune* hastened to assure his German readers that "In Russia the monarchy rested on the lash. In Germany the strength of the monarchy is in the hearts of the people." March 19, 1917, p. 4.

³⁶ Elkhart *Truth*, March 27, 1917, p. 4.

States and Germany.”³⁷ “The destruction of our unarmed merchant men going about their business on the high seas is an act of warfare against us.”³⁸ “Berlin is making no pretense of avoiding war with America.”³⁹

Those professional circles whose members had been moving gradually toward American participation in the war since its opening days in 1914 took the lead in the mobilization of opinion. In Indianapolis they organized a mass meeting at Tomlinson Hall on March 31 that enthusiastically approved resolutions calling for an “immediate declaration” of war and “universal compulsory military service.”⁴⁰

A letter from Louis Howland, pro-Allied editor of the Indianapolis *News*, to the state’s leading interventionist portrays opinion among the mass of Hoosiers and reveals the impatience felt by the war hawks. “In a little way my job during the past two years has been not unlike that of the President of the United States, namely one of getting and keeping our people together. And it has been one of enormous difficulty. Men have been talking of demanding that Congress should declare war, but what would have been the good of such a declaration by a mere majority, or even by a two-thirds vote? To be of any effect it must be practically unanimous. That we are likely

³⁷ Peru *Evening Journal*, March 22, 1917, p. 4. See also Evansville *Courier*, March 19, 1917, p. 4; Ligonier *Banner*, March 23, 1917, p. 2; Plymouth *Republican*, March 29, 1917, p. 4; Warsaw *Northern Indianian*, March 22, 1917, p. 4; Waterloo *Press*, March 22, 1917, p. 8; Salem *Democrat*, March 21, 1917, p. 2; Kokomo *Daily Tribune*, March 21, 1917, p. 6; Rensselaer *Jasper County Democrat*, March 24, 1917, p. 2; Indianapolis *News*, March 21, 1917, p. 6.

³⁸ Kentland *Newton County Enterprise*, March 22, 1917, p. 4.

³⁹ Fort Wayne *Sentinel*, March 19, 1917, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Indianapolis *News*, March 24, 1917, p. 1; March 31, p. 1.

to get. . . . I think he [Wilson] is entirely right in seeking to get a mandate from the American people, and this I think is now almost wholly his. An American army in Belgium would make my heart rejoice. And maybe that will come. That, at any rate, is my hope and prayer. For the war is one between civilization and barbarism, and we should stand for civilization."⁴¹

Howland's implied dubiousness concerning the possibility of an American expeditionary force to Europe was well founded, for at that time the average Indiana citizen did not anticipate that the United States would send a large army to the French front.⁴² There was still only limited enthusiasm for the Allies. Mistaking this reticence for wavering opinion, the Emergency Peace Federation sent a patronizing appeal to the people of the West from its Eastern headquarters to save the country from war. "You in the West do not realize how we are being stampeded into war, a war that will mean a butchery of the flower of our youth."⁴³ But such appeals foundered on the failure to devise a logical alternative at this late date. Citing the many notes that had been written and the country's restraint in awaiting overt acts, the majority believed that the United States had been more than patient. The *Kendallville News-Sun*, whose vigorous pacifist tendencies have been noted, judged

⁴¹ Howland to Lucius B. Swift, March 22, 1917, Swift Collection.

⁴² *Plymouth Democrat*, March 29, 1917, p. 4; *Oxford Gazette*, March 23, 1917, p. 1; *Columbus Evening Republican*, April 3, 1917, p. 4; *Fowler Benton Review*, April 5, 1917, p. 2.

⁴³ *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, March 30, 1917, p. 12. The *South Bend News-Times* refused to run this paid advertisement because of its condescending attitude toward "us backwoodsmen out here" and because "we have no aid, comfort, or encouragement to lend to the emperor of Germany," March 31, 1917, p. 4.

as early as March 21 that "whatever happens now . . . the people of the United States may justly feel that this government comes under no fair accusation of not having tried to maintain its neutral relations toward belligerents."⁴⁴ America, said Governor Goodrich, "can not with honor stay out any longer."⁴⁵

On April 2 Congress met in special session to consider the course to be taken. The decision, said one editor, will be war. "But this step is taken reluctantly. Uncle Sam is not a fighting man. His ways are the ways of peace and his people are a peaceful people. . . . Out here in the Middle West, where folks are, perhaps, saner, more level headed and harder to arouse, the people are facing the East and listening for the final word. They will not meet a declaration of war joyously and with a smile on their lips. Rather will they meet it with a deep feeling of responsibility, a feeling that if the test has come they must meet it and be men."⁴⁶

That day the President called for war in a speech that was glowingly approved by the local press. On April 4 Indiana's two Senators, Watson and New, joined the overwhelming Senate majority in voting for war,⁴⁷ and on the following day all of the state's thirteen Representatives voted the same way.⁴⁸ The unanimity of Indiana's Congressmen (11 Republicans,

⁴⁴ Kendallville *News-Sun*, March 21, 1917, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Indianapolis *News*, March 28, 1917, p. 1. A week earlier, Senator Harry S. New had said, "In my judgment the United States has been in a state of war with Germany for several months, but since the attacks reported last Sunday the situation has become so acute that a realization of the fact that war actually exists can not be escaped by the most ardent pacifist." *Ibid.*, March 22, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Columbus *Evening Republican*, April 2, 1917, p. 4.

⁴⁷ *Congressional Record*, 65 Congress, special session, p. 261.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 413.

4 Democrats) was indisputable evidence of the basic war sentiment in the state. However, there was but little of the singing, shouting, enthusiasm that had characterized the country's entry into the Spanish-American War or had been so pronounced among the peoples of the European belligerents in August, 1914. The public had read too much of the ways of modern warfare to regard it as an exciting and gay adventure. "War is a serious business," said the *Vincennes Capital*, "and we are entering upon it seriously, even grimly. We have gone in prompted by the consciousness of a duty that should not be avoided simply because it involves sacrifices."⁴⁹

Throughout the past two and a half years the people of Indiana had been slow to define America's exact relation to the great war. Basically, their uncertainty resulted from lack of agreement on a foreign policy for the United States as a world power. Had they believed in 1914 that the time had come for America to take a hand in balance-of-power politics, or had they favored a policy of collective security, or had they agreed on any other definite world policy, they would have possessed a standard with which to determine their role in a world at war. But inasmuch as they lacked such a single, comprehensive gauge they viewed the struggle from divergent angles, making it difficult at a later date to catch and hold an elusive public opinion.

The people had a number of inherited guide lines, however, which they followed in forming their judgment of the war. One of the most firmly established was the traditional American policy of neutrality toward European quarrels. This principle, it was

⁴⁹ *Vincennes Capital*, April 6, 1917, p. 4.

NOW THEN



Indianapolis News, April 5, 1917

assumed in 1914, would govern the country's relations with the combatants and keep the peace. But during the succeeding two and a half years other factors gradually broke down this position. Most important among those factors was the failure of the "European war" to stay in Europe. It intruded upon American national interests in the three different aspects of the submarine controversy, sabotage, and the belief that a German victory would place her in a position where she could move against the Western Hemisphere. Beyond doubt the submarine dispute was of prime importance in shaping opinion, and without this element it is difficult to conceive that the Middle West would have become sufficiently aroused to support war. Concern over the balance of power constituted the beginnings of a new American foreign policy, but in 1917 it was more in evidence in the State Department and among the Eastern journalists than in Indiana. Yet a few in the state did stress this element, and it is probable that a less vocal but larger number felt an undefined fear of German victory.

A second general factor that broke down peace sentiment was a positive nationalism, evident in some aspects of the preparedness movement, that caused the United States to advance to meet the war. A third influence was that of democratic ideology. Participation in a war "to make the world safe for democracy" was a new interpretation of an old concept of America's democratic mission. This factor alone would not have resulted in war—but it helped to bring about that result. These people had not had the edge of their optimism blunted by previous attempts along that line. This motive was not unassociated with patriotism, for American nationalism to

a considerable degree had been built around the philosophy of democratic government. A fourth factor conditioning America's attitude was moral judgment. The evangelistic tendency flows deep among the American people, and the nation was strong enough to afford moral judgments when picking its international friends. David Starr Jordan, who opposed war to the very last, was to write at a later date that "as regards the country at large, our final participation was wholly altruistic. Certain interests promoted it for selfish purposes, but these did not sway people in general"⁵⁰ Finally, economic interests, large and small, helped put the nation in a position where war followed as a natural result, though very few expected to profit from the war itself. Allied propaganda contributed to the final decision by accentuating many of the other factors. But the seeds of propaganda bear fruit only when they fall on receptive soil.

Except for references to national rights on the sea, the majority of the people made little effort to relate their war participation to past and future American foreign policy. Their failure was of little consequence in the prosecution of the war, for they agreed well enough on the immediate target. But what was unessential in war might be crucial in making peace.

⁵⁰ Jordan, *Days of a Man*, 2:675.

APPENDIX

ELECTION TOTALS, 1916

COMPARATIVE TOTALS FOR 1916*

Office	Democrats	Republicans	Progressives
First Presidential Elec- tor	334,063	341,005	3,898
Senator, long term (Kern v. New).....	325,588	337,089	4,272
Senator, short term (Taggart v. Watson)	325,577	335,193	4,798
Governor (Adair v. Goodrich)	325,060	337,831	4,573
Secretary of State (Cook v. Jackson)....	323,686	337,851	4,543
Thirteen Members of the House of Represent- atives	321,974	342,740	10,575

* Secretary of State of Indiana, *Biennial Report*, 1916, pp. 174-208.

INDIANA VOTE BY COUNTIES, 1912-1916*

Counties	First Pres. Elector 1912		U. S. Senator 1914†		First Pres. Elector 1916	
	Dem.	Rep.	Prog.	Dem.	Rep.	Prog.
Adams	2961	917	732	2907	1796	7
Allen	8659	3423	4246	8210	10169	928
Bartholomew ..	3147	1321	1604	2888	3287	40
Benton	1425	1030	796	1344	1872	6
Blackford	1651	399	1163	1528	1595	4
Boone	3280	1181	2014	3020	3333	37
Brown	909	305	253	885	506
Carroll	2275	1467	926	2246	2458	5
Cass	4421	1573	3094	4185	4879	13
Clark	3315	805	2453	3727	3173	7
Clay	3297	1494	1614	3175	3102	14
Clinton	3255	2182	1281	3139	3638	8
Crawford	1159	663	542	1306	1201	4
Daviess	2759	2005	1061	2608	3191	21
Dearborn	2957	1366	701	2722	2318	5
Decatur	2946	1263	1436	2147	2717	16
De Kalb	2766	1125	1623	3083	2898	8
Delaware	4313	2018	4059	4420	6919	46
Dubois	3059	666	606	3068	1492	5

Elkhart	4300	1199	4533	4318	1890	3825	5723	5850	13
Fayette	1455	1030	1214	1562	1446	980	2074	2360	21
Floyd	3236	669	2580	3541	1003	1808	3850	3200	9
Fountain	2499	1560	1067	2197	2157	850	2437	2634	149
Franklin	2306	929	630	2113	1143	449	2426	1495	12
Fulton	2022	1427	694	1935	1853	585	2231	2325	119
Gibson	3250	2266	1270	3121	2665	1124	3765	3576	17
Grant	4390	3939	2185	4301	4444	1728	5827	6059	31
Greene	3373	2156	1563	3329	2718	1317	3990	3878	29
Hamilton	2463	2247	1834	2388	2786	1443	2799	3951	21
Hancock	2594	738	1375	2335	1226	1054	2779	2138	11
Harrison	2106	900	1219	2081	1336	904	2373	2086	18
Hendricks	2372	1439	1495	2168	2111	1165	2453	3046	18
Henry	2687	2479	1550	2652	3067	1270	3560	4386	165
Howard	2824	2152	2184	2590	3471	1118	3934	4777	12
Huntington	3119	2108	1586	3103	2967	1121	3833	3761	21
Jackson	3225	921	1236	2603	1488	852	3312	2422	5
Jasper	1292	1238	694	1230	1597	606	1488	1995	5
Jay	2786	1282	1596	2809	1937	988	3070	3075	7
Jefferson	2325	1563	943	2264	2197	476	2518	2675	11
Jennings	1577	955	839	1594	1175	647	1686	1791	9
Johnson	2890	924	1408	2509	1657	827	3108	2428	35
Knox	4448	2805	1316	4548	3707	765	5380	4805	11
Kosciusko	2817	1767	2096	2834	3039	1081	3447	4025	15
La Grange	1233	758	1402	1230	1357	891	1512	1958	11
Lake	5136	5176	5659	4938	8609	4021	9946	13262	60
La Porte	4847	2701	2749	4696	4644	885	5276	5726	14
Lawrence	2579	1633	2106	2465	2909	1215	3108	3813	21
Madison	6676	1771	4751	6201	3015	4526	8106	7449	18
Marion	29805	12280	18396	21962	24979	11442	35043	40699	177

INDIANA VOTE BY COUNTIES—Continued

Counties	First Pres. Elector 1912			U. S. Senator 1914†			First Pres. Elector 1916		
	Dem.	Rep.	Prog.	Dem.	Rep.	Prog.	Dem.	Rep.	Prog.
Marshall	2859	1196	1490	2844	1539	1158	3221	2855	22
Martin	1440	975	553	1330	1208	415	1549	1534	2
Miami	3366	1426	1995	3280	2165	1422	3854	3390	75
Monroe	2396	1388	1497	2298	2208	987	2796	3033	32
Montgomery	3321	2747	1246	3722	3314	910	4107	4300	41
Morgan	2608	1353	1236	2447	2092	934	2616	2860	20
Newton	965	892	633	1094	1183	475	1278	1377	155
Noble	2888	1443	1760	2744	2315	878	3069	3417	4
Ohio	553	406	120	560	516	39	632	597	1
Orange	1830	1521	849	1951	2037	499	2091	2481	15
Owen	1621	711	784	1687	867	674	1812	1585	14
Parke	2031	1891	684	2095	2227	530	2329	2598	9
Perry	1931	520	1130	1988	688	989	2089	1762	11
Pike	1984	1515	489	2087	1801	298	2212	2172	4
Porter	1352	1510	1241	1442	2178	1082	1871	2913	21
Posey	2767	1193	745	2604	1719	473	2922	2291	5
Pulaski	1250	729	586	1335	1066	399	1387	1474	203
Putnam	2922	1354	1079	2699	1593	990	2965	2453	21
Randolph	2158	1988	2471	2026	2590	2039	2682	4054	68
Ripley	2431	1492	884	2421	2004	574	2549	2686	13

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Rush	2312	1931	1075	2186	2248	979	2569	2950	21
Scott	1033	327	531	942	507	329	1068	802	5
Shelby	3432	1254	1969	3342	1974	1413	3900	3201	35
Spencer	2428	1268	1142	2268	1878	723	2335	2560	14
Starke	1208	787	696	1261	1237	395	1334	1550	1
Steuben	1266	1290	1210	1214	1825	688	1427	2418	6
St. Joseph	5391	3146	5240	7177	4438	2766	9709	7961	371
Sullivan	3707	1406	1068	3526	1891	678	3880	2630	16
Switzerland	1342	882	322	1336	1110	96	1446	1214
Tippecanoe	4442	3006	2838	4277	4082	1782	4918	6386	40
Tipton	2185	1262	914	2126	1674	647	2337	2166	7
Union	705	643	342	691	771	251	826	997	3
Vanderburgh	7219	4839	2738	8287	7039	1194	10028	9966	43
Vermillion	1780	1621	680	1817	2357	373	2343	2607	4
Vigo	7256	3103	4988	9346	6318	2420	11165	8934	103
Wabash	2371	1363	2432	2394	2282	1668	3168	3849	25
Warren	872	1183	695	839	1501	426	1011	1823	5
Warrick	2218	1421	819	2107	1786	738	2244	2396	159
Washington	2233	712	1113	2163	1013	855	2414	1871	7
Wayne	3806	1851	4457	3342	2920	3923	5007	6112	42
Wells	2760	812	1080	2496	972	827	2928	1947	6
White	2059	1613	822	1987	1903	704	2262	2442	6
Whitley	2206	1082	990	2246	1633	423	2510	2191	4
Totals	281890	151267	162007	272249	226766	108581	334063	341005	3898

*Secretary of State of Indiana, *Biennial Report*, 1912, pp. 92-93; 1914, pp. 140-41; 1916, pp. 174-75. Prohibition totals for the three years were 19,249, 13,860, and 16,368. Socialist totals for the three years were 36,931, 21,719, and 21,855.

† Votes for Benjamin F. Shively, Hugh Th. Miller, and Albert J. Beveridge. The remainder of the Progressive ticket fell short of Beveridge's vote by about 18,000.

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